WISECHECKER · SERVICE DESK

Service outages: impact, recovery & what to do

Understand a reported outage before changing your setup. Selected official reports, explained with the affected features, regions and safe next steps.

Editorial review ·

Review target: every 6 hours. This is a selected editorial bulletin, not an exhaustive or continuous live feed.

Review overdue — treat the entries as last-known reports and check the official sources for the current situation.

Times use your device’s time zone when JavaScript is available; UTC is also shown. Date-only source stamps have no inferred time.
GitHub CopilotInvestigating

GitHub investigates MAI Code 2 Flash availability in Copilot

Who / what is affected
MAI Code 2 Flash in Copilot products and IDE surfaces

GitHub’s November 18 09:00 UTC notice reports degraded availability of the MAI Code 2 Flash model in Copilot products and IDE surfaces. It attributes this to an upstream model-provider issue and is working with that provider. The incident remains Investigating, without an explicit recovery time or closure.

Safe next step

GitHub recommends choosing another model or selecting Copilot Fusion to continue using Copilot. Use an option available to your account and retain continuing errors and times for established support.

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Mercado Pago Checkout ProReported resolved

Mercado Pago resolves Checkout Pro degradation

Who / what is affected
Online Payments – Checkout Pro; affected countries unspecified

Mercado Pago reported degraded Checkout Pro performance at 03:10 UTC on November 18 and explicitly resolved this incident at 03:42 UTC. The affected Checkout Pro component is Operational in the current incident record. The notice does not identify countries or establish an outage across all payment products.

Safe next step

Check the actual payment and order state before submitting again to avoid duplicate attempts. Keep continuing errors and transaction times for established Mercado Pago support.

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Mercado Pago QR OrdersReported resolved

Mercado Pago resolves QR Orders API degradation

Who / what is affected
In-store payments QR Orders API; affected countries unspecified

At 03:13 UTC on November 18, Mercado Pago reported QR Orders API degradation that could affect 5xx errors, abandonment anomalies and QR Orders notification lag. It explicitly resolved the incident at 03:22 UTC, and the QR Orders component is Operational in the current record.

Safe next step

Verify the actual order/payment and notification state before repeating requests. Keep continuing errors, order identifiers and times for established Mercado Pago support.

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inntoReported resolved

innto restores operations after access-restriction errors

Who / what is affected
Facilities using innto: display, operation and equipment such as settlement terminals

The November 18 notice reports that an access-restriction message prevented innto display/operation and equipment operation from around 01:00 to 09:10 local time. Its 09:17 update says a fix was applied at 09:10 and operation has recovered. The issuer says it will provide further information about what happened.

Safe next step

If the display has not recovered, refresh the page and follow innto’s browser-cache clearing guidance. Contact established innto support if symptoms continue beyond the stated recovery time.

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Cloudflare India networkReported resolved

Cloudflare resolves disruption across multiple India datacenters

Who / what is affected
Multiple Cloudflare datacenters in India; some Cloudflare services in the region

Cloudflare reported a network disruption across multiple datacenters in India at 08:04 UTC on November 18, affecting some regional services. It identified the issue, implemented a fix at 08:38 UTC and explicitly resolved this incident at 08:46 UTC. The notice does not identify every affected service or establish an outage throughout India.

Safe next step

Verify the actual request or service result before retrying. Keep continuing errors, locations and times for established Cloudflare support.

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Cloudflare Network Interconnect ParisReported resolved

Cloudflare resolves Paris CNI performance incident

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare Network Interconnect (CNI) only, in Paris, France

Cloudflare reported Paris network-performance issues at 03:39 UTC on November 18. At 03:57 UTC it said a fix was implemented and explicitly clarified that only Cloudflare Network Interconnect was impacted. It resolved the incident at 04:51 UTC.

Safe next step

Check the affected CNI connection and actual traffic result. Keep continuing errors, connection details and times for established Cloudflare support.

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Cloudflare MumbaiReported resolved

Cloudflare resolves Mumbai 5xx errors and latency

Who / what is affected
A subset of customers reaching Mumbai, India

Cloudflare’s exact notice says a subset of customers reaching Mumbai may have experienced increased 5xx errors and latency between 02:31 and 03:04 UTC on November 18. It explicitly states this is resolved. This is a separate incident from the later disruption across multiple India datacenters.

Safe next step

Verify the actual request result before retrying. Keep continuing errors, request identifiers and times for established Cloudflare support.

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Claude Google Docs connectorReported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude restores Google Docs connector editing

Who / what is affected
Google Docs editing through claude.ai, Claude Code and Claude Cowork; reading unaffected

Anthropic resolved this incident at 01:44 UTC on November 18. Editing documents through the Google Docs connector was affected from 00:19 to 01:33 UTC; reading documents was unaffected. A fix entered monitoring at 01:40 UTC before the explicit closure.

Safe next step

Check whether the intended edit was saved before repeating it. Keep continuing errors and times for established Claude support.

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IIJmio Type A eSIMReported resolved

Needs recheck

IIJmio restores Type A eSIM profile downloads

Who / what is affected
IIJmio Gigaplan Type A (KDDI line) eSIM profile downloads; physical SIM excluded

IIJ reports that Type A eSIM profile downloads could fail from around 04:44 to 07:43 JST on November 18 (19:44–22:43 UTC on November 17). Its 08:51 JST notice confirms recovery and normal operation, attributing the incident to a KDDI-side fault. Physical SIM service was unaffected.

Safe next step

Use the normal profile-download and setup flow and verify the result. If it still fails, retain the error and time for established IIJmio support.

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Cloudflare AccessReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves Access configuration delays

Who / what is affected
Delays making configuration changes to Cloudflare Access

Cloudflare reported possible delays making Access configuration changes at 01:10 UTC on November 18, identified the issue at 01:22 UTC and implemented a fix at 02:11 UTC. It explicitly resolved the incident at 02:39 UTC. The notice does not describe a general Access login outage.

Safe next step

Verify whether the intended configuration change was applied before repeating it. Keep continuing errors and times for established Cloudflare support.

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Cloudflare Durable ObjectsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves Durable Objects timeout incident

Who / what is affected
Durable Objects; possible effects on dependent Stream and Containers services

At 21:56 UTC on November 17, Cloudflare reported elevated timeout rates and performance degradation affecting Durable Objects, with possible impact on dependent services including Stream and Containers. It explicitly resolved this incident at 00:17 UTC on November 18. The notice does not establish that every dependent service or region was affected.

Safe next step

Verify the actual operation result before retrying. Keep continuing timeout errors, request identifiers and times for established Cloudflare support.

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Apple service statusReported resolved

Needs recheck

Apple marks nine named service incidents resolved

Who / what is affected
App Store, Volume Purchase Program, iCloud Account & Sign In, iCloud Mail, iCloud Web Apps, Apple Business, Apple School Manager, Schoolwork and AppleCare on Device

Apple’s November 17 14:48 PST (22:48 UTC) status publication marks the reported issues for these nine services resolved. Impact windows varied by service. AppleCare purchases on device were temporarily unavailable for all users; the other named service issues affected some users. Volume Purchase Program also lists a separate intermittent issue as resolved. These service notices do not establish a cause for third-party Sign in with Apple incidents.

Safe next step

Retry the normal service operation and check the result before repeating purchases or submissions. Keep continuing errors and times for established Apple support.

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TradeWaltzPartial recovery

TradeWaltz resumes production; training environment remains stopped

Who / what is affected
TradeWaltz production environment restored; training remains stopped; Grain Importers and Export Documentary excluded

The eighteenth report, published at 12:00 JST on November 18 (03:00 UTC), explicitly confirms service resumption. The preceding 09:00 JST report scopes the noon restart to the production environment and says the training environment remains stopped, with its restart to be announced through the helpdesk. TradeWaltz for Grain Importers and TradeWaltz for Export Documentary were outside this incident and remain normally usable. The production restoration does not establish completion of the security response.

Safe next step

Verify the production operation result before repeating submissions. Use the established helpdesk for training-environment guidance, and report suspicious messages through known channels without opening unexpected links or attachments.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude resolves Apple sign-in failures on web and iOS

Who / what is affected
Some users signing in with Apple on claude.ai and the Claude iOS app

Anthropic resolved this incident at 21:51 UTC on November 17. It gives the Apple sign-in impact window as 16:40–20:20 UTC for claude.ai and the Claude iOS app. Google and email sign-in were unaffected. This is the exact Claude incident closure.

Safe next step

Use the normal sign-in flow and verify the result. If problems persist, retain the error and time for established Claude support.

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DropboxReported resolved

Needs recheck

Dropbox resolves Apple sign-in issues

Who / what is affected
Some Dropbox users using Sign in with Apple

Dropbox explicitly resolved this incident at 22:16 UTC on November 17, following its 19:36 UTC report that Sign in with Apple was not working as expected for some users. The incident lists Website, Desktop Application and Mobile Application as affected components.

Safe next step

Retry the normal sign-in flow and check the result. Keep any continuing error and time for established Dropbox support.

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NotionReported resolved

Needs recheck

Notion restores Login with Apple

Who / what is affected
Login with Apple in Notion

Notion resolved this incident at 00:41 UTC on November 18 and says Login with Apple should now work normally in Notion. This supersedes its November 17 19:00 UTC notice of unavailable Apple login. The closure concerns Notion’s sign-in flow.

Safe next step

Use the normal Notion login flow and verify access. Retain continuing errors and times for established Notion support.

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OpenAI Costs APIMonitoring

OpenAI monitors recovery from Costs API data delays

Who / what is affected
Costs API reporting data

OpenAI reported delayed Costs API data at 17:46 UTC on November 17. After identifying the issue, it pushed a fix at 19:53 UTC and is monitoring recovery. The incident remains Monitoring, without an explicit final resolution or customer workaround.

Safe next step

Allow for delayed data when interpreting Costs API reports. Keep the reporting period and response time for established support and follow the recovery notice.

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Supabase Edge FunctionsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase resolves Tokyo Edge Functions incident

Who / what is affected
Edge Functions in ap-northeast-1 (Tokyo)

Supabase resolved this incident at 23:43 UTC on November 17 after mitigation restored normal operation. Its first notice described a 20:00–20:10 UTC issue, but later updates reported increased errors at 21:03 UTC, mitigation at 21:25 UTC and normal responses under monitoring at 22:12 UTC. The incident therefore was not limited to the initially reported ten-minute window.

Safe next step

Check the function region and actual invocation result before retrying. Keep continuing errors and times for established Supabase support.

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Cloudflare R2Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves R2 request errors from South America

Who / what is affected
R2 requests originating in South America; examples GRU, GIG, EZE and SCL

Cloudflare explicitly resolved this incident at 22:08 UTC on November 17. It had reported elevated errors and read timeouts for R2 requests originating in South America at 20:05 UTC and put a fix under monitoring at 20:53 UTC. The closure retains that request-origin scope.

Safe next step

Check the actual request result before retrying. Keep request identifiers, origin and times for established Cloudflare support and follow the recovery notice.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves network incident in Los Angeles and Frankfurt

Who / what is affected
Los Angeles (LAX), United States, and Frankfurt (FRA), Germany datacenters

Cloudflare’s November 17 notice reported network-performance issues in LAX and FRA datacenters. After identifying the issue, it placed a fix in Monitoring at 17:56 UTC and explicitly resolved the incident at 18:00 UTC. This closes the specific two-datacenter incident.

Safe next step

Retry the normal workflow and check actual request results. Keep request identifiers and times for established support if failures persist.

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OVHcloud Managed KubernetesReported resolved

Needs recheck

OVHcloud resolves Oregon Kubernetes control-plane incident

Who / what is affected
Managed Kubernetes control planes in US-WEST-OR1; deployed workloads unaffected

The final November 17 notice gives the impact window as 16:13–18:35 UTC: control planes were unreachable and customers could not access or manage their Kubernetes clusters. Deployed workloads were not affected. The issuer explicitly resolved the incident in its 18:54 UTC update.

Safe next step

Check current cluster-management results before repeating control actions. Use established support with cluster identifiers and error times if access still fails.

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Replicate / CloudflareReported resolved

Replicate resolves model errors and stalled predictions

Who / what is affected
Some Replicate models and API responses; affected countries unspecified

Cloudflare explicitly resolved this Replicate incident at 03:23 UTC on November 18, after implementing a fix and monitoring at 02:56 UTC. The earlier impact included HTTP 500 responses, stalled predictions, missing version information and API response-validation errors for some models. The November 17 21:53 UTC recovery had applied only to OpenAI models while other models remained affected. This final closure concerns the exact November 17 incident.

Safe next step

Check the actual prediction state before resubmitting to avoid duplicate work. Keep continuing prediction/request identifiers, times and API errors for established support.

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Cloudflare TurnstileReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves the Turnstile verification incident

Who / what is affected
Some Turnstile users with browser fingerprinting protection enabled, including Helium

Cloudflare explicitly resolved this incident at 16:37 UTC on November 17. It had affected some users with browser fingerprinting protection enabled, including Helium, and was Identified at 10:42 UTC. This exact closure supersedes the earlier fix-in-progress statement.

Safe next step

Retry normal verification with the configured privacy/security policy. If failures persist, keep browser details, error and time for the affected site’s established support.

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Cloudflare One Gateway / WARPReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves Gateway connections to regionalized domains

Who / what is affected
Requests through Cloudflare WARP/Gateway to Cloudflare Regional Services hostnames and domains

The November 17 incident reported connection drops and TCP resets for requests routed through WARP and Gateway toward Cloudflare Regional Services hostnames and domains. Cloudflare identified the cause, placed a fix in Monitoring at 14:43 UTC and explicitly resolved the incident at 14:56 UTC. This closes the specific regionalized-domain routing incident, not every Cloudflare or Gateway issue.

Safe next step

Retry the normal authorized workflow and check actual request results before repeating work. Preserve hostnames, request identifiers and times for established support if connection failures continue.

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OVHcloud Public CloudInvestigating

Needs recheck

OVHcloud investigates unavailable compute instances in RBX

Who / what is affected
Some Public Cloud compute instances in RBX; listed component RBX-A

OVHcloud’s November 17 10:59 UTC notice says some instances in the RBX region have been unavailable since 10:01 UTC and some customers cannot access them. The issuer is investigating the origin and a fix. No restoration estimate or explicit closure is given; this is scoped to affected instances in that region, not a global Public Cloud outage.

Safe next step

Confirm the exact region and instance identifiers and use established continuity/support channels. Check actual instance state before repeating control actions, and retain access errors and times for support.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase resolves Seoul project-configuration errors

Who / what is affected
Projects in ap-northeast-2 (Seoul); upstream project-configuration retrieval

Supabase explicitly resolved this incident at 09:26 UTC on November 17, saying projects in ap-northeast-2 recovered. It gives the actual configuration-retrieval impact window as 04:56–06:20 UTC: projects saw 4xx/5xx HTTP and “Project not specified” errors from the upstream network partner. The earlier Monitoring stage is superseded by this exact closure; it does not close another regional incident.

Safe next step

Verify the project region and actual request result before retrying. Retain errors and times for established support if configuration failures persist.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase resolves the São Paulo dashboard/event-ingestion incident

Who / what is affected
Some sa-east-1 projects; Dashboard health reporting, with actual health/uptime unaffected

Supabase explicitly resolved this incident at 12:43 UTC on November 17. The earlier issue involved EC2 scheduled-event timeouts causing some sa-east-1 projects to appear unhealthy in the Dashboard; actual project health and uptime were never affected, according to its 04:20 UTC update. The final closure supersedes the earlier Monitoring stage and end-of-day fix forecast; it does not separately identify a fix deployment time.

Safe next step

Check actual application health and current Dashboard results. If a warning persists, use established support; the earlier project-restart workaround should not be treated as a universal current requirement after closure.

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Claude Meetings (beta)Issue identified

Claude Meetings restores Team manual joining; Auto-join returns gradually

Who / what is affected
Claude Meetings beta: Enterprise enabled; Team manual joining restored, Auto-join gradual

The November 17 23:39 UTC update says Claude Meetings is joining calls more reliably and remains enabled for all Enterprise customers. Team customers can again add Claude to new calls manually, while Team Auto-join is being restored gradually. Earlier updates say calls already in progress and other Claude features were unaffected. The incident’s formal state remains Identified despite the latest body describing monitoring; there is no final closure.

Safe next step

Check the account plan and actual meeting state before retrying. Team customers can use manual joining, while checking whether Auto-join has returned for their account.

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Optimizely Web ExperimentationMonitoring

Needs recheck

Optimizely monitors Web Experimentation security incident

Who / what is affected
Some customer Experimentation projects; Snippet Delivery listed operational

In its November 17 01:02 UTC notice, Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited an Experimentation vulnerability to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The issuer says it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, took steps to secure affected user accounts and added protections against unauthorized code delivery. The incident remains Monitoring; Snippet Delivery is operational and the notice assigns no availability impact. It gives no affected-project total or final incident closure.

Safe next step

Authorized administrators should review project changes and official account notices with their security team. Use established Optimizely support if unexpected code or account activity remains; the vendor update does not establish each customer’s investigation is complete.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves Seoul 52x origin-connectivity errors

Who / what is affected
Customers in Seoul; regional origin-connectivity errors

Cloudflare says customers in Seoul may have experienced elevated 52x origin-connectivity errors between 04:50 and 05:50 UTC on November 17. Its exact notice explicitly states the incident is resolved. This regional report does not establish a global Cloudflare outage or completion of every customer request.

Safe next step

Check the actual request and application outcome before retrying work. Keep timestamps and request identifiers for established support if origin errors continue.

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DigitalOcean App PlatformReported resolved

Needs recheck

DigitalOcean resolves App Platform Cloud Panel errors

Who / what is affected
App Platform viewing/updating via Cloud Control Panel; running apps unaffected

The official resolved notice says increased 4xx errors affected viewing or updating App Platform apps through the Cloud Panel between 16:40 and 18:22 UTC on November 16. This was a UI-only issue: apps continued running. DigitalOcean says the issue was resolved and normal service restored as of 18:22 UTC. The notice is displayed at 21:40 UTC; its separate incident metadata says 19:10 UTC. Those are publication metadata, not additional outage times.

Safe next step

Check the actual app configuration and task outcome before retrying a change. If errors continue, open a support ticket from the established account route.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves network performance incident in Ashburn (IAD), United States

Who / what is affected
Ashburn (IAD), United States network location; affected traffic rather than a global outage

The November 17 incident reported elevated error rates and increased latency. A fix entered Monitoring at 00:52 UTC and the issuer explicitly resolved the incident at 01:48 UTC. This regional closure does not establish recovery of an unrelated Cloudflare incident or completion of every customer request.

Safe next step

Check application results and retry normal requests where appropriate. Retain timestamps and request identifiers for established support if failures continue.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves network performance incident in Montréal (YUL), Canada

Who / what is affected
Montréal (YUL), Canada network location; affected traffic rather than a global outage

The issuer gives the November 16 impact window as 20:10–20:40 UTC, with increased HTTP 499 errors and elevated latency, and explicitly says this incident is resolved. This regional closure does not establish recovery of an unrelated Cloudflare incident or completion of every customer request.

Safe next step

Check application results and retry normal requests where appropriate. Retain timestamps and request identifiers for established support if failures continue.

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Bullhorn ATS/CRMReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn resolves GRR search failures for new Candidate records

Who / what is affected
Bullhorn ATS/CRM customers on GRR; listed clusters CLS40–CLS45

Bullhorn explicitly resolved this incident on November 16 at 18:20 EST (23:20 UTC), after implementing a fix and entering Monitoring at 16:21 EST (21:21 UTC). The original problem prevented newly created ATS/CRM records from appearing in searches for GRR customers; the title identifies Candidates and lists clusters CLS40–CLS45. This closure applies to this exact search incident, not other feature or maintenance notices.

Safe next step

Check the actual record and search result before repeating creation. Retain errors and record identifiers for established Bullhorn support if problems continue; avoid duplicate Candidates.

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Bitbucket CloudReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bitbucket resolves the November 16 website and API slowdown

Who / what is affected
Some Bitbucket Cloud website and API users; countries unspecified

Atlassian explicitly resolved this separate incident at 12:53 UTC on November 16. The issuer gives the actual impact window as 09:00–12:15 UTC: some users saw slowness, intermittent errors, timeouts or failed website/API requests. This does not close a different Bitbucket incident or prove each customer request completed.

Safe next step

Retry the normal workflow and check the actual repository, request or task result before repeating work. Retain errors and times for established Atlassian support if problems continue.

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Lightning AI PlatformIssue identified

Needs recheck

Lightning AI restores full Drive access; the platform incident remains open

Who / what is affected
Lightning Studio Platform, including Studio, Jobs/Deployments and Drive; separate from GPU-cluster rental and managed Kubernetes/SLURM

The official timeline’s November 16 14:03 UTC update restores full Drive access, superseding its earlier read-only Drive stage. The security incident remains Identified, without explicit closure or confirmation that Studio, Jobs, Deployments or the web UI have returned. The separate company account describes unauthorized access to credentials detected October 15 at 23:00 UTC, user access revoked October 16 at 01:00 UTC, and an ongoing investigation with an external security firm. Its dated October 28 update described read-only Drive via CLI/SDK; that older channel description does not establish the scope of the new full-access announcement. Potentially affected customers identified to date were notified; no notice means not identified so far, not a universal all-clear.

Safe next step

Follow the issuer’s request for all users to rotate secrets/API keys and revoke credentials stored in AI Studios, and update third-party credentials used by its virtual machines. Review third-party access logs with your security team. Use known support and verify which feature/access route is actually restored before resuming work.

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GitHub Pull RequestsReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub resolves pull-request merges and Actions workflow-start degradation

Who / what is affected
Pull Request merging and Actions workflow start times in this November 16 incident

GitHub explicitly resolved the incident at 16:26 UTC on November 16. It said at 16:16 that Pull Requests and Actions had recovered after reducing system load, following mitigation/monitoring at 16:07. Earlier investigation reported merge timeouts reaching 4.75% against a baseline near 0.2%; those rates describe the earlier degradation, not a current unresolved rate. A detailed root-cause analysis is promised but is not included in the closure. This is distinct from the incident resolved November 13.

Safe next step

Check repository merges and workflow runs before retrying to avoid duplicate work. If your organization still sees errors, preserve the request/run identifier, error and time for established GitHub support.

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Cloudflare / ReplicateReported resolved

Needs recheck

Replicate resolves prediction-creation failures for some models

Who / what is affected
Replicate; prediction creation for some models; countries unspecified

Cloudflare explicitly resolved this Replicate incident at 16:19 UTC on November 16. It identified the issue at 15:30 and implemented a fix under monitoring at 15:52, after a 14:30 investigation into some model requests failing with “Failed to create prediction.” The closure is specific to this incident; it does not establish a separate outage or recovery of every Cloudflare service.

Safe next step

Retry the affected model through the normal workflow and verify the request outcome before repeating prediction work. Retain the model/request identifier, error and time for known support if failures continue.

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Claude Sonnet 5.5 / Fable 5.2Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude resolves the November 16 model-error incident

Who / what is affected
claude.ai, Claude API, Claude Code and Claude Cowork; Sonnet 5.5 and Fable 5.2 incident

Claude explicitly resolved this incident at 09:04 UTC on November 16. The issuer gives the actual impact window as 07:32–08:45 UTC, distinct from the 07:49 investigation and 08:02 monitoring notices. A fix had been deployed for Sonnet 5.5 and other Claude models. This closure covers the named surfaces in this incident and does not close the separate Apple-signup issue in the iOS app.

Safe next step

Retry the normal official workflow and verify the result. If errors continue, retain the affected model, surface, error and time for established support; check other incident notices separately.

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SonarQube CloudReported resolved

Needs recheck

SonarQube Cloud resolves Automatic Analysis failures

Who / what is affected
Automatic Analysis in SonarQube Cloud EU and US; especially JavaScript/TypeScript projects

The official incident is explicitly resolved at 12:11 UTC on November 16. SonarQube says Automatic Analysis operates normally in all regions from 11:15 UTC. The earlier issue affected a large share of projects, especially JavaScript or TypeScript; a recent change was rolled back. Failed analyses can be re-run. This does not establish that every project was affected or that an earlier failed analysis automatically completed.

Safe next step

Re-run analyses that failed during the incident as the issuer advises, then check their actual results and quality-gate state. Preserve errors and use established support if a project still fails.

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NTT DOCOMO 5G SAReported resolved

Needs recheck

DOCOMO resolves the November 16 nationwide 5G SA outage

Who / what is affected
Japan nationwide; 5G SA subscribers; voice, mobile data and SMS

DOCOMO confirms full recovery at 15:58 JST on November 16 (06:58 UTC), after disruption began at 10:02 JST (01:02 UTC). Congestion at a switch serving 5G SA subscribers made voice calls, mobile data and SMS difficult to use. MVNOs using DOCOMO, non-SA 5G, 4G and emergency calls were unaffected. The issuer has found no signs of unauthorized access or cyberattack in its investigation to date; this is not a permanent guarantee. This is a separate dated incident from November 11.

Safe next step

If service still fails, restart the phone or toggle airplane mode as DOCOMO advises. If you temporarily selected 4G, restore the previous network setting. Use established DOCOMO support for continuing problems.

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Nulab CacooInvestigating

Needs recheck

Cacoo remains suspended after unauthorized access

Who / what is affected
Cacoo operating environment and some inquiry records; Backlog and other services operating

Nulab detected unauthorized use of its credentials on November 14 and stopped Cacoo at 18:45 JST (09:45 UTC). Its November 16 notice says the service remains stopped, with no resumption time; reopening follows safety checks. It confirms leakage of about 792 inquiry records, a provisional record count, not a count of affected people. The 16:00 JST addendum says individual notices are underway and the report to Japan’s Personal Information Protection Commission is complete. Backlog has a separate operating environment; Nulab reports no identified unauthorized access to customer data in Backlog or other services so far, and says those services operate normally. Investigation continues.

Safe next step

Check the official incident and individual notice; use established Nulab support for service needs. Do not open unexpected links or attachments claiming to come from Nulab. Do not treat Backlog’s availability as Cacoo’s recovery or assume notifications are complete.

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Bullhorn AnalyticsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn Analytics production login errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Some Bullhorn Analytics users; production login

Bullhorn reported latency or errors for some users signing into Analytics production at 01:19:58 UTC on November 16. It explicitly marked this incident resolved at 01:59:20 UTC. This closure is specific to Analytics login and does not close the separate ATS/CRM feature or security-related incidents.

Safe next step

Retry the normal Analytics sign-in and contact known support if your organization is still affected. Check the separate official notices for other Bullhorn functions.

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AWS US-EAST-1Reported resolved

Needs recheck

AWS resolves US-EAST-1 signup, authentication and scoped NLB issues

Who / what is affected
US-EAST-1 signups and IAM Identity Center authentication; a subset of NLBs in one cell in use1-az1

AWS formally resolved the incident at 14:53 UTC on November 15. Its closing notice reports signup, authentication and connectivity issues between 03:05 and 06:10 PST (11:05–14:10 UTC), affecting IAM Identity Center sign-in to the AWS Console and dependent services such as Kiro and Connect. It says authentication was fully mitigated at 05:20 PST (13:20 UTC), with most services recovering then. Separately, a subset of customers using Network Load Balancers in a single cell in use1-az1 continued to have connectivity issues until 06:21 PST (14:21 UTC). That later NLB endpoint is distinct from the broader interval stated in the same notice. Earlier guidance excluded Kiro social sign-in. This does not establish impact to every resource, every availability zone or other AWS regions.

Safe next step

Check each request or transaction result before retrying a failed operation, and avoid duplicate work. If problems continue, use your account-specific AWS Health information and known support. Do not rebuild load balancers solely on the basis of the earlier interim workaround after formal recovery.

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Zoom WorkflowReported resolved

Needs recheck

Zoom restores the Workflow tab in its client

Who / what is affected
Users unable to view the Zoom Workflow tab; Zoom AIC component

Zoom investigated users being unable to view the Workflow tab in the Zoom Client at 03:36 UTC on November 15. It identified the cause at 05:34 UTC, reported recovery with monitoring at 05:53 UTC, and formally resolved the incident at 06:26 UTC. These are notice times, not a separately verified impact window; this incident does not establish a general outage of Zoom meetings or calls.

Safe next step

Confirm the Workflow tab and any task result before resubmitting work. If the same problem persists, use the official incident and known Zoom support.

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Mercado Pago Payments APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago resolves Payments API degradation

Who / what is affected
Payments API; countries are not specified in this notice

Mercado Pago reported degraded Payments API performance at 06:41 UTC on November 15 and explicitly resolved the incident at 07:07 UTC, saying Payments was working as expected. The notice does not specify countries or establish that every payment failed. It is separate from the Chile Point and Argentina in-store QR incidents.

Safe next step

Check the recorded transaction status before retrying a payment or API request to avoid duplicate charges. Keep error details and use known merchant support if a transaction remains uncertain.

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Mercado Pago Point ChileReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago closes the Chile Point rejection incident

Who / what is affected
Point payments in Chile (MLC)

At 05:45 UTC on November 15, Mercado Pago reported that it was investigating payment rejections affecting Point in Chile. It explicitly resolved this incident at 06:20 UTC. This country and product scope does not establish an outage of Point elsewhere, all Mercado Pago payments or the separate Payments API incident.

Safe next step

Verify each transaction’s recorded result before repeating payment. Preserve receipts and errors, and contact known merchant support for any unsettled transaction.

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Cloudflare R2Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves R2 bucket errors in West North America

Who / what is affected
R2 buckets based in West North America (WNAM)

Cloudflare reports elevated error rates for WNAM-based R2 buckets from 19:41 to 20:03 UTC on November 14. Its later 20:20 UTC update explicitly closes the incident. The impact window is distinct from the closure publication, and this notice does not establish an outage of all R2 regions or the whole Cloudflare network.

Safe next step

Check the results of affected storage requests before retrying writes or uploads. Use the official incident and known support if errors persist.

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Brazil / Tesouro NacionalIssue identified

Needs recheck

Brazil’s Treasury keeps selected information services offline

Who / what is affected
Brazil · document, data-series and query tools on Treasury/Tesouro Transparente websites

The Treasury’s November 13 notice says selected information services remain temporarily unavailable during security checks and recovery following the incident reported that week. This does not mean every offline system was compromised. Core Treasury operations and federal public-debt management continue normally; the issuer reports no financial impact. Interactive auction queries are unavailable, while official auction-result data remain accessible through the alternatives linked in the notice. Restoration by Monday morning, November 16, is a forecast, not a confirmed recovery. The issuer says unauthorized access was contained and monitoring was reinforced.

Safe next step

Use the official notice’s alternative routes for auction results and follow later Treasury notices for service availability. Allow for unavailable document or data queries; the Monday-morning target does not establish that service has already returned.

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Claude / iOSInvestigating

Needs recheck

Claude continues investigating Apple signup failures on iOS

Who / what is affected
Sign in with Apple in the Claude iOS app, mainly new accounts

At 20:12 UTC on November 14, Claude said it was continuing to investigate Sign in with Apple in its iOS app, mainly affecting new accounts. The initial notice was published at 07:11 UTC. New users can sign up with Google or email instead; no restoration time is announced. This does not establish a general Claude login or API outage.

Safe next step

New users can use the official Google or email signup option described by Claude. Follow the incident for updates and use established support if account creation still fails.

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Cloudflare R2 / Tiered CacheReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare R2 and Tiered Cache errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Chicago and Newark had the highest error rates; other locations were affected at lower rates

Cloudflare says a network connectivity issue between several data centers from 05:00 UTC on November 14 caused a small percentage of requests to fail. R2 requests could return HTTP 500, while Tiered Cache could return 520, 522 or 524. Error rates were close to normal from 05:30 UTC; the incident was explicitly resolved at 06:45 UTC. The 05:30 incident opening is distinct from the stated 05:00 impact start.

Safe next step

Check the result of the original storage operation before retrying a write. Retain request identifiers and errors for support if problems continue.

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OpenAI / ChatGPT billingReported resolved

Needs recheck

OpenAI resolves ChatGPT checkout and Ads invoice errors

Who / what is affected
ChatGPT billing including checkout, and Ads invoice retrieval

OpenAI reported recovery monitoring at 04:11 UTC on November 14 for errors affecting ChatGPT billing, including checkout, and Ads invoice retrieval. At 05:27 UTC it explicitly said all affected services were operating normally again. The notice does not establish an outage across all ChatGPT conversations or APIs.

Safe next step

Check the payment result and existing invoice or transaction before trying again. Do not make a duplicate payment to force a plan change; use the official support route for unresolved billing records.

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Claude / claude.aiReported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude resolves purchases and delayed plan changes

Who / what is affected
claude.ai purchases, plan upgrades and cancellations; core functionality unaffected

Claude’s 04:23 UTC November 14 update confirms that purchasing and plan-change problems are resolved and delayed payments and plan changes have been applied. The stated impact window was 02:34–04:03 UTC on November 14 (18:34–20:03 PT on November 13), distinct from the later closure publication. Core functionality was not affected.

Safe next step

Check your payment history and plan status before trying again. Do not make a duplicate payment to accelerate a plan change; use the known official support route if records still disagree.

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Cloudflare 1.1.1.1Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves 1.1.1.1 routing issue affecting users in Canada

Who / what is affected
Some users in Canada using 1.1.1.1; 1.0.0.1 and public-resolver IPv6 prefixes remained reachable

Cloudflare opened this incident at 23:53 UTC on November 13. A later notice described an active hijack of 1.1.1.0/24, then said the network responsible for the route leak had fixed it at 00:52 UTC on November 14. The incident was explicitly resolved at 01:01 UTC. These are notice milestones, not a confirmed full impact interval, and the notice does not identify an attacker or establish global resolver failure.

Safe next step

Check whether DNS requests now complete and preserve errors if they do not. Follow your administrator’s approved network configuration; avoid broad DNS or security-setting changes.

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Replicate / r8.imReported resolved

Needs recheck

Replicate r8.im model-publishing and build restriction resolved

Who / what is affected
r8.im registry used for Replicate model publishing and builds; no claim all predictions failed

This distinct incident was identified at 14:55 UTC on November 13. Cloudflare’s notice described restrictions involving the r8.im registry used for model publishing and builds. A fix entered Monitoring at 23:34 UTC, and the incident was explicitly resolved at 00:51 UTC on November 14. It is separate from the earlier model-registry incident resolved on November 13 at 01:44 UTC.

Safe next step

Verify the result of a publish or build before submitting it again. Use the exact incident and known support for continuing errors.

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Bullhorn selected servicesInvestigating

Needs recheck

Bullhorn restores four maintenance areas; Sourcebreaker Staging remains unavailable

Who / what is affected
Connexys, Daxtra parsing for JobScience, Joboti and Tx Platform restored; Sourcebreaker Staging still affected

The latest authored maintenance update, November 16 at 21:16 EST (November 17 02:16 UTC), explicitly restores Connexys, Daxtra parsing for JobScience, Joboti and Tx Platform during the ongoing security review. Only Sourcebreaker Staging remains unavailable in this notice; all other Sourcebreaker services remain available. The issuer will publish a restoration estimate when confirmed. The incident remains Investigating; the earlier November 16 forecasts are superseded by these actual restoration statements and do not establish completion of Staging maintenance or a new breach.

Safe next step

Check the exact product and environment before resuming work. Continue established alternatives for Sourcebreaker Staging and follow its official restoration notice; verify task results before retrying.

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Bullhorn KonaSearchReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn resolves the Kona service disruption

Who / what is affected
Kona / KonaSearch by Bullhorn; not all Salesforce-platform products

Bullhorn explicitly resolved the Kona incident at 11:44 EST on November 14 (16:44 UTC). The earlier November 13 notice had estimated restoration for November 20; that estimate is superseded by this closure. The notice concerns Kona / KonaSearch and does not resolve separate Bullhorn maintenance or feature restrictions.

Safe next step

Check the affected Kona workflow through the official service and use known support if a problem persists. Follow separate notices for other Bullhorn products.

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GitHub CopilotReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub resolves the Copilot GPT-model availability incident

Who / what is affected
Copilot products and IDE surfaces; gpt-5.6-sol-fast, gpt-5.6-sol, gpt-6.1-terra and gpt-6-luna

The later incident report dates degradation from 19:05 to 21:27 UTC on November 13 and names GPT-6.1 Terra, GPT-5.6 Sol and GPT-6 Luna. It attributes the issue to an upstream model provider and reports normal service after provider mitigation. The original notice opened at 20:13 UTC and additionally named gpt-5.6-sol-fast. The current incident is Resolved; its source metadata was updated at 21:38 UTC. These impact, notice and metadata times are distinct, and the report does not establish failure of every Copilot model.

Safe next step

If affected, use another available model or Auto as GitHub recommends, and verify task results before retrying.

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OpenAI / Compliance APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

OpenAI resolves delayed Costs API data publication

Who / what is affected
Organization cost data through the Costs/Compliance API; API and ChatGPT usage unaffected

OpenAI identified delayed organization cost-data publication at 16:10 UTC on November 13 and applied a mitigation. The 05:31 UTC November 14 update was Monitoring and said delays were still expected at that stage. API and ChatGPT usage are unaffected. This incident is separate from the older cost-data incidents already resolved. At 00:17:25 UTC on November 16, OpenAI explicitly marked this Costs API data-freshness incident resolved and said affected services were operating normally. This supersedes the dated Monitoring updates above; API and ChatGPT usage were outside the reported impact throughout this incident.

Safe next step

Allow for reporting lag when reconciling costs. Preserve export times and compare later data; do not infer that delayed reporting stops usage or charges.

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GitHub Pull RequestsReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub resolves pull-request merge timeouts

Who / what is affected
Pull Requests; some merge attempts, not all Git operations

GitHub investigated from 15:47 UTC on November 13. It said timeouts initially affected 3% of merge requests, later falling below 1%; a subsequent update still reported about 1%. Mitigation entered Monitoring at 17:28 UTC, and the incident was formally resolved at 18:29 UTC. These are update milestones, not a confirmed full impact interval.

Safe next step

Check the pull request and resulting commit before submitting another merge. Keep request details if failures continue.

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Netlify SupportReported resolved

Needs recheck

Netlify resolves delayed support replies to Microsoft mailboxes

Who / what is affected
Some customers using Microsoft 365 or Outlook-hosted mailboxes; Netlify Helpdesk

At 05:53 UTC on November 14, Netlify explicitly resolved its support-email delivery incident. The earlier notice concerned delayed support replies to some Microsoft 365 and Outlook-hosted mailboxes while Netlify’s support team continued processing tickets. This closure is for that support-delivery incident, not a statement about every Microsoft service.

Safe next step

Track the existing support ticket and check official delivery updates. Avoid creating repeated tickets solely because a reply has not arrived.

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NetlifyReported resolved

Needs recheck

Netlify resolves drag-and-drop deployment failures

Who / what is affected
Drag-and-drop deploys; no claim all build or deploy methods failed

Netlify explicitly reports that many drag-and-drop deployments failed between November 12 at 09:00 UTC and November 13 at 17:27 UTC, and says the issue is resolved. The incident display is backdated to the start of that window; the current source metadata was updated November 13. This does not establish impact to other deployment methods.

Safe next step

Check the deployment result before uploading again. If an attempt failed, retry through the normal deployment flow and retain its identifier.

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Cloudflare Workers APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves Workers API deployment errors

Who / what is affected
Workers deployment and other API actions; not a statement that deployed Workers stopped

Cloudflare reported increased 5xx errors for Workers deployments and other API actions at 15:31 UTC on November 13. It identified the issue at 15:39 UTC, implemented a fix by 15:42 UTC and monitored recovery. The issuer explicitly resolved the incident at 13:37 UTC on November 14. The notice does not identify affected regions or establish a failure of all existing Workers traffic.

Safe next step

Check whether an API change or deployment succeeded before retrying it. Preserve request IDs and use the official incident for recovery updates.

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Bullhorn FastForwardReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn closes the FastForward access incident

Who / what is affected
Bullhorn FastForward clients without configured validated IP settings

Bullhorn explicitly resolved the FastForward incident at 11:52 EST on November 14 (16:52 UTC). The earlier November 13 notice said access was restricted to validated IP addresses and clients without those settings temporarily lost access. Closure does not say those security controls were removed or that unrelated Bullhorn feature incidents are resolved.

Safe next step

Have the administrator check the official notice and established Bullhorn support instructions for approved IP configuration. Keep authentication and other security controls enabled.

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ApifyMonitoring

Needs recheck

Apify moves security response to Monitoring; token handling changes

Who / what is affected
API, Actors and General; affected accounts notified individually

Apify’s November 16 18:54 CET update (17:54 UTC) says it identified the most likely root cause, closed the vulnerability believed to enable initial access and hardened the attack path during November 11–13. Investigation and individual affected-user contact continue. Its no-evidence finding for additional unauthorized access is limited to the investigation to date. The original account describes November 9–10 access detected November 11 at 12:13 UTC; no email means not identified as affected so far. Additional hashing/encryption, privileged-access limits and internal credential rotations are reported. API tokens are now shown only once when created. A next update and preliminary incident report are due by November 20; this is not incident closure.

Safe next step

Store new API tokens securely; if a token is lost, create a new token and delete the lost one as Apify advises. Keep storage access Restricted where applicable, follow individual instructions, reconnect integrations through official flows and beware phishing.

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KARTE / PLAIDInvestigating

Needs recheck

KARTE remains stopped; PLAID confirms data leakage

Who / what is affected
All KARTE projects/functions stopped; 79,249 account-email records plus integration credentials and some customer-imported data

PLAID’s November 16 investigation confirms leakage of 79,249 email-address records registered for KARTE accounts, external-integration credentials such as secret keys/access tokens, and some customer-imported data including linked-table data. The email-record count is not an affected-person or customer-company total. Integration-credential and imported-data counts remain under investigation; imported fields vary by customer and may include personal information. PLAID says attackers abused a server vulnerability and stolen connection credentials; it detected access at 08:59 JST on November 13, began stopping servers around 14:27 JST and completed stated containment around 15:23 JST. It reports no newly confirmed access since blocking, not recovery of data already copied. All functions remain stopped, including tracking, delivery and dashboard operations; bulk email may stop mid-delivery and in-flight Datahub jobs can fail. Individual affected-company contact is underway; regulator reporting and police consultation are in progress, and an external security investigation is planned. None is presented as completed. The status incident remains Investigating with no reopening estimate. Its November 18 16:00 JST (07:00 UTC) update says sequential delivery of requested copies of some customer-imported data, including linked-table data described in the November 16 release, continues for customers who applied. The issuer is still assessing affected data/customers and how to notify them; contacts will begin after that assessment. This is the issuer’s delivery to requesting customers, not a new attacker disclosure or completion of all notices. Reopening has no estimate. The next communication is targeted around 21:00 JST on November 18 (12:00 UTC), not restoration.

Safe next step

Authorized integration owners should urgently invalidate the relevant integration secrets/access tokens if they have not done so; leaving them active can permit unintended writes or further leakage in connected services. Plan controlled replacements with the administrator. Use official individual notices, beware phishing to registered email addresses, verify job/delivery results before retries and preserve evidence.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude resolves the multiple-surface error incident

Who / what is affected
claude.ai, Claude API, Claude Code and Cowork components; named connectors and mobile apps; countries unspecified

Claude moved this incident to Monitoring at 15:33 UTC on November 13, while new connectors remained unavailable and some scheduled runs/security tasks were still delayed. At 15:38 UTC it explicitly resolved the issue affecting multiple surfaces. Those intermediate restrictions describe the preceding stage, not a newly asserted continuing outage. This closure does not close the separate Microsoft 365 connector incident.

Safe next step

Check whether a request or task completed before retrying, especially actions that change external systems. Preserve drafts and error details and use your organisation’s established continuity process.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude closes earlier authentication incident

Who / what is affected
Authentication on claude.ai and Claude Code; listed Console and Cowork components; countries unspecified

The earlier November 13 notice opened at 09:58 UTC for authentication problems on claude.ai and Claude Code. Claude deployed a fix and moved to Monitoring at 11:05, then formally resolved the incident at 11:58, saying the issue affecting claude.ai and Cowork was resolved. The listed components also include Console and Claude Code. These notice times do not independently establish the full impact interval. This closure does not resolve the separate incident opened at 13:09.

Safe next step

Check the exact incident if sign-in problems persist. Keep existing drafts and error details and avoid repeating external actions until you confirm their result.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago resolves Point payment rejection in Brazil

Who / what is affected
Point payments in Brazil (MLB); other products and countries not established as affected

Mercado Pago identified a Point payment-rejection incident in Brazil at 09:51 GMT-03:00 (12:51 UTC) on November 13 and formally resolved it at 10:34 GMT-03:00 (13:34 UTC). The affected component is Point MLB. These are notice times, not independently confirmed start/end of every failed transaction; no all-country payment outage is established.

Safe next step

Check the payment result before retrying to avoid duplicate charges. Keep transaction references and use established support channels for unresolved payments.

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Jira / Jira Service ManagementReported resolved

Needs recheck

Jira/JSM Microsoft incoming-email processing recovered

Who / what is affected
Incoming email processing in Jira/JSM linked to Microsoft 365 degradation; countries unspecified

At 06:07 UTC on November 14, Atlassian explicitly confirmed that incoming email processing for Microsoft-connected mailboxes in Jira and Jira Service Management had returned to normal and resolved this incident. It follows the November 13 failures and monitoring updates. This product-specific closure does not establish recovery of every Microsoft 365 service.

Safe next step

Check whether a ticket or comment was created before resending an email. Use an established web workflow if your organisation permits it and retain message details for support.

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OpenAI / ChatGPT SitesReported resolved

Needs recheck

OpenAI resolves Sites publishing failures

Who / what is affected
ChatGPT Sites publishing; countries, plans and affected-user counts unspecified

The exact Sites publishing notice records Identified at 03:59 UTC on November 13 and Resolved at 05:55 UTC, when OpenAI said affected services were operating normally again. The listed component is ChatGPT Sites. These update times do not independently establish the complete impact interval. This is separate from the Microsoft 365 connector incident and does not establish that all ChatGPT features or OpenAI APIs were unavailable.

Safe next step

Check the published site and the result of any prior publishing attempt before retrying. Keep a copy of the draft and retain errors for support if publishing still fails.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase API alert narrowed to one project; incident resolved

Who / what is affected
API routes; individual project with an unusually high request rate; no widespread issue confirmed

The 22:13 UTC November 12 notice initially suspected slightly increased Data API, Auth, Storage and other HTTP API errors across regions. At 22:52 UTC Supabase isolated the errors to one project with an unusually high request rate and explicitly withdrew the suspicion of a widespread issue. All API routes were nominal, and it formally resolved the incident at 23:31 UTC. Do not extend the original broad component labels to a confirmed platform-wide outage. This is separate from the database-connection incident.

Safe next step

Check your own project errors and completed task results before retrying. Use the exact incident and Supabase support for persistent project-specific failures.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves Durable Objects errors in North America

Who / what is affected
Durable Objects in North American colocation facilities; individual countries unspecified

Cloudflare formally resolved this incident at 03:44 UTC on November 13. Its earlier November 12 22:39 UTC notice reported increased Durable Objects errors in North American facilities after a sudden traffic increase, said impact had subsided and moved to Monitoring. The closure does not establish the full impact interval or a worldwide Cloudflare outage.

Safe next step

Check request results before repeating work and retain errors for support. Follow the exact incident for later findings and use established retry/backoff policies if project-specific errors persist.

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Bullhorn Recruitment CloudReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn resolves the Recruitment Cloud and Connexys feature incident

Who / what is affected
Recruitment Cloud Document Editor/integrated Daxtra; Connexys Document Conversion/Previewer

Bullhorn explicitly resolved this separate feature incident on November 16 at 19:39 EST (November 17 00:39 UTC). It had listed Recruitment Cloud Document Editor and integrated Daxtra, plus Connexys Document Conversion and Document Previewer, as unavailable. The closure is now in this exact feature notice; it is separate from the earlier broad Recruitment Cloud closure and does not close unrelated maintenance.

Safe next step

Verify actual feature and task results before repeating work. Retain errors for established Bullhorn support if the affected workflow still fails.

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BullhornReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn resolves its Microsoft-dependent MFA email incident

Who / what is affected
Some Bullhorn users receiving MFA codes through Microsoft technology; no all-user scope

Bullhorn explicitly resolved this incident at 09:19 EST on November 14 (14:19 UTC). Its earlier notice concerned some users unable to log in because Microsoft-dependent email delivery delayed multi-factor authentication codes. This closure applies to Bullhorn’s specific dependency notice; it does not independently establish worldwide Microsoft 365 recovery or resolve separate Recruitment Cloud/Connexys feature restrictions.

Safe next step

Check the official service notices and your organisation’s established access procedure. Avoid repeated code requests, keep MFA enabled and never share codes with unsolicited contacts.

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Microsoft 365Monitoring

Needs recheck

Microsoft 365 monitors sustained recovery and the email backlog

Who / what is affected
Business/Enterprise features that interact with Exchange Online/email; other service elements remain functional

The November 13 22:00:36 UTC notice reports sustained recovery and extended monitoring to ensure no more mitigations are needed. Microsoft is also checking the email backlog before considering the issue resolved and believes most dependent-product impact scenarios have been addressed. The public page still labels service degradation. Exchange-dependent features remain the stated scope; core Teams calls/chats and direct SharePoint file access are functional. The next-update target was November 14 at 02:30 UTC; its passage alone is not a recovery announcement.

Safe next step

Follow your organisation’s official service-health and continuity guidance. Check whether a message or task completed before repeating it, and preserve errors for support.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub closes its email incident; upstream delays may persist

Who / what is affected
Email hosted by an unnamed affected upstream provider; sign-in and verification workflows; countries unspecified

GitHub formally resolved this incident at 21:43 UTC on November 12 after resolving email-processing impact on its own systems. Its preceding notice warns that the upstream provider disruption may still delay delivery for customers using that provider; other providers operate normally. Earlier impact included sign-in, address verification, password resets and notifications. The upstream provider is not named. GitHub’s closure does not establish recovery of the separate Microsoft 365 incident; a root-cause analysis is still planned.

Safe next step

Check inbox and account-action results before requesting another verification or reset. Use known GitHub support and avoid sharing codes in unexpected recovery messages.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase resolves database connection errors across affected regions

Who / what is affected
Subset of projects; impact extended beyond initially named sa-east-1 and ap-southeast-1

Supabase initially reported connection errors and possible database unavailability at 20:35 UTC on November 12 in sa-east-1 and ap-southeast-1. At 21:42 it clarified that impact extended beyond those regions, while only a subset of projects was affected. It identified the issue at 22:38, moved to Monitoring at 23:03 and declared recovery across all affected regions at 23:40 UTC. The page lists 18 regional Postgres components; those labels do not establish that every project was affected. This database incident is separate from the later API-error notice narrowed to one unusually high-rate project.

Safe next step

Check your project’s region, connection errors and health before retrying a task. Preserve error details for Supabase support and verify results to avoid duplicate work.

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NotionReported resolved

Needs recheck

Notion resolves its Outlook-connection incident

Who / what is affected
Outlook integrations in Notion Mail and Notion Calendar; countries unspecified

Notion explicitly resolved this Outlook integration issue at 21:11 UTC on November 13. The original notice concerned mail/calendar integrations affected by the Microsoft Outlook outage. The closure is specific to Notion’s notice and does not close Microsoft’s broader incident or prove that every other provider’s email dependency has recovered.

Safe next step

Check connection status and whether a calendar or mail task completed before repeating it. Follow the official incident and retain errors for support.

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OpenAIReported resolved

Needs recheck

OpenAI resolves its Microsoft 365 connector incident

Who / what is affected
ChatGPT Connectors/Apps; Microsoft connectors; countries and plans unspecified

At 00:18 UTC on November 14, OpenAI explicitly resolved this connector incident and reported all affected services operating normally. The earlier failure of new connections and tools and the November 13 monitoring phase describe prior stages. This closes OpenAI’s specific notice, not Microsoft’s broader incident or other providers’ connector incidents.

Safe next step

Check whether the connected task completed before retrying. Use an established alternative workflow for essential work and retain connection errors for support.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub Webhooks API timeouts and errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Webhooks API; about 1% of traffic reported affected; countries unspecified

GitHub investigated degraded Webhooks performance from its 18:43 UTC November 12 notice. At 18:52 it reported timeouts and errors affecting about 1% of customer traffic. It reported recovered traffic and mitigation around 19:20, then explicitly resolved the incident at 19:33 UTC. These are update times, not a separately established full impact interval. This is distinct from the later email-delivery incident.

Safe next step

Check webhook delivery and downstream processing before replaying an event to avoid duplicates. Preserve delivery IDs and persistent errors for GitHub support.

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N-able N-centralFix available

Needs recheck

N-central HF3 available for on-premises upgrade; restrictions remain

Who / what is affected
N-central Hosted and on-premises; server, Agent/Probe upgrades and remaining remote-control/Intune restrictions

N-able’s November 13 13:40:25 UTC timeline says its published Indicators of Compromise are relevant only to customers who have not disabled the Legacy API. Customers can use them for assessment and monitoring with their security teams; the notice does not establish compromise of every such customer. The earlier 03:50 UTC update about additional indicators and specific-customer assessments remains dated context, while the older no-signs introduction is not a universal all-clear. Security assessment, remediation and safe feature restoration continue; formal status remains Identified. Hosting-specific Legacy API/Intune precautions and prior HF2/Agent/Probe guidance still apply. A separate issuer blog dated November 13 says HF3 is still being developed. It is planned to strengthen authentication/permissions, harden Agent/Probe/appliance communication and permanently remove Legacy API access. The issuer distinguishes remaining authenticated/privileged data-leakage issues and says Agent Impersonation requires an existing endpoint foothold. These are scoped vendor assessments and planned changes, not an available HF3 release or confirmation that every issue is fixed. At 18:07:23 EST on November 14 (23:07:23 UTC), N-able said final validation was continuing and HF3 would not be available that day, superseding its earlier same-day General Availability target. At 18:21:59 UTC on November 15, N-able said final HF3 validation was still underway. Its next update is planned for approximately 18:00 EST (23:00 UTC) that day, a communication target, not an available build or promised release time. At 02:07:54 UTC on November 16, N-able said the 2026.4 HF3 release build was undergoing testing and final validation. Its plan remains to start with hosted NCOD environments, followed by on-premises HF3 availability on Monday, subject to successful testing and validation. This is a conditional rollout plan, not confirmation that HF3 is available or that restricted functions have returned. The formal incident remains Identified and the existing hosting-specific HF2, Agents/Probes, Legacy API and Intune instructions remain relevant. The issuer says it removed earlier November 14–15 timed updates to shorten the post; their disappearance does not turn those dated stages into completed remediation. The new official event 202669 starts November 16 at 21:00 UTC and explicitly announces N-central 2026.4 HF3 available, superseding the earlier on-premises GA forecasts. On-premises administrators must upgrade their server as soon as possible; Hosted customers require no server-side action. Agents and Probes also require updates. HF3 adds authentication/access, Agent/Probe/appliance communication, file/import and server hardening, and permanently blocks Legacy APIs by removing their configuration option. Intune remains blocked, and remote control other than Take Control is disabled; Take Control continues to work. Event 202669 remains Identified. This new notice does not establish that every customer is upgraded, that all functions returned or that an existing compromise was removed.

Safe next step

On-premises administrators should obtain the official HF3 package/release notes and upgrade promptly through approved procedures. All hosting models must follow Agent/Probe upgrade guidance. Keep Legacy APIs blocked, do not re-enable Intune or disabled remote-control functions, and use established support/security assessment for suspected compromise.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude closes its Microsoft 365 connector and Outlook incident

Who / what is affected
claude.ai and Claude Cowork; Microsoft 365 connector and Claude for Outlook; countries unspecified

Claude explicitly resolved its notice at 21:49 UTC on November 13. The final report dates many mail, calendar and search request failures in its Microsoft 365 connector and Claude for Outlook from November 12 at 16:03 UTC to November 13 at 16:40 UTC. It still warns that occasional errors or delays may occur while Microsoft completes its recovery. The stated impact interval and later closure publication are distinct; this is not closure of Microsoft’s incident.

Safe next step

Check connected-task results before retrying and preserve errors for support. Follow this exact incident and use an established alternative workflow for essential work.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase eu-west-1 Storage request incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Storage requests in eu-west-1; two separate November 12 impact windows

Supabase reports that Storage requests in eu-west-1 may have been slow or aborted during two separate windows on November 12: 14:14–14:18 UTC and 14:25–14:29 UTC. The 14:48 UTC notice said the issue had been mitigated and was under Monitoring. At 14:56 UTC Supabase explicitly resolved the incident after observing no further issues. The notice does not establish impact on every region, all databases or every Supabase service.

Safe next step

Verify whether a storage request or upload completed before retrying to avoid duplicates. Preserve request IDs and any continuing errors for Supabase support.

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OpenAIReported resolved

Needs recheck

OpenAI GPT-image-2.5 and 2.6 Sunburst/Flare errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Named image models; API Images component; countries and plans unspecified

OpenAI identified elevated errors for GPT-image-2.5 Sunburst and Flare at 08:52 UTC on November 12 and also named GPT-image-2.6 Sunburst and Flare at 08:58. It applied a mitigation and entered Monitoring at 09:18 UTC, then explicitly resolved the incident at 09:25 UTC, saying affected services were operating normally again. These are notice times, not a separately established complete impact interval. The stated scope remains the named models and the API Images component, not all ChatGPT or API features.

Safe next step

Check whether an image request completed before resubmitting it. Retain request errors for support and use an established alternative workflow for essential work.

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Cloudflare / ReplicateReported resolved

Needs recheck

Replicate prediction 500-error incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Replicate predictions; countries and specific models unspecified

Cloudflare opened this distinct Replicate incident at 08:30 UTC on November 12, reporting increased 500 errors for predictions. It identified the issue at 09:34 and explicitly resolved it at 11:34 UTC. These notice times do not establish a separate complete impact interval. This closure does not close the separate November 11 input-upload/model-registry incident, which remains Identified; the November 10 OpenAI-model prediction incident is also separate.

Safe next step

Check the prediction result before retrying to avoid duplicate work. Keep the request ID and error for support, and follow this exact incident.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare DNSSEC configuration-change incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Enabling or disabling DNSSEC signing; DNSSEC Updates component; countries unspecified

Cloudflare investigated problems enabling or disabling DNSSEC signing from its 04:53 UTC notice on November 12. It identified the issue at 05:03, reported a fix under Monitoring at 05:06 and explicitly resolved the incident at 05:26 UTC. These are notice times, not a separately established impact interval. The stated scope is configuration changes; the notice does not establish a general DNS-resolution outage.

Safe next step

Verify the intended DNSSEC configuration and the result of any previous change before submitting another. Preserve errors for support; do not disable DNSSEC as a general workaround.

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PayPalReported resolved

Needs recheck

PayPal checkout and multiple-API incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
PP-LIVE-110644; official affected-region label: Global; named payment functions

PayPal’s official RSS notice published at 08:45:37 UTC on November 12 says PP-LIVE-110644 is resolved and its impact mitigated. It names Refunds, Authorizations, Billing Agreements, Captures, Orders, Express Checkout APIs, Online Checkout, Retail Checkout and Crypto, with affected regions labelled Global. The notice supplies no exact onset or recovery interval; its publication time is not an impact start.

Safe next step

Check the payment, order, capture or refund status before retrying to avoid duplicate transactions. Retain transaction references and continuing errors for PayPal support.

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ZoomReported resolved

Needs recheck

US: Zoom outbound SMS incident resolved; inbound unaffected

Who / what is affected
Subset of US users; outbound SMS associated with Zoom Phone, Zoom CX and meeting invitations

Zoom’s first notice at 02:21 UTC on November 12 (November 11 at 18:21 PST) reported degraded outbound SMS for a subset of US users, while inbound SMS remained operational. At 04:04 UTC Zoom said its underlying carrier had restored the affected outbound service and entered Monitoring; at 04:45 UTC it explicitly resolved the incident. These are notice times, not an independently established complete impact interval. The scope remains US outbound SMS associated with Phone, CX and meeting invitations, not a general meeting or voice outage.

Safe next step

Check whether an earlier SMS or invitation was delivered before resending. Preserve delivery errors for support and use an established alternative contact method when necessary.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Uruguay: Mercado Pago Point payment-rejection incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Point payments in Uruguay (MLU); no other country or product established as affected

Mercado Pago reported Point payment rejections in Uruguay (MLU) at 02:32 UTC on November 12 (November 11 at 23:32 GMT-03:00). It explicitly resolved this incident at 03:42 UTC (00:42 GMT-03:00 on November 12). These publication times do not establish a separate complete impact interval. No impact on other countries or products is established.

Safe next step

Check the payment and receipt status before trying again to avoid duplicate charges. Retain the error and transaction reference for Mercado Pago support.

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OpenAIReported resolved

Needs recheck

OpenAI: new Workspace Agent run-start incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Starting new Workspace Agent runs; ChatGPT Agent component; countries and plans unspecified

OpenAI’s November 11 22:50 UTC notice reported an issue preventing users from starting new Workspace Agent runs, with the ChatGPT Agent component marked affected. On November 12 at 08:32 UTC it explicitly resolved the incident and said all affected services were operating normally again. These are notice times, not a separately verified complete impact interval. The notice does not establish that already-running agents, every ChatGPT conversation or all API models failed.

Safe next step

Check the task state before submitting it again. Keep essential work available through an established alternative workflow and retain errors for support.

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AWS EC2Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Tokyo EC2 launch and connectivity incident resolved

Who / what is affected
ap-northeast-1, primarily apne1-az1; APIs, new launches and existing instances with modified networking

The revised text of AWS’s November 11 21:11 UTC closure distinguishes two phases, primarily in apne1-az1. From 14:46 to 17:46 UTC, API errors and failed launches also affected dependent workflows such as Auto Scaling, ECS and RDS; existing EC2 instances were unaffected during this first phase. After API mitigation, connectivity problems affected newly launched instances and existing instances whose network configuration was modified, with full resolution at 20:31 UTC. ECS, EKS, ELB and NAT Gateway workflows that launch instances or change networking were also affected. The later connectivity scope must not be excluded merely because an instance already existed. This is not a global AWS outage.

Safe next step

Verify the instance, network and provisioning result before repeating a launch or change. Check health data and alarms again; preserve any continuing errors for AWS support.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub Actions, Pages, Webhooks and Copilot incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Named GitHub products; Actions job backlog; countries unspecified

GitHub opened this distinct multi-product incident at 20:48 UTC on November 11. At 21:07 it reported mitigation and recovery while processing the Actions backlog. At 21:21 it said the backlog was fully processed and all affected services had recovered, then explicitly resolved the incident at 21:21:39. A root cause analysis is promised, not yet published. These are notice times, not a separately established complete impact interval. The earlier 20:22 Webhooks incident remains a separate notice.

Safe next step

Check queued jobs, deployments and webhook deliveries before retrying to avoid duplicates. Verify each task’s result and follow the official incident for later findings and the root cause report.

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OpenAIReported resolved

Needs recheck

OpenAI login, sign-up and ChatGPT feature incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Logins, sign-ups, Work, dots, Sites and Spaces; conversation creation through the OpenAI API; countries unspecified

OpenAI began posting investigation updates at 20:43 UTC on November 11 for logins, sign-ups, work mode, dots, sites and spaces. Its 20:50 update also reported elevated errors creating conversations through the OpenAI API. At 20:52 it explicitly resolved the incident and reported normal operation of affected services. The notices do not establish a complete impact window, affected-country list or failure of every API model or customer tier.

Safe next step

Check whether the earlier sign-up, conversation or task completed before retrying. Preserve continuing errors for support and use the official incident for updates.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

Earlier GitHub Webhooks incident resolved

Who / what is affected
GitHub Webhooks; countries unspecified

GitHub investigated degraded Webhooks performance at 20:22 UTC on November 11, reported normal operation under monitoring at 20:26, and explicitly resolved the incident moments later at 20:26. A root cause analysis is promised, not yet supplied. These notice times are not a separately established full impact interval. This incident is separate from the later multi-product disruption starting with a 20:48 notice.

Safe next step

Check earlier webhook deliveries and their processing state before replaying events. Follow the separate later incident if Actions, Pages or Copilot remain affected.

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SlackReported resolved

Needs recheck

Slack loading and saving incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Some Slack users: loading, sign-in, channels, saved changes and related administration/integration workflows; countries unspecified

Slack’s first notice was at 15:24 UTC on November 11. Some users had loading and saving errors; later updates also named sign-in, channel creation, app installation and workflow publication. Slack investigated a recent database change as the likely trigger of a storage-capacity problem. It reports normal error rates from 16:15 UTC and formally resolved the incident at 18:58 after monitoring and adding database capacity. The cause investigation continues. Publication and closure times do not establish that every user was affected throughout that interval.

Safe next step

Check whether the earlier change, channel, app installation or workflow was saved before repeating it. Preserve continuing errors and contact Slack support if needed.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase Tokyo project lifecycle incident resolved

Who / what is affected
ap-northeast-1: project creation, resizing, restoration and upgrades

Supabase investigated project lifecycle failures in ap-northeast-1 from its 16:44 UTC November 11 notice. Its upstream provider identified the issue at 17:05, validation was reported at 18:14 and recovery entered Monitoring at 18:39. At 21:32 UTC Supabase explicitly resolved the incident, saying all operations had returned to normal and remained stable. The named functions are project creation, resizing, restoration and upgrades; this does not establish that every existing database or other region failed. Notice times are distinct from a complete impact interval.

Safe next step

Check the current project operation and its result before submitting another create, resize, restore or upgrade request. Preserve errors and follow the exact regional incident.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare network degradation near LAX and western North America resolved

Who / what is affected
Network performance near LAX and western North America; no affected-user country list

Cloudflare investigated network performance degradation near LAX and western North America at 15:53 UTC on November 11, identified the issue at 16:00 and monitored a fix at 16:10. It explicitly resolved the incident at 16:18. These are notice times, not a separately established complete impact window. The geographically limited notice does not establish a global failure of every Cloudflare product.

Safe next step

Check the result of earlier requests before retrying. Preserve any continuing latency or connection errors for support.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Workers deployments with D1 bindings: incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Workers deployments with D1 bindings; countries unspecified

Cloudflare reports deployment problems for Workers with D1 bindings on November 11 between 12:42 and 13:03 UTC and explicitly marks the incident resolved at 13:03. The retrospective notice was created at 13:09 UTC, after that impact window. Workers and D1 are the listed services; this does not establish that every running Worker or database query failed.

Safe next step

Check the state of the earlier deployment before retrying. Preserve continuing errors for support; provider closure does not confirm that each deployment completed.

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BullhornReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn REST integrations: later authentication incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Some REST API users; connected integrations including Bullhorn Automation and Analytics; countries unspecified

Bullhorn investigated authentication errors for some REST API users and connected integrations, including Automation and Analytics, from its 08:16 EST (13:16 UTC) notice on November 11. A fix entered monitoring at 09:13 EST (14:13 UTC), and Bullhorn explicitly resolved the incident at 15:32 EST (20:32 UTC). These are notice times, not a complete impact window. The All cluster/service labels do not establish that every user or product failed. The overnight REST authentication incident remains separate.

Safe next step

Check the integration and earlier request state before retrying. Keep the error and affected workflow for support; avoid repeated credential changes without specific guidance.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Fable 5.2 and Mythos 5.2: four-minute error incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Named Claude Fable 5.2 and Mythos 5.2 models; interfaces and countries unspecified

Anthropic’s notice posted November 10 at 21:47 UTC reports overloaded errors on Fable 5.2 and Mythos 5.2 for four minutes and says the incident was mitigated, with a formal Resolved state. It does not supply exact impact-start and end times or identify affected interfaces, countries or customer counts. The publication time does not establish the start or end of those four minutes.

Safe next step

Check whether an interrupted request or task completed before retrying. Preserve continuing errors for support; do not assume every Claude model or interface was affected.

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NTT DOCOMOReported resolved

Needs recheck

Japan: DOCOMO 5G SA incident fully restored

Who / what is affected
Japan nationwide; 5G SA subscribers’ voice, mobile data and SMS; emergency calls, MVNOs and other 5G/4G excluded

DOCOMO’s November 11 20:45 JST restoration notice (11:45 UTC) explicitly confirms full recovery at 19:17 JST (10:17 UTC), following impact from 10:34 JST (01:34 UTC). Voice, mobile data and SMS for 5G SA subscribers were affected nationwide. Emergency calls, DOCOMO-network MVNOs and 5G/4G users without 5G SA subscriptions remained unaffected. DOCOMO identifies congestion in the switch serving 5G SA subscribers and reports no evidence of unauthorized access or cyberattack found to date. The earlier 20:15 JST notice is superseded by this later explicit recovery notice.

Safe next step

If service still fails, DOCOMO advises restarting the phone or toggling airplane mode. Users who temporarily switched the network setting to 4G should restore their previous setting, as the provider directs.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Custom-certificate deployment incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Deployment of a subset of Custom certificates; existing production SSL certificates unaffected

Cloudflare explicitly resolved this incident at 10:07 UTC on November 11. It had investigated deployment of a subset of Custom certificates from 07:45 UTC, identified the problem at 08:17 and monitored a fix at 09:01. The earlier pause on certificate redeployments applied until resolution. Existing production SSL certificates were expressly unaffected. These are notice times, not a separately established complete impact window.

Safe next step

Check the affected deployment state before resuming or retrying a redeployment. Keep healthy production certificates in place and preserve any continuing error for support.

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Cloudflare / ReplicateReported resolved

Needs recheck

Replicate input-upload and model-registry incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Replicate input uploads; model builds and pushes through r8.im; countries unspecified

Cloudflare marked this Replicate incident Resolved at 01:44 UTC on November 13, following a fix and Monitoring at 22:55 UTC on November 12. Earlier impact included degraded input uploads and unavailable model builds and pushes through r8.im. The incident opened on November 11 at 04:33 UTC. The closure does not define the exact full impact interval or an affected-country list. This remains distinct from the November 10 OpenAI-model prediction incident and November 12 prediction-500 incident, both separately resolved.

Safe next step

Check upload and build status before retrying to avoid duplicates. Retain the request error for support and follow the exact incident; do not assume all existing model predictions are unavailable.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Hong Kong 5xx incident resolved; impact window 07:30–07:45 UTC

Who / what is affected
Some customers reaching Hong Kong; no affected-user country list

The retrospective notice reports elevated 5xx errors for customers reaching Hong Kong on November 11 between 07:30 and 07:45 UTC and marks the incident resolved at 07:45. The notice was created at 07:52 UTC, after the impact window. This location-specific report does not establish a worldwide Cloudflare outage or a failure of every service in Hong Kong.

Safe next step

Retry affected requests after checking whether earlier writes or jobs completed. Preserve any continuing error for support; provider closure does not establish each operation’s outcome.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Worker Builds incident resolved; running Workers and Containers unaffected

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare Worker Builds; potentially multiple customers; countries unspecified

Cloudflare began investigating Worker Builds at 06:29 UTC on November 11, identified the issue at 06:32 and monitored a fix at 06:35. It explicitly resolved the incident at 06:41 UTC. Existing Workers and Containers were expressly unaffected. These are notice times, not a separately established complete impact window; this is distinct from earlier build incidents.

Safe next step

Check the failed build and deployment state before retrying. A build-service recovery does not require changing healthy runtime or security settings.

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BullhornMonitoring

Needs recheck

Bullhorn ATS/CRM REST authentication: fix under monitoring

Who / what is affected
Some users’ REST API authentication; ATS/CRM clusters labelled All; countries unspecified

Bullhorn reported REST API authentication issues for some users at 23:37 EST on November 10 (04:37 UTC on November 11). It implemented a fix at 01:01 EST (06:01 UTC), then continued monitoring at 01:30 EST (06:30 UTC). At its last verified update, the incident was Monitoring. The All cluster/service labels do not establish failure of every product or user, and this is separate from Recruitment Cloud reinstatement. The required original now redirects to the status homepage without this incident body, so its current state could not be reconfirmed and the previous check time is retained. The later REST integration incident is a separate notice.

Safe next step

Retry the affected integration after checking its current request state. Keep the error and affected cluster for support; do not repeatedly rotate credentials or change unrelated security settings without specific evidence.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare St. Louis network incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Network performance through St. Louis (STL), United States

Cloudflare’s November 10 notice at 22:50 UTC identified network-performance issues in St. Louis and said a fix was already under monitoring. It explicitly resolved this incident at 01:10 UTC on November 11. These are notice times, not a separately established full user-impact window. The named facility is STL; this does not establish a worldwide Cloudflare outage or an affected-user country list.

Safe next step

Retest the affected connection and check the result of interrupted operations. Keep local settings unchanged unless your own diagnostics identify a separate cause.

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ZoomReported resolved

Needs recheck

Zoom Conference Room Connector: AMS incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Some Conference Room Connector endpoints in the AMS region

Zoom began investigating at 20:25 UTC on November 10, identified the cause at 21:16 UTC and reported recovery under monitoring at 22:36 UTC. It formally resolved the incident at 23:00 UTC. The scope is a subset of Conference Room Connector endpoints in AMS, not every Zoom meeting or product. The notices do not provide a complete actual impact window or affected-user country list.

Safe next step

Check the room connector and retry a join after confirming the meeting’s state. Preserve any remaining error for support; do not change unrelated DNS or security settings.

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VercelReported resolved

Needs recheck

Vercel reports an 18-minute Sandbox and Blob incident in iad1

Who / what is affected
Some Sandbox and Blob API requests in iad1

Vercel’s retrospective says some requests had elevated latency and errors on November 10 from 19:16 to 19:34 UTC, lasting 18 minutes. It says a fix restored service at 19:34 UTC and marks the incident resolved. The notice was posted later at 21:04 UTC and updated at 21:08 UTC; these are distinct from the actual impact window. It does not establish a failure of every Vercel region, deployed site or storage operation.

Safe next step

Review affected requests and confirm writes or jobs before retrying, especially where duplication matters. A provider recovery statement does not establish the outcome of each individual operation.

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N-able N-centralMonitoring

Needs recheck

N-central HF2 available; all hosted servers upgraded, incident monitored

Who / what is affected
Hosted N-central worldwide; on-premises servers; customer-managed Agents and Probes

N-able’s November 11 response said HF2 build 2026.4.1.26 addressed the then-identified vulnerabilities exploitable without authentication; hosted servers were upgraded and back online. That dated statement does not establish remediation of the additional disclosures assessed in the separate November 12 incident 202613, which adds temporary feature and Intune restrictions and on-premises Legacy API precautions. Both hosting models still require customer Agent and Probe upgrades. Built-in remote control remains unavailable while Take Control works. The original 202584 incident stays Monitoring; the newer restriction incident is separately Identified.

Safe next step

Follow supported upgrade paths and the release notes. Keep on-premises servers inaccessible from the internet until HF2 is successfully installed. In both hosting models upgrade Agents before Probes; PME arrives separately automatically. Check actual communication and remaining feature restrictions, and contact support for environment-specific concerns.

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NotionReported resolved

Needs recheck

Notion Agent sessions: hanging/update incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Notion Agent · some sessions; countries and customer counts unspecified

Notion explicitly resolved the Agent-session incident at 22:14 UTC on November 10. Its 19:54 UTC notice had identified some sessions hanging or stopping updates, preventing new chat responses; the provider said an ordinary page refresh restored the session. These notice times do not establish a complete actual impact window or a general Notion outage. Closure does not confirm completion of every interrupted task.

Safe next step

Preserve unsent text, then refresh the page normally as the provider advises. Check the session and task result before repeating an operation.

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Cloudflare / ReplicateReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves OpenAI-model prediction failures through Replicate

Who / what is affected
Official OpenAI models via Replicate · some predictions; countries unspecified

At 18:35 UTC on November 10, Cloudflare reported some predictions on official OpenAI models through Replicate failing with 401 token_invalidated. It identified the issue at 18:43 and explicitly resolved the incident at 19:06 UTC. These are notice times, not a separately established full impact window. This does not establish an OpenAI-wide outage or failure of every Replicate model.

Safe next step

Check the prediction status and result before retrying. Retain the prediction identifier, error and time for support; this incident alone does not justify rotating unrelated credentials.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub resolves Git and pull-request delays affecting Actions

Who / what is affected
Git operations, pull-request processing and Actions workflows triggered by pull requests · countries unspecified

GitHub’s current retrospective identifies approximately 15:00–17:55 UTC on November 10 as the degradation window for repository pages, pull requests and Actions. The incident opened at 16:10 UTC and formally closed at 17:55 UTC; notice publication is distinct from impact onset. Some pull requests retained an earlier source-branch commit after broader recovery. About 1.8% of Actions events were delayed, peaking near 7% from 16:30–16:50 UTC; delays were usually 1.5–3.5 minutes, up to 10 minutes. About 0.09% of pull-request events did not start workflows and needed retriggering. GitHub attributes this to overloaded shared Git infrastructure after changes increased background and merge-processing work. These are historical event-specific measurements, not a new outage.

Safe next step

Verify remote Git state, the pull request and workflow result before repeating a push or job. Retain identifiers, errors and UTC times if the problem continues.

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OpenAI Costs APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

OpenAI resolves incorrect Costs API export data

Who / what is affected
Costs API exports published November 6–9 · countries and individual components unspecified

At 04:42 UTC on November 10, OpenAI reported incorrect cost data in Costs API exports published between November 6 and 9 and said it was correcting the affected records. At 07:02 UTC it explicitly marked the incident resolved and reported normal operation. These are notice times, not a complete period of impact. The notice does not establish incorrect charges, refunds or a general API outage.

Safe next step

Before using an affected export in reports or automated reconciliation, obtain a current export and verify its figures. Retain the original export, generation time and discrepancies for support.

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Cloudflare AnalyticsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare resolves filters on a subset of Analytics dashboards

Who / what is affected
Analytics filters on a subset of dashboards · countries unspecified

Cloudflare began investigating Analytics filters on a subset of dashboards at 08:02 UTC on November 10. It identified the issue at 08:12, implemented a fix and monitored at 08:25, then explicitly resolved the incident at 08:45 UTC. The notice names Analytics; it does not establish that every dashboard or country was affected.

Safe next step

Check that the expected filter is applied and compare the returned period and scope before using the figures. If results remain inconsistent, preserve the dashboard, filter and time details for support.

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Cloudflare Workers / QueuesIssue identified

Needs recheck

Cloudflare Workers changes are not producing Event Subscription events

Who / what is affected
Event Subscription events for Workers changes · Workers / Queues · countries unspecified

Cloudflare’s November 11 update at 05:05 UTC identifies the issue and says a fix is being implemented. Event Subscription generation for Workers changes remains intentionally disabled under the November 10 notice. Changes to Workers themselves work normally and deployed Workers are entirely unaffected. No restoration deadline or explicit closure is announced; this is separate from the earlier Workers changes incident resolved at 01:46 UTC on November 10.

Safe next step

If an integration depends on these events, check whether the underlying change completed and reconcile its actual state before retrying or replaying downstream work. Retain the change identifier and missing-event times. Follow the official incident; avoid unrelated DNS, security or routing changes.

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OpenAI APIsReported resolved

Needs recheck

OpenAI resolves the November 9 API errors incident

Who / what is affected
Listed OpenAI API components · exact affected models, countries and tiers unspecified

OpenAI identified elevated errors for the API services listed in this incident at 23:08 UTC on November 9 and explicitly reported affected services operating normally again at 23:50 UTC. The page lists API components including Chat Completions, Responses and Agents; it does not establish that every model, country or subscription tier was affected. These are notice times, not a separately established complete impact window, and the incident is distinct from the earlier ChatGPT conversation errors.

Safe next step

Check request completion before retrying, particularly for operations that can create side effects. Retain the request ID, endpoint, error and time, and use the exact official incident if errors continue. Do not assume a different product or all models share the same incident.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
GitHub Copilot AI Model ProvidersReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub resolves degraded availability for named Copilot models

Who / what is affected
GPT-5.3 Codex, GPT-5.6 Luna and GPT-5.6 Sol in Copilot / IDE surfaces · countries unspecified

GitHub reported degraded availability for GPT-5.3 Codex, GPT-5.6 Luna and GPT-5.6 Sol in Copilot products and IDE surfaces at 23:16 UTC on November 9, attributing it to an upstream model provider. A broader Copilot operating-normally update at 23:22 UTC did not close this model-provider incident. A 23:59 UTC update explicitly confirmed mitigation for the named models, and GitHub closed the incident at 00:05 UTC on November 10. A detailed root cause analysis is still to follow. This does not establish an outage of all Copilot models or the upstream provider’s other products.

Safe next step

Check whether the affected Copilot operation completed before repeating it. If the problem persists, review the exact incident and choose another available model or Auto where appropriate, as GitHub advised during the incident. Preserve the model, IDE, error and time for support.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Mercado Pago PointReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago resolves the November 9 Point approval anomaly in Argentina

Who / what is affected
Point payments · Argentina (MLA) · other countries and products not established as affected

Mercado Pago explicitly resolved this incident at 18:49 GMT−03:00 (21:49 UTC) on November 9. The earlier 16:56 GMT−03:00 (19:56 UTC) notice identified a Point approval anomaly in Argentina (MLA). This closure concerns this specific Point incident, not every country, payment product or earlier incident. The notices do not separately establish the complete actual impact window.

Safe next step

Check whether a payment was authorized before retrying to avoid duplicate charges. Preserve the transaction ID and time, and use Mercado Pago's official support and incident page if the result is uncertain.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Cloudflare WorkersReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare closes the Workers changes incident

Who / what is affected
Creating, editing and deleting Workers · countries unspecified · already deployed Workers unaffected

Cloudflare explicitly resolved this incident at 01:46 UTC on November 10. It began investigating creation, editing and deletion of Workers at 16:15 UTC on November 9 and moved to monitoring at 16:35 UTC. Already deployed Workers were outside the stated impact. This closure is separate from the later Event Subscription event-generation incident; it does not resolve that separate feature issue.

Safe next step

Confirm whether a deployment or configuration change completed before retrying. Preserve the change ID, error and time, and check the official incident. Avoid unrelated DNS, security or routing changes.

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Reported status at last check
Cloudflare NetworkReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare's Eastern North America network incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Network performance · Eastern North America · not a worldwide or all-product outage

Cloudflare investigated network-performance issues in Eastern North America from its 16:34 UTC notice on November 9. It posted Identified at 16:56 UTC and Monitoring at 17:21 UTC, then explicitly resolved this incident at 20:12 UTC. These are official notice times; the page does not separately establish the complete actual impact window.

Safe next step

Match your location and connection errors to the incident, preserve timestamps and check the provider's update if problems continue. Do not make unrelated DNS or security changes based on a regional notice.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
GitHub Actions / Checks API / Pages / WebhooksReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub traces November 9 Actions failures to database migration

Who / what is affected
Actions/Checks; secondary Webhooks, Pages and Copilot code review impact; countries unspecified

GitHub’s current analysis confirms impact on November 9, 18:07–18:59 UTC. An average of 28% of workflow runs was affected, peaking at 65%; some runs remained stuck and consumed concurrency after service recovery. Moving a core Actions database to a new cloud region exceeded configured capacity and rate limits, with secondary Webhooks, Pages and Copilot code review effects. GitHub shifted traffic back, increased capacity and limits, then moved it gradually. Further migration checks and stuck-run detection are being improved; a customer API is being prepared, not announced as available. November 13 at 04:16 UTC is the report edit time; the incident remains Resolved.

Safe next step

Check workflow and check-run state and webhook delivery history before retrying. Preserve run/delivery IDs and times, use deduplication where supported and check the exact incident if delays or errors continue.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
ChatGPT ConversationsReported resolved

Needs recheck

ChatGPT conversation errors resolved after monitoring

Who / what is affected
ChatGPT Conversations · affected countries, plans and models unspecified

The November 9 incident's first published update at 18:16 UTC says a mitigation had been applied and services were being monitored; it does not establish the outage's actual start time. At 19:08 UTC OpenAI explicitly reported all affected services operating normally again. The named component is ChatGPT Conversations; the notice does not establish an outage of every OpenAI API or model.

Safe next step

Check whether a message or conversation operation completed before retrying. Preserve the error and time if the problem continues, and consult the exact official incident rather than repeating a possibly completed request.

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Reported status at last check
Allium Developer APIsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Allium Developer APIs latency incident resolved for the listed chains

Who / what is affected
Realtime APIs / Wallets Endpoints · Ethereum, Base, Elysium, Hyperevm, Monad and Arc

Allium's November 9 notice at 12:12 EST (17:12 UTC) names these six chains. At 13:35 EST (18:35 UTC) it said the problem had been identified and mitigated while latency and freshness improvements were monitored. It explicitly resolved this incident at 14:56 EST (19:56 UTC). This narrow API notice does not establish completion of the separate earlier security investigation or restoration of every platform feature.

Safe next step

Check the affected endpoint, chain and data freshness before repeating an operation. Retain request IDs, errors and times and consult the official incident if latency or stale results continue.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
GitHub Actions / WebhooksReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub’s November 9 report explains delayed webhooks and skipped workflow runs

Who / what is affected
Webhooks, Actions runs, Dependabot and dependency-graph updates; countries unspecified

The report added November 12 describes queue degradation on November 9 from 09:23 to 11:40 UTC, with a small share of delays beginning as early as 01:00 UTC. Before mitigation at 10:37, webhook delays averaged 26% and peaked at 30%; some deliveries were delayed up to 3.5 hours. Actions skips events older than 30 minutes, so some workflows did not start. A degraded Kafka broker was removed, and the backlog cleared by 11:40; formal closure followed at 11:50. These are historical findings, not a new outage.

Safe next step

Check workflow run state and webhook delivery history before retrying. Use idempotency and deduplication where supported, preserve run or delivery IDs and times, and consult the official incident if delays continue.

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Reported status at last check
GitHub · anonymous requestsReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub anonymous-request timeout incident resolved after recurrence

Who / what is affected
GitHub · anonymous site requests, release downloads and CI calls using anonymous access · countries unspecified

GitHub began investigating at 05:59 UTC on November 9 and later reported a surge in anonymous traffic causing 504 Gateway Timeout errors. Anonymous site access, release downloads and CI jobs making anonymous calls could be affected. Initial mitigation and monitoring were followed by a repeated rise in errors at 07:43 UTC; monitoring resumed at 09:05 UTC and the provider explicitly resolved the incident at 09:09 UTC. GitHub says logged-in users and authenticated requests were unaffected. A detailed root cause analysis was still promised; the notice does not establish an attack or a complete user-impact interval.

Safe next step

Check whether a download or CI step completed before retrying it. Keep the affected endpoint, HTTP status and time if problems continue, and protect any existing access tokens when reporting errors.

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Checked:

Reported status at last check
Bullhorn ATS/CRMReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn ATS/CRM Sandbox CLS29 login incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Bullhorn ATS/CRM · Sandbox CLS29 · some users' login requests

Bullhorn reported at 01:40 UTC on November 9 (20:40 EST on November 8) that some users could experience latency or errors logging into the ATS/CRM application in cluster CLS29, listed under Sandbox on the official page. It explicitly resolved this incident at 01:56 UTC (20:56 EST). The notice does not give a separate complete impact window or affected-country list. This closure applies to the CLS29 login incident and does not close separate Recruitment Cloud, Connected Apps or middleware notices.

Safe next step

Use the normal sign-in route and check whether an earlier attempt succeeded before repeating a dependent workflow. Preserve the cluster, error and time if login problems continue; do not share passwords or authentication codes with an error report.

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Reported status at last check
Bullhorn Recruitment Cloud / Connected AppsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn closes Recruitment Cloud and its separate feature notice

Who / what is affected
Recruitment Cloud restored for use; separate Document Editor/Daxtra feature incident now also resolved

Bullhorn formally closed the Recruitment Cloud notice at 01:12 UTC on November 13. The preceding 21:54 UTC November 12 update confirms reinstatement, package re-enablement and completed testing, permitting system use without further reinstatement action. Its dated update reported Document Editor and integrated Daxtra unavailable for all customers. The separate feature incident opened at 01:11 UTC was explicitly resolved on November 17 at 00:39 UTC. The earlier 15:01 notice restored five off-platform services in APAC except Japan and gave Japan a 21:00 UTC target; the elapsed target alone does not confirm Japan’s recovery. Earlier rewritten history retains conflicting body and display dates, so the earlier whole-record check time is preserved.

Safe next step

Check the separate Document Editor/Daxtra incident and your actual feature availability. Do not repeat package reinstatement steps when no action is required. Verify task results before retrying and retain errors for Bullhorn support.

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Reported status at last check
Mercado Pago Webhooks PaymentsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago resolves delayed Webhook Payments notifications

Who / what is affected
Mercado Pago · Webhooks Payments · provider label: ALL SITES

Mercado Pago identified delays in Webhook Payments notifications at 18:53 UTC on November 8 (15:53 GMT−03) and explicitly resolved the incident at 19:07 UTC (16:07 GMT−03). The official notice labels the scope ALL SITES without giving a country list. Delayed notifications do not by themselves establish failed payments or an outage of every Mercado Pago product.

Safe next step

Check the actual payment status and your notification backlog before retrying any payment. Keep normal duplicate-event safeguards when processing delayed webhooks, and preserve continuing errors and times for support.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
ChatGPT Image GenerationReported resolved

Needs recheck

ChatGPT image-generation error incident resolved

Who / what is affected
ChatGPT · Image Generation · models and countries unspecified

OpenAI identified elevated image-generation errors at 15:11 UTC on November 8. It reported mitigation and monitoring at 15:43 UTC and explicitly resolved the incident at 17:00 UTC. The public incident page associates it with ChatGPT Image Generation; it does not identify affected models or countries, establish an API-wide failure, or separately specify the beginning of user impact.

Safe next step

Check whether the original image request completed before retrying. If errors continue, retain the service, error and time for support without including private prompt content.

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Checked:

Reported status at last check
Supabase SupavisorReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase Supavisor connection interruption in eu-west-2 resolved

Who / what is affected
Supabase Supavisor · eu-west-2 · some users’ connections

Supabase reports an interruption to Supavisor connections in eu-west-2 between 09:42 and 09:52 GMT (UTC) on November 8. Its 10:53 UTC notice said the interruption had ended and recovery was being monitored; the provider formally resolved the incident at 12:35 UTC after confirming normal connections. This is a regional connection incident, not confirmation that every database or Supabase service was unavailable.

Safe next step

Check your connection results and application logs before retrying writes, using normal safeguards against duplicates. Preserve any continuing connection error and time for support.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
GitHub API RequestsReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub timeout incident primarily affecting unauthenticated users resolved

Who / what is affected
GitHub · some unauthenticated users · API Requests · countries unspecified

GitHub began investigating at 10:36 UTC on November 8 and later said degradation primarily affected unauthenticated users, with API Requests also degraded. API mitigation was reported at 11:56 UTC, followed by monitoring and explicit resolution at 12:32 UTC. The notice does not give a complete impact window or establish that all GitHub services failed. A detailed root cause analysis was still promised.

Safe next step

Check whether the original operation completed before retrying. Keep the endpoint, authentication state, error and time if problems continue; never share access tokens with an error report.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Bullhorn ATS/CRMReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn ATS/CRM tasks, appointments and mass-mail incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Bullhorn ATS/CRM · CLS20, CLS21, CLS22 and CLS23 · some users

Bullhorn reported at 10:33 UTC on November 8 (05:33 EST) that some users could have trouble adding tasks, creating appointments or sending mass mail in ATS/CRM clusters CLS20–CLS23. It explicitly resolved this incident at 12:18 UTC (07:18 EST). This closure applies to this exact feature incident and does not resolve the separate Recruitment Cloud / Bullhorn for Salesforce platform or middleware notices.

Safe next step

Verify that a task, appointment or mail operation completed before repeating it, especially a mass mailing. Keep any continuing error, affected cluster and time for Bullhorn support.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Claude Fable 5.1Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude Fable 5.1 request errors resolved on November 8

Who / what is affected
Claude Fable 5.1 · claude.ai, Claude API, Claude Code and Claude Cowork · countries unspecified

Anthropic explicitly resolved this incident at 08:54 UTC on November 8. Its final notice gives an impact window of 08:18–08:32 UTC; this differs from the later monitoring and formal closure times. The investigation concerned elevated errors on Claude Fable 5.1 requests across the named services. The notice does not establish an outage of every Claude model or specify affected countries.

Safe next step

Retry the affected request after checking whether an earlier attempt completed. If errors continue, keep the model, service, time and error details for support.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Mercado Pago PointReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago Point payment rejections in Mexico resolved

Who / what is affected
Mercado Pago Point · Mexico (MLM)

Mercado Pago identified payment rejections affecting Point in Mexico at 06:24 UTC on November 8 (03:24 GMT−03:00) and explicitly resolved the incident at 07:22 UTC (04:22 GMT−03:00). The named component is Point MLM. This notice does not describe a failure of all Mercado Pago payments or establish an impact outside Mexico.

Safe next step

Check the payment result and transaction history before trying again, to avoid a duplicate charge. Keep any continuing rejection details for Mercado Pago support.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Mercado Pago QRReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago QR Dinero Ecosistema partial outage in Brazil resolved

Who / what is affected
Mercado Pago · QR Dinero Ecosistema payments · Brazil (MLB)

Mercado Pago reported a partial outage in QR Dinero Ecosistema payments in Brazil at 03:19 UTC on November 8 (00:19 GMT−03:00). It explicitly reported normal operation and resolved this incident at 03:44 UTC (00:44 GMT−03:00). The named component is QR MLB; this does not establish a problem with all payment methods, all QR payments or other countries.

Safe next step

Check the payment result and transaction history before submitting another payment. If a problem continues, keep its time, payment method and error for support.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Bullhorn Recruitment Cloud / Bullhorn for SalesforceInvestigating

Needs recheck

Bullhorn Recruitment Cloud / Salesforce platform offline for some customers

Who / what is affected
Bullhorn Recruitment Cloud / Bullhorn for Salesforce; some customers; countries unspecified

At 02:07 UTC on November 7 (21:07 EST on November 6), Bullhorn said it was investigating a matter affecting Recruitment Cloud / Bullhorn for Salesforce and was taking the platform temporarily offline for some customers as a precaution. It announced no restoration time or confirmed attack cause. This later platform notice is separate from the older middleware-only disruption and does not establish a Salesforce-wide outage.

Safe next step

Follow this exact platform notice and contact Bullhorn support with the affected product, error and time. Check saved results before repeating operations.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
Bullhorn Onboarding365Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn Onboarding365 US Production login incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Onboarding365 · US Production cluster · login

Bullhorn explicitly resolved this incident at 06:22 UTC on November 7 (01:22 EST). Its initial notice at 01:15 UTC said the Onboarding365 application was unavailable and identified the US Production cluster and login service. The resolution applies to this exact incident; it does not resolve the separate Recruitment Cloud / Bullhorn for Salesforce platform or middleware notices.

Safe next step

Check access again and keep any continuing login error and time for Bullhorn support. Do not reset credentials solely because of this availability incident.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Cloudflare SpectrumReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare Spectrum in Phoenix: incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Spectrum · Phoenix · availability of existing Spectrum applications

Cloudflare began investigating at 00:59 UTC on November 7, saying issues with Spectrum in Phoenix might affect availability of existing Spectrum applications. It moved to monitoring at 02:51 UTC that day and explicitly marked this incident resolved at 14:36 UTC on November 9. The notice concerns Spectrum applications in Phoenix; it does not establish an all-product or worldwide Cloudflare outage.

Safe next step

Match the affected Spectrum application and location to the notice. Preserve connection errors and times; check the official incident before making assessed routing changes.

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Reported status at last check
SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase US-West-2 project lifecycle operations recovered

Who / what is affected
US-West-2 · project creation, unpause, restore, resize, restart and other lifecycle operations; active projects unaffected

Supabase reported an upstream-provider incident at 23:49 UTC on November 6 affecting project lifecycle operations in US-West-2. Existing active projects remained healthy. It observed recovery at 01:34 UTC and explicitly resolved the incident at 02:17 UTC on November 7 after the upstream incident ended. The affected lifecycle operations recovered; this does not establish that every previously failed customer action completed.

Safe next step

Check whether the original lifecycle operation already completed before retrying. Preserve the project ID, operation, error and time and use official support for continuing failures.

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Reported status at last check
CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare FedRAMP cache-purge incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare FedRAMP customers; CDN cache purge; non-FedRAMP customers excluded

Cloudflare explicitly resolved this incident at 16:36 UTC on November 12. Its November 6 notice identified a purge-pipeline bug affecting FedRAMP customers, which could leave stale content until expiry; non-FedRAMP customers were excluded. The closure does not provide a separate exact end of customer impact or establish outcomes for every individual purge.

Safe next step

Check the affected purge result and expected content. Retain purge IDs and continuing errors for Cloudflare support.

Source update:

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OpenAIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Some U.S. business Mastercards: payment incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Some U.S. business Mastercards; API automatic recharges and one-time credit purchases

OpenAI explicitly resolved this incident at 16:06 UTC on November 10 and reported affected services operating normally again, after monitoring from November 7. The earlier notice concerned some U.S. business Mastercards and possible failures of API automatic recharges or one-time credit purchases; an exhausted prepaid balance could then interrupt API requests. Closure does not verify an individual charge, credit purchase or refund, or establish that all payment failures had the same cause.

Safe next step

Check the payment result and API credit balance before repeating an earlier purchase. If a problem continues, retain its time and error and use official billing support.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

IPN payment-notification delays: November 6 incident resolved

Who / what is affected
IPN payment notifications; official scope ALL SITES, without a country list

Mercado Pago reported increased IPN payment-notification response times at 17:00 UTC on November 6 and explicitly marked the incident resolved at 17:15 UTC. The notice concerns notifications; it does not establish that every payment failed or specify affected countries.

Safe next step

Check each payment’s actual status before retrying a charge or issuing a refund. Preserve payment IDs and notification times if an individual notification remains missing.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Brazil QR payments: card and Dinero Ecosistema incidents resolved separately

Who / what is affected
Brazil (MLB); QR card payments and the separately named QR Dinero Ecosistema flow

Mercado Pago reported two partial QR payment outages in Brazil at 16:33 UTC on November 6. The QR Dinero Ecosistema incident was explicitly resolved at 16:42 UTC; the separate QR card-payment incident was resolved at 16:56 UTC. These are distinct payment flows and closure times, not an all-country payment outage.

Safe next step

Confirm the individual transaction result before retrying a QR payment or refund. Keep the payment ID and time if a transaction is still unresolved.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Cloudflare Wrangler, Pages and Workers BuildsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare Wrangler, Pages and Workers Builds incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Wrangler deployments, Pages and Workers Builds; countries unspecified

Cloudflare’s November 6 notice identified failed uploads affecting Wrangler deployments, Pages and Workers Builds at 09:47 UTC. A fix was implemented with monitoring at 09:53 UTC and the incident was explicitly resolved at 10:08 UTC. The notice names deployment/build services, without an affected-country list or a claim that every already-running application failed.

Safe next step

Check deployment logs and the active deployment version before retrying a failed upload or build. Preserve build IDs and errors; verify whether the original deployment completed to avoid duplicate releases.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
PayPal · Online CheckoutReported resolved

Needs recheck

Online Checkout incident reported resolved; Global region listed

Who / what is affected
Online Checkout · PP-LIVE-110567 · official affected-region label: Global

The current official PayPal RSS item for Online Checkout PP-LIVE-110567 is timestamped 09:46 UTC on November 6. It says engineers resolved the issue and mitigated its impact, with the affected-region label Global. The body gives no exact outage start or recovery time, so the RSS timestamp does not date either event. This does not establish that every country, payment method or transaction failed, or confirm an individual payment or refund.

Safe next step

Check the payment ID and actual status in the official PayPal account or approved integration before trying again or asking a customer to pay again. Reconcile completed, pending and failed transactions separately. Preserve receipts and errors; avoid duplicate charges, refunds or orders based only on a timed-out checkout screen.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
PayPal · BraintreeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Braintree incident reported resolved; Global region listed

Who / what is affected
Braintree · PP-LIVE-110566 · official affected-region label: Global

The current official PayPal RSS item for Braintree PP-LIVE-110566 is timestamped 09:43 UTC on November 6. It says engineers resolved the issue and mitigated its impact, with the affected-region label Global. The body gives no exact outage start or recovery time, so the RSS timestamp does not date either event. This does not establish that every country, payment method or transaction failed, or confirm an individual payment or refund.

Safe next step

Check the payment ID and actual status in the official PayPal account or approved integration before trying again or asking a customer to pay again. Reconcile completed, pending and failed transactions separately. Preserve receipts and errors; avoid duplicate charges, refunds or orders based only on a timed-out checkout screen.

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Reported status at last check
CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare Singapore network incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Traffic through Singapore (SIN); no affected-user country list

Cloudflare explicitly resolved the Singapore network-performance incident at 10:43 UTC on November 6, after a 09:32 UTC monitoring update and its initial 08:54 UTC report. Singapore (SIN) is the listed affected location. This regional infrastructure label does not identify every affected user’s country or establish a worldwide service failure.

Safe next step

Preserve error messages, request IDs and times, and follow this regional incident. Check whether a request completed before a limited retry; involve your service provider if problems continue.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Bullhorn for SalesforceInvestigating

Needs recheck

Bullhorn middleware notice remains open; later platform restriction is separate

Who / what is affected
Bullhorn for Salesforce middleware integrations; later some-customer platform restriction tracked separately

The November 6 middleware notice displayed at 16:02 EST (21:02 UTC) still says Salesforce Core is operational while integration-dependent parsing, Search & Match, resume viewing/document editing and emailing documents are unavailable. A separate, later notice at November 7 02:07 UTC says Bullhorn Recruitment Cloud / Bullhorn for Salesforce is temporarily offline for some customers as a precaution. The older middleware statement does not establish current access for customers covered by that later notice. Both remain investigating, without a recovery estimate.

Safe next step

Preserve the original document and unsaved changes, and follow this exact notice. Record errors and times for Bullhorn support; check the saved result before repeating an edit.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub: multiple-service incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Git Operations, Issues, Actions, Pages and API access

GitHub’s later root-cause report dates the main impact to November 5 from 23:21 to about 23:26 UTC, affecting Git operations, Issues, Actions, authentication and API requests. A failover-automation bug during planned maintenance left the database primary unable to accept writes; restoring writes mitigated the disruption. This impact window precedes the original 23:36 UTC incident opening. The formal closure remains November 6 at 00:20 UTC; later report publication does not mean a new outage. Automation and recovery improvements remain ongoing.

Safe next step

Check whether pushes, workflow runs or other writes completed before retrying. Preserve request IDs, errors and times if a problem continues, and use the official support route.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase: pg_net calls to Edge Functions recovered

Who / what is affected
pg_net calls to Edge Functions in ap-southeast-1

The November 5 notice investigated intermittent 502/503 errors in ap-southeast-1 at 23:12 UTC and explicitly confirmed normal operation of pg_net calls to Edge Functions at 23:55 UTC. The affected component is the regional Functions service. The region label describes infrastructure and does not identify every affected user’s country.

Safe next step

Check the result of the original function call before retrying any operation that changes data or initiates a payment. Preserve request IDs and errors for official support.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Mercado Pago notificationsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago: IPN and Webhook notification windows resolved

Who / what is affected
IPN and Webhook Payments notifications; official ALL SITES label, no country list

The separate November 5 notices opened at 20:42 UTC are now explicitly resolved: Webhook Payments at 21:46 UTC and IPN at 21:58 UTC. Earlier IPN 17:06–17:26 UTC and Webhook 17:20–17:38 UTC incidents remain separate windows. The official ALL SITES label supplies no country list and does not establish the result of an individual payment.

Safe next step

Check the authoritative payment status before acting on delayed notifications or retrying a charge. Preserve notification IDs and times; follow each official incident and avoid duplicate customer charges.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Cloudflare Workers BuildsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare Workers Builds queues returned to normal

Who / what is affected
Workers Builds CI/CD; no country list or general Workers-runtime outage stated

Cloudflare reported a Workers Builds issue at 19:51 UTC on November 5. At 19:55 it was processing builds and clearing the backlog. It explicitly resolved the incident at 20:20 UTC, saying queue times had returned to normal. The notice concerns builds, without claiming all running Workers or every Cloudflare service failed.

Safe next step

Check the build and deployment result before a bounded retry. Preserve build IDs and error times and use the official notice for continuing failures.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Vercel builds and DashboardReported resolved

Needs recheck

Vercel build delays and Dashboard degradation resolved

Who / what is affected
Builds, Vercel Dashboard and Vercel CI; some customers, no region list

Vercel reported delayed builds, slow Dashboard page loads and failed Dashboard actions at 18:25 UTC on November 5. Its 18:35 monitoring update also confirmed Vercel CI impact while delayed builds were being processed. At 18:50 it explicitly resolved the incident and confirmed the build backlog was cleared. The notice does not establish an outage of all deployed sites.

Safe next step

Verify the original build/deployment state before retrying. Preserve job IDs and errors and contact support for continuing Dashboard or CI failures.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Bullhorn Talent PlatformReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn Talent Platform performance incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Talent Platform US Prod component; login and platform use, some users

Bullhorn formally resolved this performance incident in its November 5 19:21 EST notice (00:21 UTC on November 6). It followed latency or login/use errors reported at 16:38 UTC and an identified fix at 17:28 UTC on November 5. The affected component is US Prod, an infrastructure label rather than an affected-country list. The older CAPTCHA and Canvas/BBO notices remain separate.

Safe next step

Preserve errors and times and check whether an operation completed before retrying. Follow this exact performance notice and use Bullhorn support for continuing access failures.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
GitHub ActionsReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub explains November 5 Actions and Checks failures

Who / what is affected
Some Actions/Checks workflow runs; peak about 3% failed to queue and 0.21% of in-progress runs failed

The current root-cause analysis dates impact to November 5, 16:39–16:57 UTC: some Actions and Checks runs failed to start, and some running jobs failed. At peak, about 3% of workflow runs failed to queue and roughly 0.21% of in-progress runs failed; these are different measures. Concurrent large read requests exhausted resources in the database storing Actions Checks data. GitHub mitigated by failing over the host and has increased memory capacity; query-concurrency limits are still planned. The incident remains Resolved from November 5 at 17:42 UTC. November 13 at 04:23 UTC is the report’s native edit time, not a new outage.

Safe next step

Check workflow and job status before restarting a run, especially jobs that deploy or change external systems. Preserve run IDs and error times and follow the official incident.

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Reported status at last check
ChatGPT Work, dots and Codex WebReported resolved

Needs recheck

ChatGPT Work, dots and Codex Web incident resolved

Who / what is affected
ChatGPT Work, dots and Codex Web components; no affected-country or plan list

OpenAI explicitly resolved the incident at 04:31 UTC on November 6 and says all affected services are operating normally again. This follows the November 5 investigation and mitigation under monitoring. The listed components are ChatGPT Work, dots and Codex Web; the notice supplies no country or plan list and does not establish that every ChatGPT, Codex or API feature was affected.

Safe next step

Preserve unsent work and check whether a request or task completed before a bounded retry. Follow the incident for the listed components; preserve error and task IDs for support.

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Cloudflare network in IndiaReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare network disruption at nine India locations resolved

Who / what is affected
Nine impacted colocations in India; Cloudflare services in the region

Cloudflare reported a network disruption across multiple India colocations at 15:05 UTC on November 5. At 15:37 it identified nine impacted colocations, all in India, and removed them from its network while working on restoration. It explicitly resolved the incident at 16:16 UTC. Nine is a colocation count, not an affected-user count, and no city list or wider global outage is stated.

Safe next step

Check your own application and failed operations before bounded retries. Preserve errors, request IDs and times and follow the official notice for continuing regional issues.

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Cloudflare Durable ObjectsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare Durable Objects in Western Europe: formal incident closure

Who / what is affected
Durable Objects in Western Europe; no individual-country list or impact window

Cloudflare formally closed this Western Europe Durable Objects incident at 09:05 UTC on November 6. The previous November 5 13:23 UTC message said the issue was resolved while results were still being monitored; the page now has an explicit final resolved update. The notice does not provide an earlier impact-start time, individual-country list or proof of the result of a particular request.

Safe next step

Verify the result of state-changing operations before retrying to avoid duplicates. Preserve request IDs and errors; follow this exact regional incident if symptoms continue.

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Mercado Pago IPNReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago IPN notification delay explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
IPN payment notifications · notice labeled ALL SITES · countries not enumerated

Mercado Pago reported increased response times for IPN payment notifications on November 5 at 03:29 UTC (00:29 GMT−03:00), then explicitly resolved the incident at 04:07 UTC (01:07 GMT−03:00). Its affected component is IPN. The ALL SITES heading is the provider's scope label, without a country list; this notice does not establish a general payment-processing failure or a Webhook notification outage.

Safe next step

Check the provider's payment status and transaction/event IDs before resubmitting a payment or processing a repeated notification. If delays continue, preserve timestamps and contact official support.

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Bullhorn Time & ExpenseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn Time & Expense SL1 login issue resolved

Who / what is affected
Time & Expense login · SL1 cluster · some users · countries unspecified

Bullhorn reported login latency or errors for some Time & Expense users in cluster SL1 on November 5 at 05:51 UTC (00:51 EST). It explicitly resolved the incident at 06:34 UTC (01:34 EST) and marked SL1 operational. The original names login and SL1, not every Bullhorn cluster or product. This closure does not resolve the separately reported Daxtra Parsing or Canvas/BBO feature restrictions.

Safe next step

If login still fails, keep the error, cluster and time and contact Bullhorn support. Check whether a time or expense entry was saved before repeating it; do not reset credentials solely because of this resolved outage.

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ChainalysisPartial recovery

Needs recheck

Chainalysis: Data Solutions back online; follow reconnection instructions

Who / what is affected
Data Solutions; Reactor, KYT interface/API and Address Screening · customer access being restored · countries unspecified

The November 10 03:00 EST update (08:00 UTC) says Data Solutions is back online and customers are being brought back as quickly as possible, with email instructions sent. Reactor, KYT (UI and API) and Address Screening were separately reported back online on November 7 with enhanced security measures and specific reconnection instructions. This does not establish access for every customer or restoration of every other product. Service restoration does not recover exposed information or establish completion of the investigation.

Safe next step

Authorized administrators should use their known Chainalysis account team or verified official support to confirm the customer-specific reconnection procedure. Follow the provider’s instructions for the affected account and verify access; do not trust unsolicited reset links or remove access restrictions on your own.

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ChatGPT paid plansReported resolved

Needs recheck

Paid ChatGPT message errors explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
Some paid ChatGPT users · Conversations · countries and individual plans unspecified

OpenAI identified message-sending errors for some paid ChatGPT users on November 4 at 22:38 UTC. It applied a mitigation and entered monitoring at 22:49 UTC, then explicitly reported all affected services normal on November 5 at 00:32 UTC. The named component is ChatGPT Conversations. The original does not identify individual subscription plans, countries or an API incident; aggregate availability metrics do not establish each account's result.

Safe next step

Check the conversation before resending to avoid duplicate messages. If failures continue, keep the error and time and contact official support; do not share account credentials.

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Cloudflare Durable Objects / R2Reported resolved

Needs recheck

ENAM Durable Objects and downstream R2 errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Eastern North America (ENAM) · Durable Objects and downstream services such as R2

Cloudflare explicitly reports elevated errors affecting Durable Objects and downstream services such as R2 in ENAM on November 4, approximately 21:20–21:22 UTC, and says the issue was resolved. The report was last updated at 22:21 UTC; that is distinct from the short impact window. This does not establish a global outage, an affected-country list or data loss.

Safe next step

Check request IDs and whether storage operations completed before bounded retries. Follow the official incident and preserve the approved region and security settings.

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Supabase StorageReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase Storage incident explicitly resolved in both regions

Who / what is affected
Storage requests in us-east-1 and eu-central-1

Supabase formally resolved the Storage incident on November 5 at 11:02 UTC. Its earlier 08:30 UTC update said Storage in us-east-1 and eu-central-1 was operating normally. The planned us-east-1 database capacity increase had completed separately at 08:06 UTC; some Storage requests in that region may have failed briefly during the database switchover. The closure is supported by the explicit incident update, rather than inferred from the end of the 08:00–09:00 maintenance window.

Safe next step

Check the original upload or storage-operation result before bounded retries. Preserve request IDs, errors and times and follow the official incident; keep the approved project and security configuration.

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Bullhorn for Salesforce · Daxtra ParsingReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bullhorn for Salesforce: Daxtra parsing incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Resume uploads through Resume Manager in Bullhorn for Salesforce

Bullhorn explicitly resolved the Daxtra Parsing incident on November 5 at 13:14 EST (18:14 UTC), saying its third-party vendor Daxtra resolved the issue. The earlier Resume Manager upload problem reported error code 300 and named Global Parsing Action as a workaround; 300 was an error code, not an affected-user count or confirmed HTTP status. The closure asks customers to confirm their workflows. This is separate from the SL1 login incident, the new Talent Platform performance incident and the continuing Canvas/BBO restrictions.

Safe next step

Confirm resume-processing workflows and check whether the original resume was already processed before retrying. Preserve errors and times and contact Bullhorn support for continuing failures.

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GitHub ActionsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Later GitHub Actions notice now links the combined incident report

Who / what is affected
Actions trigger events and delayed job-status updates; countries unspecified

The later Actions notice, opened at 17:40 UTC on November 4 and formally resolved at 18:16 UTC, now directs readers to GitHub’s combined report. That report describes two event-routing disruption windows, 15:49–16:48 and 17:20–17:55 UTC, and a configuration change reintroduced after an initial rollback. The later notice’s 18:16 closure is distinct from the earlier notice’s conflicting 17:01 closure timestamp. Check both notices when matching a delayed workflow.

Safe next step

Check whether the workflow triggered or completed before rerunning it. Preserve the workflow/run ID, errors and times and use the official incident or support route for continuing failures.

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Netlify Build PipelineReported resolved

Needs recheck

Netlify build/deploy failures resolved

Who / what is affected
Some builds failing during function deployment

Netlify's notice posted at 17:15 UTC on November 4 says an issue identified at 16:43 UTC could cause some builds to fail with a system error during the function-deploy step. Netlify was adding capacity and working on a fix, and explicitly resolved the incident at 17:21 UTC. The earlier issue-identification time and later notice time are distinct. No affected-country list or failure of all existing deployed sites is established.

Safe next step

Check the original deployment result and build log before retrying. Preserve the deployment ID, error and time; use the official incident or support route if the same failure continues.

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GitHub Actions, Pages and WebhooksReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub publishes a combined November 4 event-routing incident report

Who / what is affected
Actions, Pages, Webhooks, Code Scanning and Copilot coding agent; countries unspecified

The report added on November 7 describes delays on November 4 during 15:49–16:48 and 17:20–17:55 UTC. Actions status updates were delayed by up to 25 minutes; Pages deployments fell to about 4% and webhook deliveries to about 58% of normal volume. An internal routing configuration and misconfigured feature flags caused the disruption; a later deployment reintroduced the change after the first rollback. Queued events were processed after mitigation. The formal resolved entry still displays 17:01 UTC, before the second reported window. This chronology remains inconsistent, so the previous confirmation time is retained.

Safe next step

Verify workflow, deployment and webhook-delivery results before repeating operations. Preserve run/delivery IDs, errors and timestamps and follow the correct official incident.

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Cloudflare Network NRTReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare NRT network latency incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Network traffic through Tokyo, Japan (NRT)

Cloudflare explicitly resolved the NRT network-latency incident at 15:33 UTC on November 4. It opened the investigation at 13:39 UTC and reported an identified issue with a fix being implemented at 14:58 UTC. The named location is Tokyo, Japan (NRT); the original does not establish a countrywide outage or impact across the entire Cloudflare network.

Safe next step

Record the affected request, error and time and check the official incident. Use existing approved failover where applicable; keep security controls and unrelated DNS settings consistent with the approved configuration.

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Cloudflare R2 and downstream servicesReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare reports resolved WNAM R2 and downstream impact

Who / what is affected
R2 in Western North America; possible Stream and Pipelines impact

The official report, last updated at 14:44 UTC on November 4, describes elevated latency and errors affecting some customers from approximately 13:00 to 22:15 UTC on November 3. Cloudflare explicitly reports this Western North America (WNAM) incident resolved; Stream and Pipelines may also have been affected. The report update is later than the incident window. The notice gives no country breakdown, individual data-loss finding or proof that all regions were affected.

Safe next step

Check the result of the original storage or media operation before retrying, and reconcile any dependent jobs. Preserve request IDs, errors and times and follow the official incident or support route for continuing problems.

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Mercado Pago QR ChileReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago Chile QR approval anomaly resolved

Who / what is affected
QR approvals in Chile (MLC)

Mercado Pago reported an anomaly in QRC approvals in Chile at 13:13 UTC on November 4 (10:13 at the provider’s displayed UTC−03 offset). It explicitly resolved the notice at 13:20 UTC (10:20 UTC−03), saying the service was operating normally. The named component is QR MLC; the notice does not establish a failure of Point terminals, all payment methods or every Chilean transaction.

Safe next step

Reconcile the original QR payment and order in the official dashboard or API before another charge attempt. Preserve transaction IDs and responses and use official merchant support if the outcome remains unclear.

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GitHub Git/API/Issues/Pull Requests/ActionsReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub Git, API, issues, pull requests and Actions incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Git Operations, API Requests, Issues, Pull Requests and Actions; countries unspecified

The later GitHub root-cause report dates intermittent errors and delays from about 09:35 UTC on November 4 across pull requests, Issues, APIs, Git and Actions. A shared database reached capacity; GitHub switched database hosts. Recovery began around 11:24 UTC, remaining Actions impact was mitigated by 11:43 UTC and formal resolution was 11:50 UTC. These differ from the 09:49 UTC public incident opening. Database-load/capacity/monitoring changes are implemented; recovery-procedure improvements continue. This remains separate from the Mission Control task incident.

Safe next step

Check whether the original push, pull request, issue update or workflow completed before repeating it. Keep error details and timestamps and use the official incident or support route for continuing failures.

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GitHub Copilot Mission ControlReported resolved

Needs recheck

Copilot Mission Control task incident formally resolved

Who / what is affected
Listing and creating Mission Control tasks; affected countries not specified

GitHub formally resolved this Mission Control task incident at 10:01 UTC on November 4. The 08:47 UTC notice reported approximately 2.5% errors in listing and creating tasks; at 09:11 UTC GitHub said it had identified an issue with a specific client version, was deploying a mitigation and observed partial recovery. A detailed root cause analysis remains pending. The notice does not specify the affected client version number or countries; this incident is distinct from the later Git Operations/API/Issues/Pull Requests/Actions incident resolved at 11:50 UTC.

Safe next step

Check whether a task was created before submitting it again. Preserve errors and timestamps and follow the official incident; keep account and organization protections enabled.

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Box AIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Box AI incident explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
Some users unable to use Box AI; countries not specified

Box first reported at 05:48 UTC on November 4 (21:48 PST on November 3) that some users could not use Box AI. At 09:07 UTC on November 4 (01:07 PST), it explicitly resolved the incident after monitoring and marked the Box AI component operational. The original scope was Box AI; this does not establish that all storage, downloads or other Box products had failed, or that every country was affected.

Safe next step

If Box AI still fails, preserve the error and time and contact Box Support through its official route. Confirm that an operation completed before repeating it; keep access controls enabled.

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Mercado Pago notificationsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago Webhook and IPN notification delays resolved

Who / what is affected
Payment notifications; provider label ALL SITES, without a country breakdown

The November 4 Webhook notice reported increased response times at 06:40:40 UTC and was resolved at 07:02:40 UTC. The separate IPN notice was posted at 06:40:38 UTC and resolved at 07:02:38 UTC. These are notification-specific notices with distinct timestamps; ALL SITES does not prove that every country or account was affected. Restored notification delivery does not confirm an individual payment, settlement or refund.

Safe next step

Reconcile the payment in the official dashboard or API and check the original order and notification before retrying. Preserve transaction IDs and errors; avoid duplicate charges or refunds.

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Cloudflare PagesReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare Pages dashboard-upload issue resolved

Who / what is affected
Creating a Pages project by uploading static assets through the Dashboard

The current original says that between October 26 and November 4 some customers uploading static Pages assets through the Cloudflare Dashboard could have had trouble creating a Pages project. It explicitly marks the incident resolved at 06:35 UTC on November 4; the notice was published at 07:11 UTC. No countries or continuous per-customer outage duration are specified. This does not establish an outage of existing Pages sites, all deployment routes or the wider Cloudflare network.

Safe next step

Check whether the intended Pages project or upload was created before retrying. Preserve build/upload errors and follow the official incident or support route; keep DNS and security settings consistent with your approved configuration.

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Mercado Pago online paymentsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago online-payment notices each resolved

Who / what is affected
Payments API, Checkout Pro, Checkout API Orders and VTEX; countries not specified

Four separate November 4 notices were resolved. In UTC, the Payments API degradation notice was posted at 06:07 and closed at 06:45; Checkout Pro at 06:11 and 06:54; Checkout API Orders at 06:17 and 06:52; and the VTEX partial-outage notice at 06:17 and 06:25. These are source-specific notice and resolution times, without a confirmed common cause, country scope or single shared recovery time. They do not confirm the outcome of an individual order or payment.

Safe next step

Reconcile the original payment and order in the official dashboard or API before another attempt. Record transaction IDs and response errors, and use the official merchant support route for an unresolved result.

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Mercado Pago Point Legacy APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago Point Legacy API degradation resolved

Who / what is affected
In-store Point Legacy API; countries not specified

Mercado Pago posted a Point Legacy API degradation notice at 06:21 UTC on November 4 and explicitly resolved it at 06:43 UTC. The notice lists possible 5xx errors and response-rate, lag or health anomalies. Its component is in-store Point Legacy, separate from online checkout and payment notifications. It gives no affected-country breakdown or proof that every terminal or individual transaction failed.

Safe next step

Check the original transaction status before another charge attempt and preserve the terminal or transaction ID and response. Follow official merchant support if the result remains unclear.

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Supabase Supavisor Shared PoolerReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase Shared Pooler errors in us-east-2 resolved

Who / what is affected
Supavisor Shared Pooler connections in us-east-2; other regions not established as affected

Supabase reports intermittent Supavisor Shared Pooler errors in us-east-2 between 00:02 and 00:50 UTC on November 4. Its 03:48 UTC monitoring notice says errors had subsided and connections were back to normal; it formally resolved the incident at 04:17 UTC. This concerns the named connection-pooler component and region, without a claim of data loss, a global database outage or confirmed impact in every country.

Safe next step

Use the approved connection configuration and bounded retries. Before repeating a write, check whether the original operation committed; preserve connection errors and contact official support for continued failures.

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Beget hosting and mailPartial recovery

Needs recheck

Beget reports 95% shared and 94% dedicated servers back online

Who / what is affected
Shared-hosting and dedicated-server recovery; percentages count servers, not websites or all data

At 23:00 MSK on November 13 (20:00 UTC), Beget reported 95% of shared-hosting servers and 94% of dedicated servers back in operation. Technical support is available again specifically for shared-hosting clients whose websites were restored from backups; AuthInfo issuance for.ru/.рф/.su domains is configured. The earlier more-than 55,000 restored websites and half of shared-hosting backup-restoration work were November 11 milestones with different denominators. The overall notice still says recovery in progress, not full service or data recovery.

Safe next step

Follow the official recovery notice and verify your own site, mail and available backups before resuming dependent work. Preserve errors and recovery evidence; use Beget support for account-specific restoration and avoid overwriting recoverable data.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub reports Git HTTPS disruption and a separate integration recovery tail

Who / what is affected
GitHub.com Git clones, fetches and pushes over HTTPS; SSH unaffected

The report added on November 6 places the main November 3 HTTPS impact at 15:00–22:37 UTC. About half of Git HTTPS traffic saw median response time rise from under 100 milliseconds to as high as 5 seconds; errors averaged 0.65% and peaked at 1.29% of requests to that service. Excess connections saturated network capacity on serving hosts. GitHub blocked a client traffic pattern and reloaded load balancers; the block separately prevented some users of one third-party integration from using Git over HTTPS until November 4 at 13:26 UTC. SSH was unaffected. The main incident was formally closed at 22:41 UTC on November 3.

Safe next step

Check whether the original push or other operation completed before retrying. If problems persist, preserve timestamps and errors and follow the official incident or support route.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Observability: historical missing logs and traces clarified

Who / what is affected
Some Observability log events, traces and issue counts from October 5–23

A notice updated November 3 describes missing logs, incomplete traces or inconsistent issue counts between October 5 at 13:00 UTC and October 23 at 21:00 UTC, caused by ingestion-pipeline capacity limits. Cloudflare says capacity increased and service returned to normal; traffic and Workers were unaffected, and dropped events will not be billed. It does not confirm that every missing historical event was recovered.

Safe next step

Identify whether your evidence or analysis depends on that window. Preserve remaining logs and ask support about missing records; do not assume a restored service has backfilled all evidence.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Dallas Durable Objects errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Durable Objects in Dallas, Texas, United States

Cloudflare began investigating increased Durable Objects errors in Dallas at 15:38 UTC on November 3, monitored the incident from 16:13 UTC and explicitly declared it resolved at 16:42 UTC. The reported scope was Dallas, Texas, not all US or global Durable Objects.

Safe next step

Check whether the affected requests use Dallas and inspect request results before retrying. Preserve error times and IDs; avoid duplicate state-changing operations.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Workers and Pages build incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Workers/Pages builds and the Workers Builders queue

Cloudflare reported build failures at 14:46 UTC on November 3 and elevated Workers Builders queues at 15:15 UTC. At 17:23 UTC it said queues were returning to normal; it explicitly resolved the incident at 19:38 UTC. This concerned build/deployment operations, not confirmation that all deployed Workers runtimes were down.

Safe next step

Check the existing build and deployment result before resubmitting. Keep the last successful deployment available and retain the build ID and error details.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Hong Kong: congestion incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Traffic through Hong Kong; elevated 5xx responses and CNI timeouts

Cloudflare reports congestion from 06:20 to 06:32 UTC on November 3, with elevated 5xx errors and CNI timeouts. It explicitly marks resolution at 06:32 UTC. The notice was subsequently updated at 07:25 UTC; this later publication time is not the recovery time.

Safe next step

If errors persist, compare their region and timestamps with the incident window. Preserve request IDs and investigate a continuing local or application issue separately.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

APJC network performance incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Network performance in Asia Pacific, Japan and China (APJC)

Cloudflare investigated regional network performance from 03:26 UTC on November 3, identified the issue at 04:53 UTC, and monitored recovery from 05:49 UTC. It explicitly resolved the incident at 05:56 UTC. Later notice edits do not extend the disruption window or establish an outage of every APJC service.

Safe next step

For persistent errors, retain the affected location and request details and compare them with the regional incident. Confirm the current service result before changing routing.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Containers: start failures resolved

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare Containers failing to start

Cloudflare reported container-start failures at 04:12 UTC on November 3, identified the issue at 05:07 UTC and began monitoring at 05:12 UTC. The incident was explicitly resolved at 05:23 UTC. The notice concerns starting containers and does not establish loss of all container data.

Safe next step

Check the existing container state before creating a replacement. Retain start errors and identifiers; do not delete volumes or data to address a historical platform incident.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

API, Git and Copilot request incident resolved

Who / what is affected
GitHub API and Git requests, Copilot and a period of Issues degradation

GitHub began reporting Copilot degradation at 13:25 UTC on November 3 and later included API, Git and Issues impact. Issues mitigation was reported at 13:43 UTC, API requests were normal by 13:52 UTC, and the incident was explicitly resolved at 13:56 UTC. A detailed root-cause analysis was promised; it is not established as completed by this notice.

Safe next step

Before retrying a Git push, API mutation or Copilot job, check whether the first operation succeeded. Keep request IDs and compare any continuing error with the current status.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Postgres configuration and Connection Logging incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Management API Postgres configuration changes and affected dashboard controls

Supabase reported that Postgres configuration updates through the Management API could retain only the latest submitted values, overwriting earlier configuration. Certain dashboard controls were temporarily disabled. A fix was deployed and Connection Logging was re-enabled during monitoring. At 07:04 UTC on November 3 it declared the incident resolved and said Connection Logging was working for all customers. This does not confirm automatic restoration of every configuration value previously overwritten.

Safe next step

Review the intended Postgres configuration against the values actually saved, especially if you changed settings during the incident. Record differences before applying a deliberate correction; do not repeatedly submit the same change without checking its result.

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OpenAIReported resolved

Needs recheck

ChatGPT: file-upload and file-reading incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Some ChatGPT users uploading files or asking ChatGPT to read uploaded files

OpenAI reported file-upload or file-reading problems at 00:46 UTC on November 3, applied a mitigation by 02:51 UTC, and explicitly confirmed full recovery of affected services at 05:39 UTC. This incident concerned the reported file operations; it was not an outage of every ChatGPT feature.

Safe next step

Keep the original file and request. Check the upload result and official status before retrying to avoid duplicate uploads. If reading fails, do not assume the file was processed successfully.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare: Gateway DNS-over-TLS over IPv4 incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Gateway DNS-over-TLS connections over IPv4; IPv6 DoT, DoH and standard UDP/TCP DNS unaffected

Cloudflare investigated timeouts and DNS-resolution failures from 22:12 UTC on November 2. After a fix and monitoring, it explicitly resolved the incident at 00:34 UTC on November 3. The notice excludes DNS-over-TLS over IPv6, DNS-over-HTTPS and standard UDP/TCP DNS; it is not a global DNS outage.

Safe next step

Check the affected Gateway connection and official status. If errors persist, give your administrator or Cloudflare Support the time and connection details; avoid unrelated DNS changes or bypassing organizational protection.

Source update:

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase: Storage upload errors in us-east-1 resolved

Who / what is affected
Storage uploads in us-east-1; not a platform-wide database outage

Supabase investigated 5xx errors on Storage uploads in us-east-1 from 21:34 UTC on November 2. A fix entered monitoring at 22:23 UTC, and the incident was explicitly resolved at 22:48 UTC after uploads remained stable. The notice does not establish data loss or an outage of other regions and services.

Safe next step

Check whether each object reached its intended destination before retrying an upload. Keep the request reference and use official support if the result remains unclear.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago: later November 2 Point incident in Brazil resolved

Who / what is affected
Point in Brazil (MLB); separate from the morning incident

The separate Brazil Point approval anomaly reported at 19:38 UTC on November 2 was explicitly resolved at 21:18 UTC. This closes the later incident only; it does not combine it with the earlier Brazil incident or determine the outcome of any individual payment.

Safe next step

Check the transaction, receipt and any charge before retrying or collecting again. Keep its reference and use official support if its result is unclear.

Source update:

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago: four separate IPN/Webhook delays resolved

Who / what is affected
IPN and Webhook payment notifications; notices labelled ALL SITES

On November 2, the official notices report separate IPN episodes at 18:01–18:21 and 19:53–20:07 UTC, and Webhook episodes at 18:18–18:27 and 19:48–20:03 UTC. Each was explicitly resolved. These are four notices, not one continuous outage. Notification delay alone does not establish payment failure.

Safe next step

Reconcile the existing payment and notification records before retrying a charge. Developers should follow documented retry and idempotency handling; avoid duplicate fulfillment or collection.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago: three short Point Orders incidents resolved

Who / what is affected
Point Orders API; country scope not specified

Three separate November 2 notices cover 16:26–16:27, 16:28–16:29 and 16:30–16:33 UTC. Each reported API degradation potentially affecting error/rate anomalies, order handling and notification lag, and each was explicitly resolved. These are distinct episodes; the notices do not prove every order was cancelled.

Safe next step

Check the transaction, receipt and any charge before retrying or collecting again. Keep its reference and use official support if its result is unclear.

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Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago: Point payment rejection incident in Chile resolved

Who / what is affected
Point in Chile (MLC)

The November 2 notice reports a Point payment rejection incident in Chile at 16:31 UTC and explicitly resolves it at 17:20 UTC. This notice is separate from Brazil and Mexico approval anomalies; it does not determine the outcome of a particular payment.

Safe next step

Check the transaction, receipt and any charge before retrying or collecting again. Keep its reference and use official support if its result is unclear.

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GitHub CopilotReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub Copilot: GPT-5.4 Nano errors resolved

Who / what is affected
GPT-5.4 Nano in Copilot products and IDE surfaces

GitHub investigated elevated errors from 17:46 UTC on November 2, attributing degraded GPT-5.4 Nano availability to an upstream model provider. It reported mitigation/monitoring at 18:10 and resolution at 18:24 UTC. This does not describe an outage of all Copilot models or a ChatGPT-wide incident.

Safe next step

Retry the affected request and check the official notice. If necessary, use another model already available under your organization’s policy and plan; do not change security settings.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare: Workers deployment delays resolved

Who / what is affected
Deployment of updates to Cloudflare Workers; some customers

Cloudflare reported at 16:41 UTC on November 2 that some customers might see delays deploying Workers updates, with remediation in progress. It explicitly resolved the incident at 17:30 UTC. The notice does not establish failure of all running Workers or a general CDN outage.

Safe next step

Check deployment status and the official incident before submitting the same update again. Verify the deployed version; avoid unrelated DNS or security changes.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago: November 2 Point incident in Mexico resolved

Who / what is affected
Point in Mexico (MLM); separate from both November 2 Brazil incidents

The Mexico Point approval anomaly reported at 13:16 UTC on November 2 was explicitly resolved at 15:11 UTC. This closes that incident only. It does not determine an individual payment outcome or cover the separate Brazil incidents.

Safe next step

Check the existing transaction, receipt and any charge before retrying or collecting again. Keep the reference and consult official support if its result is unclear.

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Trigger.devMitigation available

Needs recheck

Trigger.dev: incident report identifies exposed root API keys and affected environments

Who / what is affected
Provider reports 0.66% of all customers affected; particular environments; self-hosted deployments unaffected

The November 6 report follows the November 1 incident. Trigger.dev says an attacker obtained customer root API keys for some environments, allowing access to environment variables, and listed recent runs, deployments and schedules in some environments. It reports impact to 0.66% of all customers and says it revoked potentially affected Trigger.dev API keys. It found no evidence of access to other customer data, services, production databases or dashboard accounts. Affected customers received email and dashboard notifications. The report says self-hosted deployments were unaffected and webhook signing secrets were not exposed. Containment and the resolved status notice do not establish recovery of copied secrets or completion of customers’ credential replacement.

Safe next step

Check the known Trigger.dev dashboard for the impact banner and affected environments. Affected owners should regenerate revoked Trigger.dev keys, rotate credentials in those environments, revoke the old credentials with their providers and check dependent services. The report says webhook signing secrets do not need rotation. Use known support if impact is unclear; do not send secret values.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago: November 2 Point incident in Brazil resolved

Who / what is affected
Point in Brazil (MLB); not a notice about all countries or every payment product

Mercado Pago reported the Brazil Point approval anomaly at 08:52 UTC on November 2 and explicitly resolved it at 10:45 UTC. This resolves that incident only; it does not determine the outcome of an individual transaction or cover the separate Mexico incident.

Safe next step

Check the existing payment status, receipt and any charge before retrying or collecting again, to avoid duplicate payments. Keep the transaction reference and contact official support if the outcome is unclear.

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NetlifyReported resolved

Needs recheck

Netlify: November 2 build-log display delays resolved

Who / what is affected
Build-log display in the Netlify UI; the notice does not report all builds or deployed sites failing

Netlify opened the investigation at 00:15 UTC on November 2 and explicitly resolved the build-log display incident at 09:12 UTC. The notice concerns logs appearing in the UI, not confirmation that all builds or deployed sites failed. The October incidents remain separate.

Safe next step

Check the existing build and deployment status before starting another build. A delayed log view alone does not establish build failure. Keep the build ID and relevant timestamps for support.

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Atlassian JiraReported resolved

Needs recheck

Jira: missing fields and related search/automation issues resolved

Who / what is affected
Some users of Jira family products; work-item fields and operations that use them

Atlassian reported missing work-item fields, including impacts on search and automation, at 00:10 UTC on November 2. It reverted a potential configuration cause and monitored recovery at 00:25 UTC. At 00:38 UTC it explicitly confirmed field-related operations across the four Jira family products named in the notice were operational. This is not the October 21 project-sidebar incident.

Safe next step

Check the affected fields and search results before editing configuration. Review automation execution history before rerunning an action to avoid duplicate changes; contact Atlassian support if symptoms persist.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago: Point approval anomalies in Argentina resolved

Who / what is affected
Point in Argentina (MLA); not all countries or payment products

Mercado Pago reported an approval anomaly affecting Point in Argentina at 18:44 UTC on November 1. It explicitly resolved the incident at 19:11 UTC. The notice does not give an affected-customer count or establish the result of any individual payment.

Safe next step

Check the payment status and receipt before collecting payment again. Use Mercado Pago support for persistent inconsistencies.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Mercado Pago: Point payment rejections in Brazil resolved

Who / what is affected
Mercado Pago Point in Brazil (MLB); not all countries or payment products

At 04:15 UTC on November 1, Mercado Pago identified payment rejections affecting Point in Brazil. It explicitly resolved the incident at 04:46 UTC. The notice gives no affected-customer count. Resolution does not establish the outcome of an individual payment.

Safe next step

Check the transaction result and receipt before taking another payment. If a rejection or inconsistent charge persists, contact Mercado Pago through its known support channel.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase: PG15 to PG17 upgrade incident resolved

Who / what is affected
PostgreSQL 15 to 17 upgrades on Supabase; affected regions and project count unspecified

Supabase explicitly resolved the PG15 to PG17 upgrade incident at 21:14 UTC on October 31. It had rolled back an AMI release after failed upgrades and reported normal error rates at 20:42 UTC. Regions and affected-project counts were not stated; check the result of your own upgrade before relying on it.

Safe next step

Project administrators should check their project’s upgrade result and the provider’s guidance before retrying. Contact Supabase support for a stalled upgrade and preserve existing backups.

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DiscordReported resolved

Needs recheck

Discord: voice-call establishment incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Establishing Discord voice calls; affected users, components and regions not specified

Discord explicitly resolved the voice-call establishment incident at 21:43 UTC on October 31, after implementing a fix at 19:40 UTC. The investigation began at 15:26 UTC. Affected users, components and regions were not enumerated; this was not a report that every call or message failed.

Safe next step

Check the official status and retry a call. If problems persist, report the symptoms through Discord’s known support channels while keeping your existing account and device settings.

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Akamai / LinodeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Linode closes its CVE-2026-98432 advisory; customer kernel updates still matter

Who / what is affected
Akamai Compute / Linode customer workloads; affected countries and counts unspecified

Akamai marked this advisory resolved at 21:23 UTC on November 9. It says most upstream OS vendors have now released fixed kernel packages and recommends customers apply them; customers using a Linode-provided kernel should deploy the latest listed version. The provider says IPv4 rules on public and VPC interfaces eliminated the immediate remote attack vector. Its closure does not show that every customer kernel is patched, every exploitation path is excluded or an affected system is clean.

Safe next step

Authorized administrators should apply applicable vendor kernel/OS updates when available, prepare recovery and test workloads. The provider’s network filtering is not an instruction to copy blanket rules into your own network. Do not test with an unknown exploit.

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OpenAIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Search issue in Dots and some ChatGPT experiences resolved

Who / what is affected
Search in Dots, ChatGPT Work and certain ChatGPT thinking experiences; countries unspecified

OpenAI explicitly resolved this search incident at 21:14 UTC on October 30. It affected search in Dots, ChatGPT Work and certain thinking experiences; the notice does not establish failure of every ChatGPT message or all API requests.

Safe next step

Preserve your query and any error details. Check the official notice before limited retries; do not delete conversations or change unrelated network settings.

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GitHub DependabotReported resolved

Needs recheck

Dependabot retrospective distinguishes write failures from later alert delays

Who / what is affected
Dependabot alert writes, update-PR links and security-alert creation/update delays; regions unspecified

GitHub's November 4 retrospective identifies datastore write failures on October 30, 20:15–21:56 UTC: dismissing/resolving alerts and linking update pull requests could fail. Creating/updating security alerts was delayed through November 2. The October 30 23:29 UTC formal closure is a separate milestone and does not establish that these later delays ended that day. GitHub attributes the overload to a missing fan-out queue throttle and says it restored throttling and isolation. Service recovery does not fix the underlying dependency vulnerabilities.

Safe next step

Retain known security findings and use the official incident for updates. Do not dismiss alerts or disable dependency protections to remove the error.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

October 30 Actions, Pages and Webhooks: root-cause follow-up

Who / what is affected
Actions workflows, Pages deployments and webhook events; code search/live updates also named

The incident was mitigated at 18:32 UTC and formally resolved at 19:23 UTC on October 30. A follow-up updated November 3 attributes it to gateway maintenance and aggressive Redis reconnections in the Central US Azure path, with about 90% of connection attempts failing. GitHub removed affected resources from rotation, reduced retries and described further retry/resilience work. The 90% figure concerns those connections, not all GitHub requests.

Safe next step

Check whether workflows, deployments and webhook deliveries completed before repeating them. Preserve timestamps for persistent failures.

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DiscordReported resolved

Needs recheck

Voice-call connection issue resolved

Who / what is affected
Establishing voice calls; countries and affected-user count not specified

Discord investigated voice-call connection problems at 15:23 UTC on October 30, monitored a fix at 15:43 and explicitly resolved the incident at 16:18 UTC. The notice does not establish a failure of every Discord feature.

Safe next step

If connection errors persist, retain the time and affected call details and follow official support. Avoid deleting app data or weakening security settings.

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NorthflankMonitoring

Needs recheck

Northflank: monitoring; rotate integration and project secrets

Who / what is affected
Northflank workloads, secret groups, global secrets and public addon access; countries unspecified

Northflank’s November 6 10:09 UTC update says the platform has remained operational and customer workloads stayed online, with no evidence of access to workloads or workload data. Its first known secrets decryption is dated October 30 between 02:39 and 03:08 UTC, before the first security-platform alert at 11:43 UTC. It says the exploit was patched within 60 minutes of notification and customers were notified within two hours. Investigation and independent forensic review continue. Customers should still rotate integration/project secrets not yet replaced and review provider activity; containment is not recovery of copied secrets.

Safe next step

Authorized administrators should follow the provider’s rotation order, update and verify dependent services, then retire old secrets as instructed. Review upstream provider logs and unexpected AI spend; contact those providers directly. Sign in again and reconnect integrations where Northflank revoked access. Ordinary users should follow their operator’s notice.

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ConnectWise Cloud BackupPartial recovery

Needs recheck

ConnectWise Cloud Backup: more reporting and core notifications restored

Who / what is affected
Formerly SkyKick; re-authorized Microsoft 365 tenants; portal and monitoring restored

The November 4 update at 18:55 UTC retains partial restoration. Backup Health reporting, Export jobs and Marketplace APIs became available on November 3; core notifications are live, with additional notifications enabled gradually. Billing capabilities and the platform backup dashboard are still being restored. Backup/restore access requires Microsoft 365 tenant re-authorization, and re-authorization alone does not prove that backups have resumed. SaaS Security and Cloud Automation have separate reconnection guidance; this is not confirmation that every capability or historical backup gap has been restored.

Safe next step

Follow the current partner guidance for your authentication method. Portal username/password users should reset their password and complete MFA setup if prompted. For Microsoft 365 sign-in, a password reset is not required; an authorized tenant administrator should verify the official provider flow and review requested permissions before consenting. Re-authorize each tenant and verify successful new backup snapshots.

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Archive of Our Own (AO3)Issue identified

Needs recheck

AO3 reopens with feature limits; review drafts before November 29

Who / what is affected
Archive of Our Own (AO3); affected countries and account counts unspecified

At the prior verification, OTW’s November 15 reopening notice displayed 08:28 UTC; its current public display is 08:00 UTC. The unreconciled display-time difference does not establish another reopening. The notice says AO3 is back online with limited functionality. Icons are temporarily hidden, not deleted; external-work importing is unavailable and downloads are HTML-only. OTW says no AO3 data or drafts were deleted during the downtime. Draft deletion remains paused for two weeks; starting November 29, normal deletion resumes for drafts 30 days old. The old deletion date shown on a draft may not reflect this extension. OTW has engaged a security firm and still cannot rule out compromise of the user database. The incident remains formally Identified, not fully resolved. The separate required October 30 original could not be reread, so the whole-record verification clock is held. The current notice also says high traffic may cause intentional loading delays and advises refreshing and trying again if the AO3 downtime page appears.

Safe next step

Use the known AO3 site to save copies of or publish drafts before normal deletion resumes; do not rely on the old displayed draft deadline. Consider changing the AO3 password, check the account email, and change passwords reused elsewhere. Use official notices and avoid unofficial recovery pages. Expect loading delays during high traffic; if the official AO3 downtime page appears, refresh and try again.

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OpenAI GPT Image 2 APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

GPT Image 2 API edit errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Some GPT Image 2 API image-edit requests; countries not specified

OpenAI applied a mitigation at 16:06 UTC on October 30, then explicitly resolved the image-edit API incident at 18:36 UTC. The notice concerns some image-edit requests, not all image generation or ordinary ChatGPT.

Safe next step

Preserve request IDs and error details. Check the official incident before bounded retries; do not treat repeated paid API requests as a guaranteed fix.

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Figma SitesReported resolved

Needs recheck

Figma Sites publishing disruption explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
Figma Sites publishing; not every Figma product

An official update posted at 20:44 UTC on November 1 explicitly says the incident was resolved as of October 31 at 02:00 UTC. That is the reported recovery time, not the publication time. The October 30 fix had previously remained under monitoring. The notice attributes the publishing degradation to a third-party dependency.

Safe next step

Retry publishing once and verify the published result. If an existing attempt has already completed, avoid duplicate publication; report persistent errors through Figma support.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub service disruption explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
Multiple services during an error burst; Issues and Pages named

GitHub reports a burst of errors from 14:21 to 14:30 UTC on October 30. It later monitored Pages recovery and explicitly resolved the incident at 15:02 UTC. The earlier monitoring state in some snapshots is no longer the latest state.

Safe next step

Check the result of page deployments and issue actions before repeating them. Preserve error times if problems persist; resolution does not prove every individual request succeeded.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase multiregion Logs issue resolved

Who / what is affected
Dashboard Logs and Logs API; other database/API services excluded by the notice

Logs were delayed, missing or unavailable from the 11:38 UTC report on October 30. Supabase says tests passed at 12:20 UTC and published resolution at 12:29 UTC. Its notice excludes other services, including databases and other APIs.

Safe next step

Check current logs and any gaps before rerunning work. Missing logs do not alone establish missing database data; do not repeat writes solely to recreate a log entry.

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Cloudflare Browser RunReported resolved

Needs recheck

Browser Run Quick Actions incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare Browser Run Quick Actions; potentially multiple customers

Cloudflare explicitly resolved the October 30 incident at 03:48 UTC after monitoring a fix from 03:31 UTC. The investigation began at 02:41 UTC and concerned intermittent 500 errors in Browser Run Quick Actions.

Safe next step

Check the outcome of an operation before retrying. If errors persist, preserve request details; this resolution does not close unrelated Cloudflare incidents.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Webhook Payments notification delay resolved

Who / what is affected
Mercado Pago Webhook Payments; official notice says ALL SITES

The October 29 notice investigated slower Webhook Payments notifications from 21:57 UTC and explicitly resolved the incident at 22:13 UTC. Notification delays do not by themselves establish failed or duplicate payments.

Safe next step

Check the payment record and notification identifiers before retrying or fulfilling an order. Do not charge again merely because a notification arrived late.

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PolymarketReported resolved

Needs recheck

Polymarket trading restored; postmortem reports partial refund completion

Who / what is affected
International Polymarket.com; Predictions/CLOB

The October 30 20:07 UTC postmortem says a compromised monitoring script abused some active sessions. It reports full refunds for 95% of affected wallets at that time and US$3.9 million in total returns, including pause-related losses. This is not confirmation that every affected wallet has been repaid.

Safe next step

Check orders and account activity before retrying. Service recovery does not prove reimbursement completion.

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BinanceMitigation available

Needs recheck

Binance reports replenishment complete; 198-token snapshot and future proof remain distinct

Who / what is affected
Company reserve replenishment and staged withdrawals; account/currency/network availability varies

Binance’s November 13 announcement says it completed replenishing assets affected by the incident, using more than $6.34 billion in corporate funds from named sources including part of SAFU and excess Futures Insurance Fund reserves. It commits to replenishing SAFU to about $1 billion. Its new reserve snapshot covers 198 tokens at November 12 08:00 UTC+8 (00:00 UTC); generating the full zero-knowledge proof is still expected to take about 40–50 hours. These are company statements, not an independent full financial audit or recovery of stolen assets. Withdrawals will continue to resume in phases; unsupported tokens follow its delisting process. Required older originals remain unavailable, so the previous whole-record check time is retained. No publication hour is supplied.

Safe next step

Use the known official app or website to check your exact currency/network and request. Never pay for priority withdrawals, connect or sign with a wallet to unlock funds, or give passwords, 2FA codes or recovery phrases to an unsolicited contact.

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Cloudflare R2Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Eastern Europe R2 latency explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
R2 requests in Eastern Europe

Cloudflare explicitly resolved the October 29 R2 latency incident at 21:50 UTC. The investigation began at 19:57 UTC and concerned Eastern Europe; it was not a confirmed worldwide R2 outage.

Safe next step

Check completed uploads before retrying. Preserve request identifiers if latency persists; this resolution does not close other active Cloudflare incidents.

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Cloudflare Durable Objects / ENAMReported resolved

Needs recheck

ENAM Durable Objects and downstream errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Durable Objects and downstream services in Eastern North America (ENAM)

The official timeline places the identified impact at 16:00 UTC on October 29, followed by monitoring and explicit resolution at 16:50 UTC. This regional incident is separate from the earlier Durable Objects/D1/Workflows record.

Safe next step

Compare regional logs and completed operations before retrying. Resolution of this incident does not settle other active Cloudflare notices.

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AlliumPartial recovery

Needs recheck

Allium MCP restored; public dashboard-link sharing still pending

Who / what is affected
Explorer/API, Assistant/MCP, uploaded tables, Datashares and public dashboard links

Allium says MCP was restored for all users on November 5 at 14:11 UTC. Its feature notice remains in monitoring and still lists sharing dashboards via public links among features to be brought back online. Core Explorer/API was already restored. On November 2, the Datashare incident was explicitly resolved at 15:38 UTC and Assistant was restored for all users at 16:22 UTC. These separate milestones do not establish full platform recovery or completion of the security investigation.

Safe next step

Follow official account/key instructions and check dependent jobs and data completeness. Datashare verification does not establish recovery of copied information or compromise of downstream companies.

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Cloudflare Durable Objects / D1 / WorkflowsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Durable Objects, D1 and Workflows incident explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
The October 29 incident opened at 14:16 UTC; geographic scope unspecified

Cloudflare explicitly resolved this incident at 16:33 UTC on October 29 after monitoring a fix. This is separate from the earlier 11:49 UTC resolution, the ENAM incident resolved at 16:50 UTC, and the later R2 latency investigation in Eastern Europe.

Safe next step

Match requests to the incident and time window. Check completed writes before retrying; preserve request identifiers for persistent errors.

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Cloudflare DashboardReported resolved

Needs recheck

Dashboard rate limits affecting shared networks resolved

Who / what is affected
Legitimate Dashboard users behind shared egress, including corporate proxies and Cloudflare One default egress IPs

Cloudflare reported elevated HTTP 429 responses on dash.cloudflare.com at 10:31 UTC on October 29 for some users sharing outbound IP addresses. A rate-limit adjustment was monitored from 12:00 UTC; the incident was explicitly resolved at 12:10 UTC. This Dashboard issue does not establish an outage of customers’ websites.

Safe next step

If an administrative action failed, check its outcome before repeating it. Preserve the error time for support if symptoms continue. Avoid bypassing corporate security or disabling protections to evade shared-IP rate limits.

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Cloudflare developer servicesReported resolved

Needs recheck

Earlier developer-service 500 errors explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
Durable Objects, D1, Workflows, Workers Assets uploads and Cloudchamber

Cloudflare reported elevated 500 errors for these services at 09:22 UTC on October 29, monitored a fix at 11:37 UTC and explicitly resolved the incident at 11:49 UTC. The later investigation opened at 14:16 UTC for Durable Objects, D1 and Workflows is a separate record; this resolution does not settle that newer incident.

Safe next step

Match failures to the correct time window and service. Check completed writes or uploads before retrying and retain request identifiers for continuing errors.

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Cloudflare Durable ObjectsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Eastern Europe EEUR2 Durable Objects incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Durable Objects and dependent services in the EEUR2 region

Cloudflare identified degraded availability, elevated errors and latency in EEUR2 at 10:06 UTC on October 29 and explicitly resolved this regional incident at 11:47 UTC. The scope is Eastern Europe EEUR2, not all Durable Objects regions.

Safe next step

Compare regional request logs with this window. Check completed operations before retrying and consult separate current incidents if errors continue elsewhere.

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GitHub Copilot cloud agentReported resolved

Needs recheck

Copilot agent-session report explains the October 29 disruption

Who / what is affected
Cloud agent session creation/listing on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app

The report updated on November 4 describes degraded Copilot agent sessions on GitHub.com and in VS Code between 05:50 and 12:40 UTC on October 29; formal incident closure was at 12:49 UTC. On average, 2.14% of agent-session service requests failed, peaking at 8.61%; for about ten minutes around 09:20 UTC, up to 40% of list/create-session requests failed. GitHub attributes the issue to client-experiment task-list traffic overloading a cache and describes capacity/load mitigations. These are historical metrics with different request scopes, not a new outage or evidence that every Copilot surface failed.

Safe next step

Check whether a session was created before starting another to avoid duplicate work. If symptoms persist, preserve the session identifier and timestamp for official support.

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Shopify AdminReported resolved

Needs recheck

Shopify Admin and mobile Admin incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Some merchants using Shopify Admin, including its mobile app

The official detailed history reports Admin errors between 07:53 and 08:45 UTC on October 29. A fix was implemented at 08:30 UTC; the 09:00 UTC resolution says monitoring ended with no further impact observed. Earlier updates described slow pages and 504 errors. This does not establish a failure of all Shopify services.

Safe next step

If an admin operation was interrupted, check its result before repeating a change. Compare any continuing symptoms with current official status and contact Shopify support with the error time.

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Cloudflare CNI 2.0Reported resolved

Needs recheck

CNI 2.0 errors and latency in Los Angeles resolved

Who / what is affected
Some Cloudflare Network Interconnect 2.0 traffic in LAX, Los Angeles

Cloudflare reported increased errors or latency affecting some CNI 2.0 connections in LAX at 06:55 UTC on October 29. A fix was under monitoring at 08:08 UTC, followed by explicit resolution at 08:28 UTC. The notice is limited to this product and location.

Safe next step

Compare connection logs and the LAX path with the official timeline. If symptoms persist, preserve request and connection identifiers for support; avoid unrelated DNS changes or disabling protection.

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Cloudflare networkReported resolved

Needs recheck

Queretaro network degradation explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
Traffic routed through Queretaro, Mexico

Cloudflare reports elevated 5xx errors, latency and connection timeouts for traffic through Queretaro between October 28 at 23:25 and October 29 at 00:35 UTC. The original explicitly says the incident is resolved. Its later record-update time is not a new outage onset.

Safe next step

Match affected requests to the location and time window. Check completed writes before retrying and preserve logs. This notice does not establish a nationwide or global outage.

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Cloudflare R2Reported resolved

Needs recheck

R2 incident in Eastern North America explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
R2 · ENAM region

Cloudflare reported increased R2 latency and error rates at 21:01 UTC on October 28, then explicitly resolved the incident at 21:12 UTC. This is separate from the earlier Durable Objects incidents and does not establish a global storage outage.

Safe next step

Check the actual region and operation. Preserve logs and reconcile completed writes before controlled retries; do not delete buckets, change unrelated DNS or weaken access controls.

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Claude · Google Calendar connectorReported resolved

Needs recheck

Google Calendar connector incident resolved

Who / what is affected
claude.ai, Claude Code and Claude Cowork · listing/searching events

The 20:05 UTC resolution on October 28 gives an impact window from 11:07 UTC on October 26 to 18:52 UTC on October 28. It concerns the Google Calendar connector and failed event list/search requests, not proof that Google Calendar itself or all connectors were down.

Safe next step

Retry a harmless read after checking the official status. Verify results before repeating calendar changes; do not remove accounts or change authorization merely because of this past incident.

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Supabase · Logging & ObservabilityReported resolved

Needs recheck

Log-delivery delay explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
Logging & Observability ·14:10–15:30 UTC on October 28

Supabase reported log delivery about 7–8 minutes late during this window. Monitoring initially noted a small remaining subset being reinserted; the 17:13 UTC resolution later said delivery was operational again. This does not establish an application-data loss or database outage.

Safe next step

Compare event times with ingestion times and check missing examples before retrying jobs. Preserve original evidence and contact support for specific gaps; do not replay writes simply because their logs appeared late.

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Cloudflare Durable ObjectsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Later Eastern North America Durable Objects incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Eastern North America · Durable Objects and possible downstream effects

A separate October 28 notice reported elevated errors, including storage operations, at 09:45 UTC. D1, Queues and Workflows could also be affected downstream. A fix entered monitoring at 10:26 UTC; explicit resolution followed at 11:10 UTC. This is distinct from the earlier same-day incident resolved at 03:28 UTC.

Safe next step

Check the affected operation and region. Reconcile writes and completed jobs before retrying, and preserve logs. Do not delete healthy resources or treat regional errors as proof of a global outage.

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GitHub CopilotReported resolved

Needs recheck

Copilot model report identifies the October 28 upstream-credential failure

Who / what is affected
Copilot products and IDE surfaces · six named models

The report updated on November 4 describes errors with several GPT-family models and MAI Code 1.1 Flash from 13:52 to 15:24 UTC on October 28, affecting named Copilot chat, CLI, review and agent experiences. About 9.73% of requests to the affected models failed, with a peak of about 36.97%. GitHub says an upstream-provider authentication credential became invalid and was replaced before redeployment; the incident was formally resolved at 15:28 UTC on October 28. This does not establish stolen credentials, a new attack, or failure of every model or request.

Safe next step

Check completed work before retrying an interrupted request. If symptoms persist, compare the current official status and the specific model and interface. Keep authentication and security controls enabled.

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Mercado Pago API Point OrdersReported resolved

Needs recheck

API Point Orders degradation explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
Point Orders API · error rates, order handling and notifications

The provider reported degradation at 04:12 UTC on October 28, potentially affecting 5xx errors, 4xx/2xx rate anomalies, order abandonment or forced dequeue/cancellation, and notification lag. It explicitly resolved the incident at 04:26 UTC. No country was specified.

Safe next step

Reconcile order and payment state before recreating or cancelling an order. Check notifications and logs, and avoid blindly repeating terminal transactions.

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Mercado Pago Payments APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Payments API: two separate degraded periods resolved

Who / what is affected
Payments API · no country specified in these notices

Two separate October 28 notices report degraded performance: 03:15–03:27 UTC and 05:49–06:06 UTC. Each has an explicit resolved update. The originals do not identify a country or establish that every payment failed. These are separate from the October 27 event.

Safe next step

Check payment status and notifications before retrying. Use your existing idempotency controls to avoid duplicate charges; do not treat a delayed response as confirmation that payment failed.

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Cloudflare networkReported resolved

Needs recheck

Ashburn IAD network incident explicitly resolved

Who / what is affected
Traffic routed through Ashburn (IAD), United States

Cloudflare explicitly resolved the Ashburn (IAD) network incident at 22:18 UTC on October 28. It had reported elevated latency or 5xx errors for traffic routed through IAD, followed by monitoring. This is a location-specific resolution, not a statement about every region.

Safe next step

Check whether affected requests actually used IAD. Use bounded retries for safe operations and check completion before repeating writes; preserve logs and keep normal security controls in place.

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Claude Gmail connectorReported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude Gmail connector search and reading restored

Who / what is affected
claude.ai, Claude Code and Claude Cowork · Gmail connector

The provider reports errors searching and reading email from October 27 23:00 UTC to October 28 05:29 UTC, with the formal resolution posted at 05:48 UTC. Other connectors were explicitly unaffected. This is a Claude connector incident, not evidence that Gmail itself was down.

Safe next step

Retry the failed search or read operation and check its result. Keep account protections enabled; do not delete mail, clear mailbox data or reauthorize unrelated connectors.

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Cloudflare Access APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Access configuration API incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Access API configuration changes · authentication and policy enforcement unaffected

At 21:13 UTC on October 27, Cloudflare reported elevated API errors that could delay or fail configuration updates. It explicitly said authentication and policy enforcement were unaffected. API errors and latency recovered by 21:28 UTC; formal resolution followed at 21:58 UTC.

Safe next step

Check the saved configuration and audit trail before resubmitting changes. Keep access policies and authentication enabled; this notice does not establish a login outage.

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Cloudflare Network Error LoggingReported resolved

Needs recheck

Network Error Logging processing incident resolved

Who / what is affected
NEL reports and analytics · website traffic unaffected

The October 27 22:21 UTC notice says NEL report processing stopped around 19:30 UTC. Cloudflare explicitly excluded website traffic and other services, then marked the incident resolved at 22:58 UTC. Resolution does not establish that missing historical reports were backfilled.

Safe next step

Retain independent application and edge logs. An empty NEL chart is not proof that requests had no errors; clearing browser data or changing DNS will not restore missing provider analytics.

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Cloudflare Durable ObjectsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Eastern North America Durable Objects: incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Eastern North America · Durable Objects; possible downstream impact

Cloudflare reported overload errors affecting multiple customers in Eastern North America at 00:17 UTC on October 28. D 1, Queues and Workflows could also be affected downstream. A fix entered monitoring at 01:22 UTC; the provider explicitly marked the incident resolved at 03:28 UTC. This regional notice does not establish a global outage.

Safe next step

Check the actual affected region and operation, and inspect completed writes or jobs before a bounded retry. Keep logs; do not assume a global outage or disable protections.

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DigitalOcean Managed KubernetesReported resolved

Needs recheck

Managed Kubernetes management operations restored

Who / what is affected
All regions · cluster creation, deletion, scaling and upgrades

DigitalOcean reported delayed or failed management operations from October 27 22:14 UTC, later specifying all regions. Existing running workloads were unaffected. A fix entered monitoring at 01:34 UTC on October 28; the provider explicitly resolved the incident at 01:55 UTC.

Safe next step

Check whether a management operation completed before retrying. Do not delete and recreate a healthy cluster or treat this as an outage of existing workloads.

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DreamHostReported resolved

Needs recheck

File Manager incident closed; some credential resets still required

Who / what is affected
Subset of email and FTP/SFTP users; File Manager and webmail

DreamHost explicitly marked the File Manager incident resolved at 23:45 UTC on October 27, following its October 26 restoration. File Manager remains operational, while a subset of mail and FTP/SFTP users still need passwords set by their account owner. Incident closure does not remove this account-specific action or establish recovery of any exposed data.

Safe next step

Affected owners: open the panel directly and follow official account-specific instructions. Other users should contact the owner. Allow up to 15 minutes; never send a password in reply to an unsolicited email.

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GitHub · App installation tokensReported resolved

Needs recheck

GitHub App token 404 errors: incident report

Who / what is affected
API and git authentication with GitHub App server-to-server tokens · Actions tokens excluded

The report describes elevated 404 errors between 06:55 and 08:01 UTC on October 27, linked to a database migration overlapping a cleanup job. The incident is resolved; this does not establish revoked credentials or deleted repositories.

Safe next step

Verify the repository and App installation normally; retry completed checks carefully. Do not regenerate every token or change repository visibility solely for this past incident.

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Cloudflare · cache purgeReported resolved

Needs recheck

URL-based cache purge delays resolved

Who / what is affected
Purge-by-URL requests routed through EEUR queues; Always Online

Cloudflare reported delays of up to 30 minutes from 15:10 UTC on October 27. Requests routed through EEUR queues could delay invalidation across its global network. It marked the incident resolved at 16:14.

Safe next step

Check invalidation results. Avoid indiscriminate Purge Everything, which can overload the origin; clearing a visitor’s browser data does not fix provider purge queues.

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Cloudflare · StreamReported resolved

Needs recheck

Stream playback and upload processing restored

Who / what is affected
Some live broadcasts from Western Europe; on-demand upload processing

Cloudflare reported degraded playback for certain live broadcasts originating in Western Europe and slow on-demand upload processing at 16:10 UTC on October 27. It marked the incident resolved at 17:02. The upload scope is not expressly limited to Western Europe.

Safe next step

Check playback and upload status before resubmitting; retain source video and job identifiers.

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Cloudflare · AI Security for AppsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Unsafe-topic detection failures resolved

Who / what is affected
AI Security for Apps · unsafe-topic detection

Cloudflare reported intermittent detection failures at 16:31 UTC on October 27 and marked the incident resolved at 17:09. The notice concerns this specific detection feature, not every WAF or Cloudflare protection.

Safe next step

Operators: review relevant application and security logs. Do not disable the WAF or remove other protections because of this feature-specific notice.

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Claude · Sonnet 5.5Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Later Sonnet 5.5 incident resolved

Who / what is affected
claude.ai, Claude API, Claude Code and Claude Cowork

Anthropic confirms impact from 14:42 to 15:17 UTC on October 27; its resolution notice was posted at 15:50. This later Sonnet 5.5 incident is separate from the 09 UTC incident.

Safe next step

Check existing results and completed operations before retrying. Keep normal authentication and security protections enabled.

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OpenAI · 6.1 SolReported resolved

Needs recheck

6.1 Sol performance incident resolved

Who / what is affected
6.1 Sol · affected interfaces not specified

OpenAI reported degraded model performance from 15:02 UTC on October 27, monitored mitigation from 15:40 and marked all affected services restored at 16:20. The notice does not specify exact interfaces or a performance metric.

Safe next step

Check existing results and completed operations before retrying. Keep normal authentication and security protections enabled.

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Cloudflare · external vendor firewallReported resolved

Needs recheck

External-firewall HTTPS incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Customers whose traffic passes through an external vendor firewall

Cloudflare explicitly marked this incident resolved at 15:12 UTC on October 27 after monitoring its fix. It affected traffic through an external vendor firewall: ERR_TIMED_OUT on standard HTTPS and ERR_EMPTY_RESPONSE on non-standard HTTPS ports such as 8443. Country and vendor remain unspecified.

Safe next step

Check the official incident and your administrator’s diagnostics. Keep firewall and certificate protections enabled; do not change DNS or repeatedly submit payments to work around it.

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Mercado Pago · Payments APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Payments API degradation resolved

Who / what is affected
Payments API · affected country not specified

Mercado Pago reported degraded Payments API performance at 13:59 UTC on October 27 and marked it resolved at 14:08. The notice does not identify a country; do not infer a Brazil-wide or worldwide payment outage.

Safe next step

Check payment status and transaction identifiers before retrying to avoid duplicate charges. Do not share payment credentials.

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Cloudflare · Workers BuildsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Workers with Containers deployment issue resolved

Who / what is affected
Some Workers Builds customers deploying Workers with Containers

Cloudflare identified deployment failures at 11:38 UTC on October 27, monitored recovery at 12:50 and marked the issue resolved at 12:55. This is separate from the earlier Pages/Workers build incident.

Safe next step

Check the deployment result before resubmitting. Preserve build logs and configuration; do not disable security controls.

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Claude · Sonnet 5.5Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Sonnet 5.5 errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Requests to Claude Sonnet 5.5

Anthropic reported elevated request errors at 09:14 UTC on October 27, monitored a fix from 09:38 and marked the incident resolved at 09:56. The notice names Sonnet 5.5, not every Claude model.

Safe next step

Check existing responses or job results before retrying. Reuse normal authentication; do not expose API keys.

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Cloudflare Pages / Workers BuildsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Intermittent Pages and Workers build failures resolved

Who / what is affected
Some Cloudflare Pages / Workers Builds customers · GitHub cloning

Cloudflare investigated intermittent build failures from 08:04 UTC on October 27 and identified failing GitHub repository clones. It monitored a fix from 08:10 UTC and explicitly resolved the incident at 08:17 UTC. This is separate from October 26 queue delays and does not establish a general website-delivery outage.

Safe next step

Check build logs and the deployed revision before retrying. Keep working deployments and security settings in place while confirming the affected build’s outcome.

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NetlifyReported resolved

Needs recheck

Build and Agent Runner failures reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Netlify Build Pipeline and Agent Runners

Netlify investigated elevated build and Agent Runner failures from 07:48 UTC on October 27. An earlier monitoring entry was displayed at 08:04 UTC; the explicit resolved update is 08:45 UTC. This is separate from the prior build-log display delay.

Safe next step

Inspect the affected job and deployment outcome before retrying. Re-run only incomplete work and verify results to avoid duplicate changes.

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OpenAI · hosted reviewsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Hosted private-repository reviews restored

Who / what is affected
Most hosted Code Reviews and Security Reviews · private GitHub repositories

OpenAI explicitly marked the hosted Code Reviews and Security Reviews incident resolved at 08:30 UTC on October 27. The earlier errors affected most hosted reviews on private GitHub repositories; this is not a report of every ChatGPT or local coding-agent action failing.

Safe next step

Check the review job’s status and any existing result before retrying. Do not revoke GitHub access, reinstall tools or change repository visibility solely because of this notice.

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Cloudflare WorkersReported resolved

Needs recheck

Delayed, skipped or duplicated Cron Triggers resolved

Who / what is affected
Scheduled Cloudflare Workers invocations

Cloudflare investigated delayed, missed or repeated Cron Triggers from October 26 at 21:48 UTC and explicitly resolved the incident on October 27 at 01:15 UTC. This is a separate incident from the October 23 Cron issue.

Safe next step

Review execution logs and resulting data before replaying jobs. Confirm idempotency and completed work to avoid duplicate actions.

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NetlifyReported resolved

Needs recheck

Build logs delayed in the Netlify UI

Who / what is affected
Netlify build-log display · upstream service dependency

Netlify explicitly resolved the build-log display incident at 03:21 UTC on October 27. An earlier update observed recovery from 01:55 UTC. This follows intermittent delays and monitoring of an upstream service issue; it does not establish that deployments themselves failed.

Safe next step

Use build/deployment status as well as logs to determine what happened. Check before triggering duplicate builds, and keep the build ID and time for support. Missing or delayed UI logs alone do not establish a failed deployment.

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OpenAIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Ads POST request errors reported recovered

Who / what is affected
OpenAI Ads API · POST /ads/* endpoints

OpenAI identified elevated errors on POST /ads/* endpoints at 18:19 UTC on October 26, applied a mitigation and reported full recovery at 18:30 UTC. The affected component is Ads API; this notice does not describe a general ChatGPT, Codex or model API outage.

Safe next step

Verify whether an ad operation completed before repeating it. Preserve the endpoint, request ID and timestamp for official support rather than assuming the entire account or platform is unavailable.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

API latency and related feature disruption resolved

Who / what is affected
GitHub REST/GraphQL, Checks, Actions, Issues and Pull Requests

GitHub reported elevated REST API latency, including Checks, and degraded parts of Actions, Issues, Pull Requests and GraphQL. Some requests were slow or timed out; notifications were delayed from 17:59–18:40 UTC on October 26. GitHub said services had recovered and formally resolved the incident at 18:57 UTC. A detailed root-cause analysis was still promised.

Safe next step

Inspect the request, workflow or pull request before retrying an action that changes state. Keep request and run IDs if problems continue; this notice does not justify changing credentials or disabling protections.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Workers build queues returned to normal

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare Workers Builds · build processing

Cloudflare reported increased Workers build delays at 15:12 UTC on October 26, deployed a fix at 15:38 and explicitly reported normal queue times at 16:03 UTC. The notice concerns Workers builds; it does not establish that all deployed Workers or every Cloudflare service failed.

Safe next step

Check whether a queued build already completed before starting another. If still affected, retain the build ID and timing for official support; avoid unrelated DNS or security-setting changes.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Point payment rejection incident in Brazil resolved

Who / what is affected
Brazil (MLB) · Point payments

Mercado Pago investigated payment rejections affecting Point in Brazil from 13:23 UTC on October 26 and marked the incident resolved at 13:50 UTC. The notice does not establish an outage across all countries or payment products.

Safe next step

Confirm the transaction result before retrying to avoid duplicate charges. Keep the transaction ID and contact official support if a payment remains inconsistent.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Localized Chicago network degradation resolved

Who / what is affected
Traffic routed through Chicago (ORD)

Cloudflare reported localized degradation between 08:21 and 09:03 UTC on October 26. Traffic routed through Chicago could experience intermittent latency and connection timeouts. The official notice marks the incident resolved; it does not describe a worldwide outage.

Safe next step

If errors persist, record the time, affected URL and request ID for support. Do not change DNS settings or disable protection solely because of this resolved regional notice.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Sonnet 5.5 and other Claude model errors reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Requests to Sonnet 5.5, Mythos 5.1, Fable 5.1, Opus 5.5 and Haiku 5.5 named in this notice

Anthropic reports impact from 06:05 to 06:35 UTC on October 25 and formally closed the notice at 07:53 UTC. Its initial investigation named several Claude models; this does not establish that every model, account or request was unavailable. The impact window and the later closure time are different.

Safe next step

Check failed messages, requests and task outputs before retrying. Rerun only the failed work after checking for writes or charges. A provider error alone is not a reason to rotate API keys or delete local project data.

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Claude · Fable 5.1Reported resolved

Needs recheck

Separate Fable 5.1 error incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Requests to Claude Fable 5.1

Anthropic reports a separate Fable 5.1 incident with impact from 08:08 to 08:29 UTC on October 25 and formal closure at 08:49 UTC. This is separate from the earlier multi-model episode, not one continuous outage. Recovery does not confirm that an interrupted request or agent task completed.

Safe next step

Check failed messages, requests and task outputs before retrying. Rerun only the failed work after checking for writes or charges. A provider error alone is not a reason to rotate API keys or delete local project data.

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PayPal · HyperwalletReported resolved

Needs recheck

Hyperwallet payout maintenance completed

Who / what is affected
Hyperwallet production payouts, APIs, Control Panel, Pay Portal and batch-file processing

PayPal’s official feed reports successful completion on October 25 at 09:25 UTC and says all Hyperwallet payout services are back online. The revised planned window was 06:00–12:00 UTC that day; completion was explicitly reported before the planned end. This was scheduled maintenance, not a newly detected unplanned outage.

Safe next step

Check the provider’s current notice and each payout’s actual result before retrying to avoid duplicate payments. Preserve payout identifiers and processing records; do not delete queued jobs or disable security controls as a workaround.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Two Payments API incidents reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Mercado Pago Payments API; countries not specified in these notices

Two separate notices reported degraded Payments API performance on October 25 UTC, at 01:12 and 05:09. Mercado Pago formally resolved them at 01:31 and 05:27 UTC respectively. These are separate episodes, not one continuous outage; the notices do not identify affected countries.

Safe next step

Check each payment’s actual status and your processing records before retrying. Preserve request or transaction identifiers and follow the official integration guidance to avoid duplicate charges. Do not assume that every Mercado Pago service or country was affected.

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RailwayReported resolved

Needs recheck

Precautionary API-key notice closed

Who / what is affected
Keys revoked by AI providers after the October incident

On October 25 at 06:26 UTC, Railway closed this notice as having no impact. Railway clarified on October 24 that precautionary revocations by AI providers can include newer replacement keys inadvertently included in a batch. It says this is not a new attack and does not show those replacement keys were compromised. The separate platform outage remains resolved; this notice concerns revoked-key failures. This closure applies to the clarification notice; the October 21 security incident and its credential guidance remain separate.

Safe next step

If your provider revoked a key, replace that key, update its Railway environment variable and redeploy dependent services. Follow the provider notice. If the keys still work, this notice does not require repeating completed rotations.

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BullhornPartial recovery

Needs recheck

Bullhorn: Canvas 11 restored; Canvas 10 report restrictions remain

Who / what is affected
Bullhorn Canvas versions 10 and 11; BBO login and the QuickBooks Desktop connector

The latest combined update at 15:02 UTC on November 13 repeats the feature limits. An older duplicate is still displayed as November 9 23:00 EST (November 10 04:00 UTC); the new entry does not explicitly reconcile earlier rewritten-history dating conflicts, so the previous whole-record check time remains held. Canvas 11 has full functionality; Canvas 10 can run existing reports but cannot create or schedule reports. Indeed is online with up to 3 hours for job posting, and the QuickBooks Desktop connector is online. Omission of the earlier BBO-login paragraph is not closure; the previous whole-record clock remains held. The earlier November 12 15:01 UTC Recruitment Cloud notice restored five off-platform services for APAC excluding Japan and gave Japan a 21:00 UTC target; that target alone did not confirm recovery. Bullhorn formally closed the related Recruitment Cloud reinstatement notice at 01:12 UTC on November 13. The separate Recruitment Cloud Document Editor/Integrated Daxtra and Connexys Document Conversion/Document Previewer incident was explicitly resolved on November 17 at 00:39 UTC. The combined incident remains Monitoring.

Safe next step

Follow the current combined notice for affected report, Indeed or BBO issues. Verify results before retrying and allow the stated job-posting delay; use Bullhorn support for continuing login problems.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Workflow Operations error incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare Workflows operations

Cloudflare investigated increased errors in Workflow Operations from its 13:13 UTC notice on October 24, moved to monitoring at 13:38 UTC and formally resolved the incident at 13:57 UTC. The notice did not establish a worldwide Cloudflare outage or an exact start time for every affected operation.

Safe next step

Check the workflow history and the actual outcome of failed steps before retrying work. Avoid duplicate external actions; do not change DNS or security settings for this resolved Workflows incident.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Fable request-error incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Claude Fable 5 and Fable 5.1 named in the official bulletin

Claude reported impact from 05:00 to 05:35 UTC on October 24 and formally resolved this incident at 05:53 UTC. The bulletin names Fable 5 and Fable 5.1; some updates refer to other models without a complete list. Do not infer that every Claude model or product was unavailable.

Safe next step

Check the saved response and actual agent/tool outcome before retrying failed work. Avoid duplicate operations; this is separate from the earlier Opus and multi-model incidents.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Ashburn network incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Ashburn, Virginia · Durable Objects, R2, Workflows, Queues, D1 and Artifacts

Cloudflare formally resolved the Ashburn, Virginia network incident at 03:09 UTC on October 24, after monitoring a fix from 01:28 UTC. The notice listed Durable Objects, R2, Workflows, Queues, D1 and Artifacts as affected. This is separate from the prior eastern US incident.

Safe next step

Check region, request ID and operation outcome before a limited retry. Preserve errors for support; do not change unrelated DNS settings or disable protection.

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RailwayPartial recovery

Needs recheck

Support notice closed; new signups still paused

Who / what is affected
station.railway.com, new Railway registrations and some nonessential features

Railway closed the separate support notice at 03:20 UTC on October 27. Its October 26 report says services are fully restored for existing users, while new signups remain paused; reopening this week is a plan. Closing the notice does not prove signups reopened or recover exposed credentials.

Safe next step

Use Railway’s restored official support/community site for affected requests. Check the separate platform and security notices for your service. Avoid repeated registrations and unofficial recovery links.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Opus 5.5 request errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Requests to Claude Opus 5.5

Claude reported an impact window of 00:23–00:34 UTC on October 24 for elevated Opus 5.5 errors and formally resolved the incident at 00:37 UTC. This is separate from the earlier multi-model incident.

Safe next step

Check the actual response or agent run before retrying failed work. Avoid duplicate tool actions or assuming that all Claude models were unavailable.

Official sourcesClaude · Opus 5.5 ↗

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Multi-model request errors resolved

Who / what is affected
Fable 5.1, Sonnet 5.5, Haiku 5.5 and Opus 5.5 fast mode

The official impact window was 23:28–23:59 UTC on October 23. The investigation expanded from Fable to the listed models, including fast-mode Opus requests. Claude formally resolved the incident at 00:11 UTC on October 24.

Safe next step

Review saved output and the actual tool/task state before retrying only failed work. A recovered service does not prove every interrupted operation completed.

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GitHub CopilotReported resolved

Needs recheck

Grok model availability in Copilot resolved

Who / what is affected
Grok 4.6 and 4.7 · Copilot products and IDE surfaces

GitHub reported reduced availability for these Copilot model options at 23:42 UTC on October 23, attributed it to an upstream model provider and formally resolved the incident at 00:23 UTC on October 24. This is not evidence of a GitHub-wide or worldwide Grok outage. The later retrospective says October 27, conflicting with the original October 23–24 notice timestamps. The earlier confirmation time is retained pending clarification; this is not counted as a new October 27 incident.

Safe next step

Check unsaved work and actual task output before retrying. Use only an organization-approved alternative model if needed; do not change API credentials solely because of this incident.

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ChatGPTReported resolved

Needs recheck

App-connection authentication incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Some ChatGPT app connections using CIMD

OpenAI investigated at 22:52 UTC on October 23. Some new connections or refreshes of existing connections failed; the authentication metadata endpoint was available again by 23:17 UTC, and recovery was confirmed at 23:43 UTC. This was not a confirmed failure of every ChatGPT app.

Safe next step

Retry the failed connection after checking its current state. Do not revoke unrelated integrations, change API keys or delete chat data solely because of this provider incident.

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OpenAI SupportReported resolved

Needs recheck

Help Center chat support incident resolved

Who / what is affected
OpenAI Help Center chat support

OpenAI reported degraded Help Center chat support at 21:30 UTC on October 23, monitored a mitigation at 21:52 and confirmed recovery at 22:02 UTC. This is separate from the earlier customer-support delay notice.

Safe next step

Use current official support channels and retain the existing case reference. Avoid duplicate requests or sending account credentials to unofficial support contacts.

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Cloudflare WorkersReported resolved

Needs recheck

Delayed, missed and duplicate Cron triggers resolved

Who / what is affected
Workers Cron Triggers

Cloudflare investigated delayed, skipped and duplicate scheduled invocations from 15:27 UTC on October 23, monitored a fix at 20:29 and resolved the incident at 20:37 UTC. A late trigger is not proof that the job never ran.

Safe next step

Inspect execution IDs and downstream effects before rerunning a job. Avoid duplicate payments, messages or other non-idempotent actions.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Eastern US network disruption resolved

Who / what is affected
Ashburn–Atlanta routes · eastern United States

Cloudflare reported latency, packet loss and intermittent service issues from 15:47 UTC on October 23. An initial improvement was followed by a recurrence; the incident was formally resolved at 18:43 UTC. The notice concerned eastern US network paths, not a global outage.

Safe next step

Retry the affected request cautiously and retain its region and error. Do not change unrelated DNS settings or disable protection to work around a provider routing incident.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Webhook notification delay resolved

Who / what is affected
Webhook notifications · all sites in the notice

Mercado Pago reported increased Webhook notification response times at 18:26 UTC on October 23 and resolution at 18:50 UTC. This is separate from the earlier IPN incident. Delayed notification does not establish that a payment failed.

Safe next step

Check the actual transaction and notification before reconciling or retrying. Do not charge a customer again solely because the Webhook is late.

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VercelReported resolved

Needs recheck

Logs and observability delay resolved

Who / what is affected
Vercel logs and observability

Vercel identified delayed logs and observability at 16:31 UTC on October 23 and resolved the incident at 17:32 UTC. The notice does not establish whether an individual application request succeeded or failed.

Safe next step

Check the actual operation before resubmitting it. Missing or late logs alone are not a reason to repeat a payment, deployment or other state-changing request.

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ZoomReported resolved

Needs recheck

Multi-service degradation resolved; Zoom Phone excluded

Who / what is affected
Affected Zoom services · Zoom Phone not affected

Zoom investigated service degradation at 16:01 UTC on October 23, identified an external vendor issue and explicitly stated that Zoom Phone was not affected. The incident was resolved at 16:48 UTC; later page metadata is not a separate incident.

Safe next step

Retry the affected Zoom function normally. Preserve the error if it persists; do not disable sign-in protection or assume every Zoom product was unavailable.

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RailwayReported resolved

Needs recheck

Builds and deployments resolved; separate restrictions remain

Who / what is affected
Railway API, dashboard, builds and deployments

Railway formally resolved the platform incident at 22:06 UTC on October 23. Builds, deployments, the API and dashboard were operating normally. New signups remained paused and station.railway.com unavailable under a separate notice; this does not close the credential-exposure investigation.

Safe next step

Check the actual deployment outcome before resubmitting. Follow official credential guidance and review provider activity; rotations completed after containment need not be repeated solely because of this update.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

IPN payment-notification delay resolved

Who / what is affected
IPN notifications · all sites in the notice

Mercado Pago reported increased IPN notification response times at 13:19 UTC on October 23 and resolution at 13:39 UTC. A delayed notification is not proof that the payment failed.

Safe next step

Check the actual transaction and notification state before reconciling or retrying. Do not charge the customer again solely because an IPN is late.

Official sourcesMercado Pago · IPN ↗

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Cloudflare AccessReported resolved

Needs recheck

Access with Microsoft Entra ID restored

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare Access using Microsoft Entra ID

Cloudflare investigated Access issues with Microsoft Entra ID from 09:01 UTC on October 23, applied a fix at 09:15 and marked the incident resolved at 09:22. This notice does not establish an Entra ID-wide outage.

Safe next step

Retry normal sign-in and preserve the error if it persists. Do not bypass Access, disable MFA or weaken the organization’s sign-in policy.

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GitHub ActionsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Actions check-result delays resolved

Who / what is affected
Workflow results shown in GitHub

GitHub’s current retrospective places delayed workflow results, check updates and logs between 07:06 and 07:27 UTC on October 23, refining the initial 07:07 notice. Delays averaged about 2 minutes and reached about 7 minutes. A throttled storage dependency caused a processing queue; the queue was fully processed by 07:27 UTC, while formal incident closure was later at 08:05 UTC. Added storage capacity and further scaling work are provider measures, not evidence that an individual workflow failed.

Safe next step

Check the run and result before rerunning workflows; delayed status does not establish a failed job.

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NotionReported resolved

Needs recheck

Notion sign-in and page access restored

Who / what is affected
Sign-in, page loading and editing

Notion declared resolution at 06:44 UTC on October 23 after access and page-loading failures. This is separate from its certificate and PHP security-review notices.

Safe next step

Retry normally. Do not delete local data or weaken certificate protections because of this incident.

Official sourcesNotion · Access ↗

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OpenAI SupportReported resolved

Needs recheck

Support-response delays resolved

Who / what is affected
Customer-support systems

OpenAI reported support-system issues at 03:41 UTC on October 23 and recovery at 05:58 UTC. This notice does not establish a ChatGPT or API-wide outage.

Safe next step

Keep your case reference, check existing replies and use official support channels rather than sending duplicate requests.

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Cloudflare SupportReported resolved

Needs recheck

Helpdesk incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Tickets, chat and urgent support

Cloudflare marked the support-provider incident resolved at 09:42 UTC on October 23, after a fix at 06:37 UTC. Earlier disruption included the portal, live chat and emergency telephone line; this was not a CDN or DNS outage.

Safe next step

Retry through official support channels and keep your existing case reference. Avoid duplicate tickets or unofficial contacts.

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Zoom MeetingsReported resolved

Needs recheck

US meeting-disconnection incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Subset of Zoom Meetings users · United States

Zoom formally resolved this October 22 incident at 17:35 UTC on October 23, after monitoring the fix. It concerned intermittent meeting disconnects for a subset of users in the US, not every Zoom service worldwide.

Safe next step

Try a normal meeting connection. If problems continue, preserve the meeting time and error for official support rather than deleting app data or changing security settings.

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SlackReported resolved

Needs recheck

Real-time connections and messaging: reported recovered

Who / what is affected
Some Slack customers · connections, message delivery and history loading

Slack's retrospective notice reports disrupted connections, delayed messages and conversation-history loading errors from 16:08 UTC on October 22, with normal service restored by 16:26. Many simultaneous reconnections briefly strained messaging services. The notice was published at 18:50 UTC; that is not the outage start. Slack plans a full investigation, so the technical trigger and preventive actions are not yet a final root-cause report. No country list is supplied.

Safe next step

Check whether a message was actually delivered before sending it again, and keep a copy of unsent work. Record the workspace, error and time if problems persist. Do not delete conversation history, reset the workspace or disable account protections to address a provider-side connection incident.

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OpenAI · ChatGPT DotsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Dots message failures: provider reports recovery

Who / what is affected
ChatGPT Dots · impact primarily on Enterprise customers

OpenAI reported failures sending messages to Dots at 18:51 UTC on October 22. Its 18:59 update said the majority of impact affected Enterprise customers and mitigation was being implemented. At 20:55 it formally marked the incident Resolved and reported full recovery of impacted services. This is not a report that every ChatGPT feature, subscription or API failed, nor confirmation of an individual message's outcome.

Safe next step

Check the conversation before resending and preserve unsent work and error details. Use only an organization-approved alternative for confidential data. Do not share credentials, delete workspaces or weaken account protections to work around this reported service issue.

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OpenAI · Ads PlatformReported resolved

Needs recheck

New ad-account administrator assignment reported resolved

Who / what is affected
New OpenAI ad accounts · Ads Manager and Ads API

At 00:07 UTC on October 23, OpenAI formally marked the new ad-account administrator-assignment incident Resolved and reported full recovery. This follows the October 22 mitigation under monitoring. The notice concerns Ads Manager and Ads API, not a general ChatGPT outage, and does not verify the role assignment or billing outcome of each individual account.

Safe next step

Keep the account ID, creation time and error, and ask official support to verify the assignment. Avoid creating duplicate ad accounts or repeating billing actions to obtain access. Never share login details, use someone else's administrator account or disable two-step verification as a workaround.

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Supabase · Logging & ObservabilityReported resolved

Needs recheck

Log drains: rollback followed by reported resolution

Who / what is affected
Some regions · routed logs for a subset of components

Supabase reported at 18:03 UTC on October 22 that log-drain customers in some regions might be missing routed logs for a subset of components. At 18:22 it said a rollback restored normal operation; at 18:50 it formally resolved the incident. Regions and affected components are not fully enumerated. This is distinct from the API Gateway and Management API incidents and does not confirm that every missing historical log was recovered.

Safe next step

Keep independent application logs, request IDs and time ranges, and check the destination before rerunning an operation. Ask official support about any remaining gaps. Do not repeat production writes just to generate logs, delete projects or weaken logging and security policies.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Management API issue resolved after monitoring

Who / what is affected
Multiple regions · Project Creation

At 10:16 UTC on October 26, Supabase confirmed resolution and operational response times. This was the October 22 API Gateway notice later renamed for Management API errors, with Project Creation listed across multiple regions; it is separate from the earlier four-region incident.

Safe next step

Check your project region, request ID and actual operation outcome before a limited retry. Avoid duplicate creation, repeated restarts or an unplanned production restore; preserve errors for official support.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

Projects update delays reported resolved

Who / what is affected
GitHub Projects · new items and project updates · other affected services recovered

GitHub formally resolved the Projects update-delay incident at 02:30 UTC on October 23, following mitigation under monitoring at 00:55. A detailed root-cause report is still pending. This closes the same incident previously covering Issues, Pull Requests and search; it does not verify every queued update or job.

Safe next step

Check whether the issue, pull request, project edit or downstream action was saved before repeating it. Keep the URL, error and time for support. Do not bypass required checks, force-push, delete repositories or rotate credentials merely to fix a delayed page or project update.

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Cloudflare Durable ObjectsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Western Europe Durable Objects errors reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Western Europe · Durable Objects and related services

Cloudflare formally resolved this Western Europe Durable Objects incident at 00:09 UTC on October 23, following the fix under monitoring on October 22. The notice concerns Durable Objects and related services in that region, not a worldwide Cloudflare outage. Recovery does not verify the outcome of each interrupted operation or establish whether data was lost.

Safe next step

Match the failing request to the affected service and region. Preserve request IDs and errors, and check whether a state-changing request completed before retrying. Do not delete stored state, disable protections or change unrelated DNS settings as a workaround.

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Cloudflare WARP / Zero TrustReported resolved

Needs recheck

WARP and Zero Trust audit-log incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
WARP API audit logs · Zero Trust · some dependent services

Cloudflare formally resolved the delayed audit-log incident at 00:10 UTC on October 23, after the October 22 fix under monitoring. The earlier report concerned some WARP API customers and dependent services, with capacity pressure in a shared PDX data pipeline. Resolution does not confirm that all missing historical records were restored, prove a breach or establish that every WARP connection failed.

Safe next step

Keep WARP and Zero Trust protections enabled. Preserve independent logs and request times, and account for gaps when reviewing activity. Ask your administrator or official support to assess missing records; do not bypass security policies simply to obtain logs.

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Cloudflare Network Error LoggingReported resolved

Needs recheck

Network Error Logging: provider reports resolution

Who / what is affected
NEL processing and analytics · not website traffic

After partial service restoration at 20:08 UTC on October 22, Cloudflare reported a fix under monitoring at 21:36 and formally resolved the NEL incident at 22:00. The original notice said affected reports would not appear in NEL analytics and explicitly excluded website traffic and other services. Resolution does not confirm that missing historical analytics were backfilled. The original undated start-time wording remains ambiguous and is not treated as a verified dated onset.

Safe next step

Retain independent browser, application and server diagnostics. Do not interpret an empty NEL chart as proof that requests had no errors, and do not change DNS or disable security protections to restore analytics.

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NetlifyReported resolved

Needs recheck

Functions and Edge Functions log delays: reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Logs from 13:58–15:35 UTC on October 22 · UI and log drains

Netlify formally resolved this incident at 20:10 UTC on October 22. Its earlier notice concerned delayed Functions and Edge Functions logs from 13:58–15:35 UTC appearing in the UI and log drains while a backlog was processed. Function and Edge Function requests were explicitly unaffected. This is separate from the earlier build-log incident; provider resolution alone does not verify that every individual log is present at your destination.

Safe next step

Preserve invocation IDs, timestamps and independent evidence of outcomes. Do not rerun production functions merely to make logs appear; check whether an operation already completed before retrying and use official support if records remain missing.

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GitHub ActionsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Actions retrospective has an unresolved recovery-time conflict

Who / what is affected
GitHub Actions · workflow and step results · repository updates

GitHub's new retrospective describes October 22 delays in workflow/step results, notifications and repository pushes, caused by overloaded event-streaming brokers. It gives an initial 13:05–15:20 UTC window, a recurrence at 16:26 and recovery beginning at 17:16, but ends with an undated '2:07'. The structured incident still closes at 15:18 UTC. These milestones cannot yet be reconciled. Its formal state remains Resolved, while this card retains the previous confirmation and source clock; no exact final recovery time is asserted.

Safe next step

Check the run ID, commit, step state and actual deployment or downstream outcome before rerunning a workflow. Preserve errors and times, and avoid duplicate production changes. Do not bypass required checks, force-push code, delete repositories or rotate credentials solely because a result is delayed.

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Supabase · Management APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Management API and supabase.com login incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Management API · ap-southeast-1 / eu-west-1 / us-east-1 / us-west-1 · Dashboard

Supabase formally resolved this incident at 13:42 UTC on October 22 after error rates and latency remained normal following mitigation. Its 12:07 UTC notice had reported mitigation and normal rates while monitoring stability. Earlier reports concerned Management API errors, dependent operations such as project creation, and supabase.com login timeouts, with four API regions and Dashboard listed. Resolution does not verify each management job, and this was not confirmation of an outage of every running database or customer application's end-user authentication. The separate EU lifecycle incident remains under monitoring; this resolution must not be applied to it.

Safe next step

Keep the project, region, operation ID, time and error details. Check whether a management job already completed before retrying. For login failures, verify the official address and status; do not disable MFA, rotate keys, delete projects or start an unplanned production restore solely to bypass this provider incident.

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PayPalReported resolved

Needs recheck

Online Checkout incident reported resolved; Global region listed

Who / what is affected
Online Checkout · PP-LIVE-110330 · official affected-region label: Global

The current official PayPal RSS item for Online Checkout PP-LIVE-110330 is timestamped 12:31 UTC on October 26. It says engineers resolved the issue and mitigated its impact, with the affected-region label Global. The body gives no exact outage start or recovery time, so the RSS timestamp does not date either event. This does not establish that every country, payment method or transaction failed, or confirm an individual payment or refund.

Safe next step

Check the payment ID and actual status in the official PayPal account or approved integration before trying again or asking a customer to pay again. Reconcile completed, pending and failed transactions separately. Preserve receipts and errors; avoid duplicate charges, refunds or orders based only on a timed-out checkout screen.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Connector-error incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
claude.ai / Claude Cowork · connectors · affected countries not specified

Claude reported elevated connector errors at 03:50 UTC on October 22, deployed a fix under monitoring at 07:28 UTC and explicitly marked the claude.ai / Claude Cowork incident resolved at 08:07 UTC. This supersedes the earlier investigation notice. It does not prove completion of every connector action or establish that all APIs or Claude Code sessions were unavailable. A common cause with Notion's separate MCP incident is not confirmed.

Safe next step

Keep the connector name, task ID, time and error details. Check the connected service and whether an action completed before retrying. Do not delete working connections, rotate credentials or broaden permissions solely because of this provider notice; preserve unsaved work and follow your organization's access policy.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

EU project lifecycle incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
EU region in the notice · Management API eu-west-1 component · create / restore / pause

At 15:56 UTC on October 22, Supabase formally marked this EU project lifecycle incident Resolved after error rates remained normal following mitigation. The earlier notice reported errors since 23:00 UTC on October 21, with the eu-west-1 Management API component listed. Provider recovery does not verify the outcome of every affected creation, restore or pause job. This remains separate from the October 21 all-regions incident, the earlier multi-region Management API report and the new API gateway demand incident; do not infer a common cause or an outage of all running databases.

Safe next step

Check the project ID, region and lifecycle job state before retrying creation, pausing or restoration. Keep errors and timestamps for official support. Do not delete projects, issue repeated restarts or start an unplanned production restore as a workaround; follow an assessed recovery plan.

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Notion MCPReported resolved

Needs recheck

Notion MCP query_data_source in Claude clients reported available again

Who / what is affected
Notion MCP · query_data_source tool · Claude clients

Notion reported the MCP query_data_source tool temporarily unavailable in Claude clients at 03:23 UTC on October 22 and explicitly marked the issue resolved at 04:42 UTC, saying the tool is available again. This does not establish an outage of all Notion, all MCP tools or every Claude connector, or confirm completion of each interrupted query. It is separate from the earlier infrastructure migration and Claude's connector-error report; a common cause is not confirmed.

Safe next step

Keep the query, tool name, time and error details. Check the result and any downstream task before retrying. Do not recreate connections, rotate integration tokens or broaden workspace permissions solely because of this incident; use only access already authorized for the data source.

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OpenAI · ChatGPT / Responses APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

ChatGPT conversation and Responses API incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Conversations / Responses API · India, Japan and Korea named in revised updates

OpenAI explicitly reported full recovery and marked this incident resolved at 08:50 UTC on October 22, following investigation at 02:18 UTC and mitigation under monitoring at 02:42 UTC. The revised title refers to ChatGPT conversations and Responses API errors; revised earlier updates name users in India, Japan and Korea. This replaces the earlier conversion-failures wording, not a newly separate incident. It does not confirm a worldwide outage or completion of each interrupted conversation or API operation.

Safe next step

Preserve prompts, partial outputs, error responses and request IDs. Check existing conversations and completed operations before retrying a write or billable API request; repeat only failed work. Do not delete conversations, rotate API keys or move restricted data to an unapproved service solely because of this provider incident.

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Mercado Pago · Checkout ProReported resolved

Needs recheck

Checkout Pro performance incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Online payments · Checkout Pro · countries not specified in the notice

Mercado Pago reported degraded Checkout Pro performance at 01:59 UTC on October 22 and formally marked the incident Resolved at 02:19 UTC. The notice does not name affected countries or establish failures in every payment method. This is separate from the Argentina in-store QR incident and does not prove that each payment, refund or notification completed.

Safe next step

Check the payment ID and its actual status in the account or approved integration before asking a customer to pay again. Reconcile completed, pending and failed transactions separately, and keep the error and time. Avoid repeated charges, duplicate refunds or recreating orders merely because the checkout page previously failed or timed out.

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Mercado Pago · Argentina QRReported resolved

Needs recheck

Argentina: new in-store QR payment incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Argentina (MLA) · in-store QR payments

Mercado Pago reported increased declines for in-store QR payments in Argentina at 01:52 UTC on October 22 and marked the incident Resolved at 02:16 UTC, corresponding to 22:52–23:16 on October 21 in Argentina. This is a separate report from the October 19 QR and October 22 UTC Checkout Pro incidents, not proof of a continuous outage or failures in all payment methods or countries.

Safe next step

Confirm the transaction's actual status with its payment ID before trying again or switching payment methods. A declined or timed-out screen alone does not prove that no charge occurred. Preserve receipts and error details, reconcile pending payments and avoid repeated charges or duplicate refunds.

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Cloudflare · Portland / SeattleReported resolved

Needs recheck

Portland and Seattle congestion incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
United States · Portland (PDX) / Seattle (SEA) facilities

Cloudflare investigated network congestion in Portland and Seattle at 00:23 UTC on October 22, reported a fix under monitoring at 01:08 UTC and formally marked the incident Resolved at 02:09 UTC. The notice names these facilities and regional impact, not an outage of every connection in the northwestern US or Cloudflare worldwide. It does not confirm completion of each interrupted application request.

Safe next step

Compare the URL, error, region and time with the provider notice and your own logs. Before repeating a state-changing request, check whether it already completed. Do not reinstall applications, disable security controls or change DNS solely because of this regional provider incident.

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Cloudflare · Durable ObjectsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Lisbon: Durable Objects incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Lisbon (LIS), Portugal · Durable Objects handled by this facility

Cloudflare formally marked this Lisbon Durable Objects incident Resolved at 00:35 UTC on October 22, after the investigation notice at 23:50 UTC on October 21. The resolution concerns this specific incident, not proof that every Lisbon facility service or interrupted operation is healthy or completed. The notice does not establish an outage across Portugal or all Durable Objects locations and remains separate from Eastern North America.

Safe next step

Record the request ID, error, location and time, and compare them with application logs and the current official notice. Check whether a state-changing operation completed before retrying, using normal duplicate-prevention safeguards. Do not reset object state, delete storage or change DNS merely to bypass this regional provider issue.

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ClaudeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Claude request-error incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Notice names Claude Fable 5 · lists claude.ai, API, Claude Code and Cowork

Claude investigated elevated errors for Claude Fable 5 at 19:49 UTC on October 21 and marked the incident Resolved at 20:29 UTC. The notice lists claude.ai, the Claude API, Claude Code and Claude Cowork. Its closing text refers to other Claude models, without naming them; this does not establish that every model, request or feature failed. Provider recovery does not verify each interrupted operation.

Safe next step

Preserve prompts, local changes, partial outputs and request IDs. In an agent workflow, check file changes, command results and completed actions before resuming so that writes or deployments are not duplicated. Do not delete project data or move restricted data to an unapproved service merely to bypass a provider error.

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Cloudflare · R2 / Durable ObjectsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Eastern North America: R2 and Durable Objects errors reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Eastern North America (ENAM) · some R2 / Durable Objects customers

Cloudflare revised the October 21 error window for some R2 and Durable Objects customers in Eastern North America to approximately 19:02–19:05 UTC, replacing its earlier 19:19–19:28 report. The revised timeline shows a resolved entry at 19:05 UTC and a later resolution notice and last update at 21:21 UTC. The incident remains Resolved; these times are not evidence of a continuous outage between the entries or completion of every failed write.

Safe next step

Match the region, request ID and time with application logs. Check whether an object write or state-changing operation completed before retrying it, using the application's normal duplicate-prevention safeguards. Do not delete storage, reset object state or change DNS solely because of this regional incident.

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BitbucketReported resolved

Needs recheck

Bitbucket availability incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Bitbucket · Git over SSH/HTTPS · website/API · Pipelines and related services

Bitbucket investigated a disruption at 17:22 UTC on October 21, reported recovery under monitoring at 17:51 UTC, and formally marked the incident Resolved at 18:01 UTC with normal service for affected customers. The notice covers several Git, web and automation components. Provider recovery does not prove that each interrupted push, pipeline or webhook delivery completed.

Safe next step

Preserve local commits and unpushed work. Check the remote branch, commit and pipeline or delivery ID before retrying. Do not delete the repository, discard changes or repeatedly trigger deployments solely because an earlier request timed out.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

India: increased latency incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
India · some traffic · CDN/Cache

Cloudflare reported increased latency affecting some traffic in India at 16:42 UTC on October 21, implemented a fix and moved to monitoring at 18:51 UTC, and formally marked the incident Resolved at 19:57 UTC. The notice lists CDN/Cache. It does not describe all Indian connections failing or a worldwide outage, and is separate from scheduled Mumbai maintenance.

Safe next step

Record the affected URL, region, time and error or latency details. Compare them with the official notice before changing the site or network. Do not delete site data, disable security controls or change DNS simply to bypass a reported provider latency issue.

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OpenAI · gpt-5.6-luna APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

gpt-5.6-luna API error incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
gpt-5.6-luna API requests · Chat Completions / Responses

OpenAI reported elevated gpt-5.6-luna API errors at 15:34 UTC on October 21, moved to monitoring at 15:47 UTC and explicitly reported full recovery of impacted services at 16:44 UTC. The page lists Chat Completions and Responses. This is separate from the FedRAMP incident, not proof that every model or ChatGPT was unavailable or that each request completed.

Safe next step

Keep request IDs, error responses and partial outputs. Check whether work already completed before retrying a write or billable request, and retry only the failed operation. Do not rotate API keys or delete project data solely because of this provider incident.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Project creation, pausing and restoration incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
All regions in the notice · project lifecycle operations

Supabase investigated project lifecycle failures in all regions at 15:36 UTC on October 21, reported a fix and monitoring at 16:12 UTC, and explicitly confirmed normal operations and resolution at 16:51 UTC. The notice concerns operations such as creating, pausing and restoring projects, not a confirmed outage of every running database. It does not verify the result of each individual job.

Safe next step

Check the project ID and existing job state before retrying creation, pausing or restoration. Keep error details and consult official support if a job is still pending. Do not create duplicate projects or start an unplanned production restore as a workaround; follow an assessed recovery plan.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

Pull Requests, Actions and webhook incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Pull Requests / Actions / Webhooks · audit-log event backlog

At 19:22 UTC on October 21, GitHub reported that Pull Request updates, Actions and webhook deliveries had recovered and audit-log delays were below 40 minutes, within its healthy threshold, while the remaining backlog continued to process. It then formally marked the incident Resolved. This is not confirmation of zero audit-log delay or completion of every operation or audit event. A detailed root-cause analysis is still pending.

Safe next step

Check Pull Request, workflow and delivery IDs before retrying, and reconcile audit events after the backlog clears. Missing or delayed audit events do not prove that an action never happened. Avoid duplicate merges, deployments or redelivery. Do not disable auditing, rotate secrets or broaden repository permissions solely because events are delayed.

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Jira CloudReported resolved

Needs recheck

Project-sidebar and navigation incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Jira / JSM / JPD / JWM · project sidebar and navigation

At 15:45 UTC on October 21, Atlassian formally marked the project-sidebar and navigation incident Resolved and reported normal operation for affected customers. The follow-up lists Jira, JSM, JPD and JWM. This supersedes the earlier Monitoring notice, but does not prove that each interrupted edit or operation was saved or completed.

Safe next step

Preserve unsaved issue edits and comments. If available, use a known issue or project URL that you already have permission to access, and check whether changes were saved before resubmitting them. Do not change project permissions or delete local data simply to repair a missing navigation menu.

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OpenAI · FedRAMPReported resolved

Needs recheck

FedRAMP Astra/Sol API error incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
OpenAI FedRAMP environment · Astra / Sol API errors

OpenAI explicitly reported full recovery of the affected FedRAMP Astra/Sol services and marked the incident Resolved at 19:34 UTC on October 21. This follows mitigation and Monitoring displayed at 16:46 UTC in the revised timeline. The notice concerns the FedRAMP environment, not a general ChatGPT, Codex or public API outage, and does not verify the result of each individual request.

Safe next step

Check the approved environment and model, and preserve request IDs and error details. Confirm whether an operation completed before retrying a write or billable request. Do not move regulated or restricted data to a consumer service or another endpoint simply to bypass the incident; use only a fallback approved by your organization.

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NetlifyReported resolved

Needs recheck

Build-log delay incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Build Pipeline · Netlify Application UI · log visibility

Netlify reported completed build-log backlog processing at 09:35 UTC on October 22 and expected consistent access to historical and new logs while monitoring for recurrence. Its revised timeline shows a formal Resolved notice at 10:12 UTC; that entry was created at 10:28 UTC and last edited at 10:28:54 UTC. These provider report times are distinct from the earlier estimated deadlines and do not prove completion of each build, deployment or write. The notice concerns log availability, not confirmation that all hosted sites had been offline.

Safe next step

Check the deploy status and result separately from whether its logs have appeared. Keep the deploy ID, commit and error details. Check official updates before canceling or repeatedly triggering a production build; missing logs alone are not a reason to roll back a working deployment or repeat automated actions.

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OpenAI · ChatGPT / Codex / APIsReported resolved

Needs recheck

ChatGPT, Codex and API performance incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
ChatGPT features · Codex Web / API / CLI · multiple API components

OpenAI's revised official timeline displays investigation at 02:26 UTC on October 21, mitigation and monitoring at 02:48 UTC, and full recovery of impacted services at 03:28 UTC. These displayed times differ from the earlier version of the notice. The page lists ChatGPT, Codex and multiple API features. This does not establish that every model or request was completely unavailable, or that each interrupted chat, agent run or API operation completed.

Safe next step

Preserve unsaved prompts, work and code changes. Check the conversation, task history and outputs before rerunning work, especially operations that can write data or incur charges. Retry only the failed operation after checking its state. Do not rotate API keys or delete local project data solely because of this provider incident.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

us-east-2 restarting-state incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
us-east-2 · some projects in the restarting state

The incident affected some us-east-2 projects stuck in the restarting state. At 04:47 UTC on October 21, Supabase said the fix had fully rolled out and projects were no longer stuck. At 05:39 UTC it explicitly resolved the incident, reporting all affected projects fixed and no recurrence. Provider recovery does not prove that each interrupted client operation, write or job completed. The notice does not establish a worldwide outage or data loss.

Safe next step

Check the project ID, region and current state against the official notice. Avoid repeatedly restarting, deleting or recreating the project as a workaround. Save error details and timestamps for official support, and check whether writes or jobs already completed before retrying them. Use an assessed recovery plan rather than an unplanned production restore.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Brazil: separate evening in-store QR incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Brazil (MLB) · in-store QR payment declines · October 20, 22:02–22:35 UTC

Mercado Pago reported increased in-store QR payment declines in Brazil at 22:02 UTC on October 20 and explicitly marked this incident resolved at 22:35 UTC (19:02–19:35 in Brasília). This is separate from the earlier 03:32–03:55 UTC incident that day, not proof of a continuous all-day outage. It does not establish failures in every payment method or country, or verify each transaction.

Safe next step

Check the payment ID, time and final status in the official account before retrying or asking a customer to pay again. Reconcile the merchant and customer records to avoid duplicate charges. Do not treat a service recovery notice as proof that an individual payment succeeded or failed.

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NotionReported resolved

Needs recheck

Notion closes its precautionary certificate status notice

Who / what is affected
eMudhra certificate authority · preventative security notice · not an outage report

On October 26 Notion marked this notice resolved and directed further updates to its Security Advisories page. The earlier update said it had proactively updated affected software and certificate bundles and found no evidence of compromise connected with the eMudhra issue. This was preventative security work, not proof of a Notion outage or a statement that every other application has the required certificate protection.

Safe next step

Use only official Notion app updates and your organization's IT guidance. If a certificate warning appears, do not bypass it, disable certificate verification or install untrusted certificates. Preserve unsynced work and consult official support or IT if access fails; do not treat this notice alone as evidence of an account breach.

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NotionReported resolved

Needs recheck

Installing other members' connections: resolution reported

Who / what is affected
Workspace-scoped connections · installation by someone other than the creator

At 14:43 UTC on October 21, Notion explicitly marked the issue installing connections created by other workspace members resolved. The earlier problem made those connections absent from Browse; creators could still install their own. This recovery concerns that installation issue, not confirmation that every existing integration works or that the separate infrastructure migration has finished.

Safe next step

Confirm who created the connection and whether it is workspace-scoped, then check the official update or contact your workspace administrator. Do not rotate tokens, recreate integrations, remove working connections or broaden permissions solely to make an item appear; those changes can create duplicates or disrupt existing access.

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Cloudflare Bot ManagementReported resolved

Needs recheck

Verified-bot categorization incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Bot Management · limited number of verified bots · categorization, not confirmed blocking

Cloudflare reported incorrect traffic categorization involving a limited number of verified bots at 19:35 UTC on October 20 and explicitly marked the incident resolved at 20:16 UTC. The notice concerns Bot Management categorization; it does not prove that every crawler was blocked, that all automated traffic was malicious, or that your site's rules caused the issue.

Safe next step

Compare request times and existing Bot Management or security-event records. Verify the actual allow, challenge or block action before attributing an access failure to this notice. Do not disable bot protection, allow all automated traffic or change country-blocking rules solely because of this resolved report.

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Google CloudReported resolved

Needs recheck

London incident report corrects the previously conflicting conversion

Who / what is affected
London · europe-west2-b zone · regional errors in europe-west2

Google's November 4 report now pairs 03:13 US/Pacific with 11:13 BST, correcting the previously held mismatch. It attributes the October 20 europe-west2-b outage to an external cable fault and generator-control misconfiguration. Its 06:00–12:08 UTC main-impact window ends with 99.5% of GCE VMs healthy; individual product tails recovered later, including final affected AlloyDB zonal primaries at 15:28 UTC. This current source supports renewing the card's confirmation. Service recovery does not prove every interrupted job completed.

Safe next step

Match the project, region, zone and service to the notice. Check logs and whether writes or jobs already completed before retrying. If still affected, open an official support case with the workload ID, error and time. Do not move or recreate production workloads solely on this notice; use an assessed failover plan rather than disabling protections or making unrelated DNS changes.

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NetlifyReported resolved

Needs recheck

Agent Runner failures: recovery reported

Who / what is affected
Agent Runners · no specific countries named

Netlify reported increased Agent Runner failures at 07:47 UTC on October 20, moved to monitoring at 08:04 UTC and marked the incident resolved at 08:55 UTC. The notice concerns Agent Runners, not a confirmed outage of every Netlify-hosted site. Provider recovery does not confirm that each interrupted run completed.

Safe next step

Check the run history, logs and any generated changes before restarting a task to avoid duplicate actions. Preserve your work and keep the run ID, error and time for official support if failures continue. Do not broaden permissions or disable security controls as a workaround.

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Cloudflare Access · Zero TrustReported resolved

Needs recheck

Zero Trust connectivity and Access API incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Access API · Gateway traffic with identity policies · Dashboard

Cloudflare reported the Access API fully restored at 06:14 UTC on October 20 and marked this Zero Trust connectivity incident resolved at 06:32 UTC. It had previously confirmed recovery of Access logins and Secure Web Gateway connectivity. The incident affected Gateway traffic with identity policies and the Dashboard. This was a separate incident from the Gemini DLP enforcement issue; provider recovery does not confirm that each interrupted API operation completed.

Safe next step

Check whether the failure involves an Access API operation or a user login. Verify the current configuration before retrying API writes to avoid duplicate changes; give your IT team the error and time if problems continue. Do not remove identity policies, bypass Gateway, disable protections or make unrelated DNS changes.

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

October 20 Brazil in-store QR payment incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Brazil (MLB) · in-store QR payments · separate October 20 report

Mercado Pago reported increased in-store QR payment declines in Brazil at 03:32 UTC on October 20 and marked the incident resolved at 03:55 UTC (00:32–00:55 in Brasília). This is separate from the October 19 reports and does not establish failures in every payment method or country, or verify each transaction.

Safe next step

Check the transaction status and merchant receipt before retrying. Do not pay again solely because a notification is missing. If the result is unclear, contact the merchant or official support to avoid duplicate charges; do not reset payment equipment solely because of this resolved notice.

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BoxReported resolved

Needs recheck

Box API, file transfers and Sign: recovery reported

Who / what is affected
Content API · web uploads/downloads · Box Sign · no specific countries named

Box marked this incident Resolved at 03:47 UTC on October 20 after monitoring and reported that service functionality had been restored. The incident concerned Content API, web uploads/downloads and Box Sign. This provider recovery report does not confirm that every interrupted file transfer, API write or signature request completed.

Safe next step

Preserve local files and check whether an upload, API operation or signature request already completed before retrying. Avoid duplicate files or repeated signature invitations. Keep the error and time for official support; do not delete stored content or disable security controls as a workaround.

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Cloudflare Gateway · DLPReported resolved

Needs recheck

Gemini Gateway controls and DLP incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare Gateway application controls · DLP prompt logging and enforcement · certain Google Gemini traffic

Cloudflare explicitly marked this incident resolved at 22:46 UTC on October 20. It concerned Gateway application controls and DLP inspection for certain Google Gemini traffic, including prompt logging and enforcement. The earlier October 19 notice described a Gateway fix rolling out while DLP recovery continued; the new resolution notice supersedes that status. This is not a report of a general Gemini outage or confirmed data loss, and does not verify every organization's individual policy configuration.

Safe next step

If your organization relies on these controls, avoid submitting sensitive data through potentially affected Gemini workflows until your administrator verifies the required protections. Keep the relevant policy details and diagnostic timestamps. Do not bypass Gateway, disable DLP or relax security rules as a workaround.

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SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Support-ticket creation incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Supabase · support form and ticket creation for some customers

Supabase identified errors creating support tickets for some customers at 17:13 UTC on October 19. It reported a deployed fix and normal ticket creation at 17:36 UTC, then explicitly marked the incident resolved at 18:13 UTC after ticket creation remained normal. This concerns the support form, not a confirmed outage of existing databases or Realtime, and does not verify each individual ticket.

Safe next step

Check for a ticket confirmation before resubmitting so you do not open duplicates. Keep the error message and time, without including credentials. Do not reset a database, rotate keys or change project settings solely because of this support-form notice.

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GitHubReported resolved

Needs recheck

October 19 Actions incident: retrospective adds impact and recovery details

Who / what is affected
Actions · Pages · Actions-generated webhooks · live updates and code search for part of the incident

GitHub expanded its October 19 incident report on October 22, describing impact from 15:24 to 16:52 UTC on October 19; the initial investigation notice was at 15:49. Actions status, logs and checks, Pages deployments and Actions-generated webhooks were delayed, with live updates and code search also affected for part of the period. GitHub reports no data loss. A connection retry surge overloaded a shared network link; mitigation reduced connections and moved a service away from affected cache servers. The initial connection timeouts remain under investigation. This retrospective is not a new outage or proof that each job succeeded; the separate October 22 Actions-results incident remains under investigation.

Safe next step

Check workflow run status, deployment history and webhook delivery records before retrying. Confirm whether a production deployment or downstream action already ran to avoid duplicate changes. Do not force-push code, reset repositories or rotate credentials solely because of this resolved incident.

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OpenAI · ChatGPT & APIReported resolved

Needs recheck

File-download error incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
OpenAI · file-related ChatGPT and API components

OpenAI reported elevated errors at 13:31 UTC on October 19 and marked its File Download errors incident resolved at 14:14 UTC. The official page lists API Responses, Images and Files, plus ChatGPT file uploads and image generation. This does not establish that every request or model was unavailable, or that an interrupted file operation completed.

Safe next step

Keep any existing files and results. Check whether the operation completed before retrying, especially for API jobs that may create duplicate work or charges. Do not delete conversation data or disable browser protection solely because of this resolved notice.

Source update:

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Two Brazil in-store QR incidents reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Brazil (MLB) · in-store QR payments · two separate reports

Mercado Pago published two separate reports of increased in-store QR payment declines in Brazil on October 19: 12:07–12:20 UTC and 12:57–13:00 UTC (09:07–09:20 and 09:57–10:00 in Brasília). Both were explicitly marked resolved. These are not evidence of a continuous outage between the reports, or of failures in every payment method or country.

Safe next step

Check each transaction and the merchant receipt before retrying a payment. If the result is unclear, contact the merchant or official support to avoid duplicate charges. Do not reset payment equipment solely because of these resolved notices.

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Cloudflare DNSReported resolved

Needs recheck

DNS record-update delay reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare DNS record updates · propagation delays

Cloudflare investigated delays in propagating updates to DNS records from 11:28 UTC on October 19 and marked the incident resolved at 11:50 UTC. The notice concerned record updates, not a confirmed outage of all DNS lookups. Provider recovery does not prove that every resolver or client already has the latest record.

Safe next step

Compare saved record values with authoritative DNS and your deployment records. Respect the record's cache lifetime if old answers persist; do not repeatedly rewrite records or change nameservers solely because of this resolved notice.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Argentina in-store QR payment incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Argentina (MLA) · in-store QR payments

Mercado Pago reported increased declines for in-store QR payments in Argentina at 10:02 UTC and marked the incident resolved at 11:50 UTC on October 19 (07:02–08:50 in Argentina). The report did not establish that every payment method or other countries were affected. A recovery notice does not verify each individual transaction.

Safe next step

Check the transaction status and merchant receipt before retrying. If the result is unclear, contact the merchant or official support to avoid duplicate charges; do not reset payment equipment solely because of this notice.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Notion AgentReported resolved

Needs recheck

Notion Agent incomplete-request incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Notion Agent · requests stopping before completion

Notion marked the issue causing some Agent requests to stop before completion resolved at 15:51 UTC on October 18 and reported normal Agent operation. This does not confirm that every interrupted task completed. The earlier real-time/API incident and planned October 20 migration remain separate.

Safe next step

Keep your prompt and any partial results. Check what the agent already changed before retrying a task to avoid duplicate work; do not clear local data or reset the workspace.

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Cloudflare NetworkReported resolved

Needs recheck

Virginia and Ohio latency incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
United States · Ashburn (IAD) and Columbus (CMH) · October 18, 08:00–08:50 UTC

Cloudflare retrospectively reported increased latency and timeouts on external-provider peering links in IAD and CMH. It says services fully normalized after routing advertisements were restored. The reported impact window ended at 08:50 UTC; the notice was published at 09:37 UTC, not the start of a new outage.

Safe next step

Compare your error times and traffic location with the reported window. Keep request identifiers for support if problems continue; do not change DNS or redeploy solely because of this resolved report.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Uruguay Point payment-rejection incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Uruguay (MLU) · Point payments

Mercado Pago marked the Point payment-rejection incident in Uruguay resolved at 02:57 UTC on October 18 (23:57 in Uruguay on October 17). The initial report was posted at 01:38 UTC. This incident did not establish that all payment methods or countries were affected; the recovery notice does not verify each individual transaction.

Safe next step

Check the transaction status and merchant receipt before retrying. If the result is unclear, contact the merchant or official support to avoid duplicate charges; do not reset the terminal solely because of this notice.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
SupabaseReported resolved

Needs recheck

Supabase project creation and unpausing restored in ap-northeast-1

Who / what is affected
ap-northeast-1 · creating projects and resuming paused projects

Supabase reported errors when creating or unpausing projects in this region during an upstream provider outage. At 07:49 UTC on October 17, it confirmed full restoration and re-enabled both operations. This notice does not establish that all running databases or all regions were unavailable.

Safe next step

Check the project's current state before retrying creation or unpausing. Keep error details for support if it still fails; do not delete or recreate a project, or move regions, solely because of this resolved incident.

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NetlifyReported resolved

Needs recheck

Netlify build errors affecting the CSP extension resolved

Who / what is affected
Build Pipeline · builds using the CSP extension

Netlify identified a third-party service issue affecting builds that use the CSP extension. It released a fix, monitored the results and marked the incident resolved at 05:55 UTC on October 17. This report does not establish an outage of all hosted sites.

Safe next step

Retry an affected build normally and check the build log. If errors continue, save the build ID and error for Netlify support; do not remove security headers or disable CSP as a workaround.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

October 17 IPN and Webhook notification delays resolved

Who / what is affected
Payment notifications · all sites in the provider notices

Mercado Pago reported new IPN and Webhook payment notification delays on October 17. It marked Webhook notifications resolved at 03:50 UTC and IPN at 04:00 UTC. These are separate from the October 15–16 incidents; a delayed notification does not by itself mean a payment failed.

Safe next step

Check the transaction in the official account before retrying a payment or fulfilling an order. Reconcile delayed notifications with transaction records to avoid duplicate charges or fulfillment.

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare FedRAMP Dashboard and Access incident resolved

Who / what is affected
FedRAMP Dashboard · applications protected by FedRAMP Access

Cloudflare marked this incident resolved at 19:09 UTC on October 16. Its follow-up included login failures in the FedRAMP Dashboard and applications protected by FedRAMP Access. Cached-file delivery through the CDN and other Edge security features were not affected by this incident.

Safe next step

Retry the affected dashboard or protected application normally. If access still fails, keep the error and time for your IT team or official support; do not change DNS or disable access controls.

Source update:

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Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Later October 16 IPN notification delay resolved

Who / what is affected
IPN payment notifications · all sites in the provider notice

Mercado Pago reported another IPN notification delay at 13:45 UTC and marked it resolved at 14:01 UTC on October 16. This is a separate incident from the earlier IPN/Webhook reports; a delayed notification does not by itself prove that a payment failed.

Safe next step

Check the transaction in the official account before retrying a payment or fulfilling an order. Reconcile delayed notifications with transaction records to avoid duplicate charges or fulfillment.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Brazil in-store QR payment incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Brazil (MLB) · in-store QR payments

Mercado Pago reported increased declines for in-store QR payments in Brazil and marked the incident resolved at 13:16 UTC on October 16. This was separate from the Uruguay QR and Chile Point incidents; it was not a report of all payment methods failing.

Safe next step

Check the transaction status and merchant receipt before trying again. Do not repeat a payment solely because its notification is missing; contact official support if the result remains unclear.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Chile Point payment-approval incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Chile (MLC) · Point payments

Mercado Pago reported a payment-approval anomaly affecting Point in Chile and marked it resolved at 11:49 UTC on October 16. The report does not establish a worldwide payment outage.

Safe next step

Check the transaction status and receipt before retrying a payment. If the result is unclear, contact the merchant or official support to avoid duplicate charges.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare Dashboard signup issue resolved

Who / what is affected
Dashboard · account signup for some users

Cloudflare reported that some users could not sign up to its Dashboard. The incident was marked resolved at 11:24 UTC on October 16; this report was about signup, not a general website-delivery outage.

Safe next step

Retry signup through the official Dashboard. If an account may already exist, use its sign-in or recovery flow before creating another account; no DNS change is needed for this signup issue.

Source update:

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CloudflareReported resolved

Needs recheck

Cloudflare Access post-login issue resolved

Who / what is affected
Cloudflare Access · after login

Cloudflare investigated problems with Access after login and marked the incident resolved at 09:59 UTC on October 16. The notice did not specify affected countries or establish a general Internet outage.

Safe next step

Retry the protected application normally. If access still fails, give your IT administrator the error and time; do not disable Access policies or bypass your organization's controls.

Source update:

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Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Uruguay in-store QR payment incident resolved

Who / what is affected
Uruguay (MLU) · in-store QR payments

Mercado Pago reported increased declines for in-store QR payments in Uruguay and marked the incident resolved at 04:51 UTC on October 16. This was a regional payment issue, not a worldwide outage.

Safe next step

Check the payment status and merchant receipt before retrying. Do not pay again solely because a notification is missing; avoid duplicate charges.

Source update:

Checked:

Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

October 16 IPN and Webhook notification delays resolved

Who / what is affected
Payment notifications · provider labels both reports all sites

Mercado Pago marked separate October 16 notification delays resolved: Webhooks at 03:42 UTC and IPN at 03:53 UTC. These are new reports, separate from the October 15 IPN incident; notification delays alone do not establish failed payments.

Safe next step

Reconcile notifications against payment records before retrying or marking orders unpaid. Use duplicate-safe processing and do not automatically repeat a charge.

Source update:

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Cloudflare WorkersReported resolved

Needs recheck

Workers Cron Triggers incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Workers Cron Triggers · a subset of customers

Cloudflare reports that Workers Cron Triggers have stabilized and marks this incident resolved. The earlier missed scheduled triggers affected a subset of customers; check your own jobs for missed or duplicated work.

Safe next step

Check scheduled-run history and logs before manually rerunning a job. Confirm whether previous work completed and use duplicate-safe retries; do not replay payments or other irreversible tasks blindly.

Official sourcesCloudflare Status ↗

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Reported status at last check
Mercado PagoReported resolved

Needs recheck

Payment notification delays

Who / what is affected
IPN payment notifications · provider labels all sites

Mercado Pago has marked this IPN notification incident resolved. The earlier delay did not establish that payments themselves had failed; individual transactions still need to be checked separately.

Safe next step

Verify the individual payment in the official account or authorized integration before retrying a charge or fulfilling an order. A missing notification is not proof of non-payment.

Official sourcesMercado Pago Status ↗

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Cloudflare NetworkReported resolved

Needs recheck

Latency and errors at two eastern North American facilities

Who / what is affected
Traffic handled by Ashburn (IAD) and Newark (EWR)

Cloudflare has marked the network performance incident at Ashburn and Newark resolved. The report concerned traffic handled by these facilities, not a worldwide outage.

Safe next step

Compare error times and the affected traffic path with the official notice. Preserve request identifiers for support; avoid unrelated DNS changes or repeated deployments.

Official sourcesCloudflare Status ↗

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Reported status at last check
Cloudflare Durable ObjectsReported resolved

Needs recheck

Durable Objects errors in DEN

Who / what is affected
DEN · Durable Objects and dependent services

Cloudflare has explicitly marked the DEN Durable Objects incident resolved. The reported errors affected Durable Objects and dependent services in DEN, not every dependent service worldwide.

Safe next step

Check whether the failing operation uses the affected service and location. Keep error identifiers and verify prior writes before retrying operations that could create duplicates.

Official sourcesCloudflare Status ↗

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Cloudflare PagesReported resolved

Needs recheck

pages.dev access issue in Norway

Who / what is affected
Norway · pages.dev subdomains

Cloudflare has marked this pages.dev access incident in Norway resolved. Custom domains were not affected by this report.

Safe next step

Compare the visitor’s region and hostname with this notice. Avoid unrelated DNS changes; check the official update before retrying deployment.

Official sourcesCloudflare Status ↗

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OpenAIReported resolved

Needs recheck

Compliance API cost-data delay reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Organization cost reporting · not ChatGPT availability

OpenAI has marked the Compliance API cost-data delay resolved. This incident concerned organization cost reporting, not API request processing or ChatGPT availability.

Safe next step

Recheck the affected reporting periods and reconcile totals in the official account. A provider recovery notice does not validate every individual bill or report.

Official sourcesOpenAI Status ↗

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NotionReported resolved

Needs recheck

Infrastructure migration completed; incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Real-time updates · API/MCP · Notion AI screenshots · agents · workspace members

At 18:56 UTC on October 21, Notion explicitly confirmed that its infrastructure migration had completed without customer impact, service remained stable and this incident was resolved. This supersedes the earlier migration-in-progress notice covering real-time updates, API/MCP, Notion AI screenshots, agents and workspace members. It does not erase the earlier disruptions or prove that each queued change or agent run completed; the report time is not an exact migration-completion time.

Safe next step

Preserve unsynced work. Confirm whether a write reached the workspace before repeating it; avoid clearing local data while edits are pending.

Official sourcesNotion Status ↗

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Supabase RealtimeReported resolved

Needs recheck

Realtime latency incident reported resolved

Who / what is affected
Realtime presence and channel joins

Supabase marked this incident resolved. It was not a report of a complete database outage.

Safe next step

If your app still fails, check its subscriptions and logs separately. A resolved provider incident does not prove every client has recovered.

Official sourcesSupabase Status ↗

Source update:

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Reported status at last check

Check the match before you change anything

1 · Match the symptom

Compare the exact error, service feature, country, app version and timing. A nearby incident may be unrelated to your problem.

2 · Protect your work

Keep a copy of unsynced work and note the error and time. Avoid repeated payment attempts, destructive resets or security changes while the cause is unclear.

3 · Choose the next check

Use the live monitor for provider reports. If there is no matching report, check a second device or network only where safe and permitted; absence of a report is not proof of normal service.

How this desk works

We select official provider status notices, release-health records and release notes, then distinguish reported impact from our suggested next step. We do not infer global downtime from one region, a resolved incident from a missing feed entry, or device recovery from an available update. Public reports cannot confirm the health of your particular account or tenant.

The live monitor polls official sources separately, typically every 5 minutes where supported. These pages add context on a 6-hour review target. Collection failures and overdue reviews are not reported as healthy service.

Coverage starts with selected cloud, collaboration, Windows and browser issues relevant to WiseChecker readers. This is not a complete list of every service, region or security vulnerability. For urgent decisions, use the provider’s current notice and your organization’s guidance.

Official links may be in English; the summaries and guidance here are localized.